G.R. No. L-1418. August 30, 1947
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF NUEVA ECIJA, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA AND FELICIANO VALDERAMA, RESPONDENTS.
HILADO, J.:
Simbulan (alias Peping), Enting, Eugenio (alias Geniong Dusa), and
Arsenio (alias Bulahap) were charged in an information filed with the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija by the Provincial Fiscal as follows:
“That on or about the 8th day of October, 1946, in the municipality of Gapan,
province of Nueva Ecija, P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Feliciano Valderama, together with one Bolong, Francisco
alias Inggo, Jose Simbulan alias Peping, Enting, Eugenio alias Geniong Dusa and
Arsenio alias Bulahap, who have not as yet been apprehended, all with arms,
conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, by means of violence
against and intimidation of persons and with intent to gain, did then and there
voluntarily, maliciously, illegally and criminally take and carry away the
following personal properties:
2 pairs of West Point Clothes valued at P40.00 1 Blanket valued at 20.00 1 hat (Bangkuang) valued at 1.00 ________ P61.00 belonging to Inocencio Mateo and
1 blanket valued at P20.00 1 shirt (Indian Head) valued at 10.00 1 pair of slippers valued at 5.00 1 pair of rope (Guyuran) valued at 4.00 ________ P39.00 belonging to Leonides Pablo in the aggregate sum of P100, against their will
and to their damage and prejudice in the said sum of P100.”
On March 4, 1947, the other accused not having been apprehended, only
Feliciano Valderama was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the information.
Thereupon, the prosecution called the first witness Leonides Pablo, who gave his
testimony. After the conclusion of this witness’s testimony, the prosecution
called its second witness named Emerenciana de San Jose “to prove the robbery
committed in the house of Inocencio Mateo,” as petitioner alleges in paragraph 3
of the petition.
According to the respondent judge’s order (Annex B of the petition), “after
arraignment and while the second witness for the prosecution was testifying, the
defense counsel objected to her testimony tending to prove that a robbery was
committed in the house of Inocencio Mateo, after the first witness had testified
to a robbery committed in the house of Leonides Pablo.” This objection provoked
the raising of a question which gave rise to the present petition for certiorari
and mandamus. That question is whether or not the defendant Feliciano Valderama
in not moving to quash the information upon the ground that more than one
offense was charged therein before pleading thereto, waived all objection upon
that ground later in the proceedings.
The respondent judge ruled in his aforesaid order Annex B that under Rule
113, section 10, waiver of objection for duplicity can only be predicated upon
failure to move to quash upon such ground where the duplicity “clearly appears
on the face of the information.” His Honor was of opinion that in the
above-quoted information said defect is not clearly apparent.
Whether two offenses of robbery are alleged in the information, or only one,
we do not decide. But even hypothetically supposing that the former is the case,
that the information would have been subject to objection for duplicity if
timely made, the fact is that for failure to raise the objection before pleading
to the information, the defendant “shall be taken to have waived” such
objection. Rule 113, section 10 partly provides:
“* * * If the defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information
before he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all objections which
are grounds for a motion to quash except when the complaint or information does
not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same * *
*.”
Upon this point, we should consider as of decisive importance a very radical
innovation introduced by Rule 113, sections 1, 2, and 10, in relation with
General Orders No. 58, upon the subject “demurrer and pleas”, particularly
sections 19 and 21. Section 19 provided that “If, on the arraignment, the
defendant requires it, he must be allowed a reasonable time, not less than one
day”, to demur or plead to the complaint or information. Section 21
provided:
“The defendant may demur to the complaint or information when it appears on
the face thereof—* * * * *
* *“3. That more than one offense is charged; except only in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various allied
offenses.”* * * * *
* *
On the other hand, Rule 113, section 1—evincing an aim at a speedier trial
than General Orders No. 58 did—directs that,
“Upon being arraigned the defendant shall immediately (italics
supplied), unless the court grants him further time, either move to quash the
complaint or information or plead thereto, or do both. If he moves to quash,
without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled he shall
immediately plead” (italics supplied).
Section 2 provides:
“* * * The defendant may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:* * * * *
* *“(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;”* * * * *
* *
Section 10 mandatorily ordains:
“* * * If the defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information
before he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all objections
which are grounds for a motion to quash except when the complaint or information
does not charge an offense or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. * *
*”
The mandatory provision last above quoted did not exist in General Orders No.
58. Neither was there an equivalent provision therein.
And in the jurisprudence which developed from the above-quoted provisions of
section 21 of General Orders No. 58, it came to be held that when the accused
does not demur upon the ground of duplicity and goes to trial under the
complaint or information charging him with more than one offense, he could not
be heard to complain on appeal against that defect. (U. S. vs. Zapanta,
13 Phil., 409; U. S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260; U. S. vs. Jamad,
37 Phil., 305; People vs. Alafriz, 53 Phil., 583; People vs.
Benito, 57 Phil., 587.) In other words, he was held to have waived the
objection. On the other hand, Rule 113, section 10, dispenses entirely
with the necessity of the defendant without objection going to trial down to the
final judgment of the trial court, in order to hold him to have waived all
objections based upon any ground on which a motion to quash could have been
made. If he does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads
thereto “he shall (italics supplied) be taken to have waived all
objections which are grounds for a motion to quash * * *.” If we are now to
require, before declaring the waiver to have taken place, that the defendant
first go to trial down to the final judgment of the trial court, as
before, we would be writing the very important innovation thus introduced
by said section 10 entirely off the Rules of Court. Mark that said provision
uses “shall” characteristic of mandatory precepts. We are clearly of opinion
that this provision denied the trial judge all discretion in the matter, and
made it his peremptory duty to take the defendant as having waived the
objection, and to proceed with the already commenced trial accordingly. So long
as this rule remains in force, it must be obeyed not alone by the parties and
counsel in criminal cases, but more particularly by the judges who are to take
cognizance of, try and decide them.
Wherefore, judgment will be entered ordering the respondent judge to proceed
with the trial of the above-mentioned case, which has already been commenced,
upon the information already referred to by continuing the examination of the
second witness for the prosecution, Emerenciana de San Jose, its conclusion, and
proceeding with the rest of the evidence of one and the other party in the usual
manner, down to final judgment. No costs will be allowed. So
ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Briones, and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.
CONCURRING
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result. I do not think that the testimony of a witness to
prove that robbery was committed in the house of Inocencio Mateo, after a
witness had testified that robbery was committed in the house of Leonides Pablo,
would necessarily have the effect of charging the defendant with two robberies.
Whether two offenses are charged in an information must not be made to depend
upon the evidence presented at the trial but upon the facts alleged in the
information. I am of the opinion that the facts alleged in the information do
not clearly show that two robberies are charged. For that reason, failure by the
defendant to move to quash the information on the ground of duplicity of
offenses charged could not constitute a waiver. Hence the order of the
respondent Court requiring the petitioner Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija to
choose or elect which of the two offenses he would stand on is not only
erroneous but also constitutes a grave abuse of discretion; and as there is no
other plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, for no
appeal may be taken from the order complained of, the writ applied for herein
must be granted. The order must be set aside, and the respondent Court directed
to proceed with the trial of the case until final judgment allowing the second
witness Emerenciana de San Jose to testify.
PARAS, J.:
I concur.
DISSENTING
PERFECTO, J.:
Petitioner prays that respondent judge be ordered to proceed to try criminal
case No. 398 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija under the information
as filed by petitioner on December 7, 1946, and that we set aside the order of
respondent judge dated March 18, 1947.
The main question in this case is whether the facts alleged in the
information, quoted in the above order, alleges one offense, as contended by the
defense, or two offenses, as petitioner pretends. There is no quarrel as to the
legal effects in each case and as to what should be the logical outcome of
either contention.
As drafted and as we read it, we do not have any doubt that defense’s
position is entirely correct.
No complete copy of the information was filed with us, so we have to rely on
the following paragraphs, presumably contained in the body of the information as
quoted in the order of the lower court dated March 18, 1947, marked as Annex B
of the petition:
“That on or about the 8th day of October, 1946, in the municipality of Gapan,
Province of Nueva Ecija, P. I., and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Feliciano Valderama, together with one Bolong, Francisco
alias Inggo, Jose Simbulan alias Peping, Enting, Eugenio alias Geniong Dusa and
Arsenio alias Bulahap, who have not as yet been apprehended, all with arms,
conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, by means of violence
against and intimidation of persons and with intent to gain, did then and there
voluntarily, maliciously, illegally and criminally take and carry away the
following personal properties:
2 pairs of West Point clothes valued at P40.00 1 blanket valued at 20.00 1 hat (Bangkuang) valued at 1.00 ________ P61.00 belonging to Inocencio Mateo and
1 blanket valued at P20.00 1 shirt (Indian Head) at 10.00 1 pair of slippers valued at 5.00 1 pair of rope (Guyuran) valued at 4.00 ________ P39.00 belonging to Leonides Pablo in the aggregate sum of P100.00, against their
will and to their damage and prejudice in the said sum of
P100.00.”
All the above appear in the order under the following statement: “When the
case reached the Court of First Instance, these defendants were accused of
robbery (italics ours) committed according to the information as
follows:”
The text of the information unmistakably convey the idea that only one
robbery was committed, although with two victims, Inocencio Mateo and Leonides
Pablo, the owners of the articles stolen.
No matter what the intention of the drafter of the information, the facts
alleged therein show that only one robbery was committed. The reasons are:
- There is singleness of date, October 8, 1946.
- There is singleness of place, the Municipality of Gapan.
- There is singleness of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the lower court.
- There is singleness of act between the several accused, who are alleged to
have conspired together and mutually aided one another. - There is singleness in the intent to gain.
- There is singleness in the taking and carrying away of the articles.
- And, finally, there is singleness in the word “robbery,” used in singular
number, in the order Annex B, which should have taken it from the first
paragraph of the information which usually contains the allegation that the
signer of the information accuses defendants with the crime imputed to them.
In case there is any doubt as to the ideas conveyed by the information
and there is any ambiguity as to whether it alleges only one offense, as read by
counsel for the defense, or two or more offenses, as contended by the provincial
fiscal, the doubt and ambiguity must be decided against the writer of the
information, according to a well-known principle of documentary interpretation.
And the rule appears to be more compelling if we take into consideration that
the provincial fiscal had the inescapable duty, by constitutional mandate, of
informing the accused “of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.”
(Section 1 [17], Article III of the Constitution.)
If during the trial, it appeared that the prosecution’s purpose was to charge
the accused with two offenses, as happened to have been revealed in the case in
question, the lower court acted correctly in issuing the order of March 18,
1947, Annex B of the petition, and which is attached to this opinion as appendix
and part thereof.
For all the foregoing, we are of opinion that the petition is completely
without merit and should be denied.
BENGZON, J.:
I concur in the foregoing
dissent.
Annex B
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
NUEVA ECIJA
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 398.—THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant,
versus FELICIANO VALDERAMA, accused
ORDER
It appears that in a criminal complaint filed by the Chief of Police of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the above-named defendant together with several others were
charged with two robberies with violence, one in the house of Inocencio Mateo
and another in the house of Leonides Pablo. Supporting affidavits attest to this
fact. When the case reached the Court of First Instance, these defendants were
accused of robbery committed according to the information as follows:
“That on or about the 8th day of October, 1946, in the municipality of Gapan,
province of Nueva Ecija, P. I., and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Feliciano Valderama, together with one Bolong, Francisco
alias Inggo, Jose Simbulan alias Peping, Enting, Eugenio alias Geniong Buso and
Arsenio alias Bulahap, who have not as yet been apprehended, all with arms,
conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, by means of violence
against and intimidation of persons and with intent to gain, did then and there
voluntarily, maliciously, illegally and criminally take and carry away the
following personal properties:
2 pairs of West Point clothes valued at P40.00 1 blanket valued at 20.00 1 hat (Bangkuang) valued at 1.00 ________ 61.00 belonging to Inocencio Mateo and
1 blanket valued at 20.00 1 shirt (Indian Head) at 10.00 1 pair of slippers valued at 5.00 1 pair of rope (Guyuran) valued at 4.00 ________ 39.00 belonging to Leonides Pablo in the aggregate sum of P100, against their will
and to their damage and prejudice in the said sum of P100.”
After arraignment and while the second witness for the prosecution was
testifying, the defense counsel objected to her testimony tending to prove that
a robbery was committed in the house of Inocencio Mateo, after the first witness
had testified to a robbery committed in the house of Leonides Pablo.
The Provincial Fiscal argued that the defense counsel having failed to raise
the question of duplicity before the defendants pleaded, they thereby waived the
objection on the ground of duplicity (section 10, Rule 113). He further argued
that in prohibiting the allegation of more than one offense in the same
information, the law seeks to give the accused a chance to properly prepare his
defense—which purpose has been subserved in the present information which
mentions the two offended parties, Inocencio Mateo and Leonides Pablo; and that
at any rate, only one offense is charged in the information.
For his part, defense counsel contends that the information does not charge
two crimes and that he had a right to assume that only one crime was charged in
the information notwithstanding that two offended parties are named therein, as
it was the duty of the Fiscal to do. He further moves that the Provincial Fiscal
be required to elect on which offense to stand, whether the robbery committed in
the house of Leonides Pablo or that committed in the house of Inocencio
Mateo.
Although section 10, Rule 113 in declaring that when an accused pleads
without moving to quash the information, he would be deemed to have waived all
objections which are grounds for a motion to quash, the court believes that this
rule in so far as duplicity is concerned is applicable only where the
duplicitousness clearly appears on the face of the information. Moreover,
general principle of waiver, be it implied or express, requires that the party
deemed waiving has knowledge of the right he does waive. The mere mention of two
victims of robbery in the information does not necessarily imply two separate
and distinct offenses as they could have been held up simultaneously, thus
giving rise only to one offense. Under the circumstances, the following rule is
considered controlling:
“Necessity for Election.—(a) In General. When one offense is
charged and the evidence tends to show that more than one has been committed
within the period of limitations prior to the presentation of the indictment,
and either of them would support the charge in the indictment, the prosecution
may be required to elect upon which it will rely for a conviction, although the
charges are only misdemeanors: since, while the different acts may be proper as
evidence in aid of the particular charge in the indictment, defendant is
entitled to know which specific act is relied on for a conviction in order that
he may properly meet the charge, and in order that a conviction shall not be a
matter of choice between offenses.” (16 C. J., p. 860, section
2169.)
On the other hand, the cases holding that a failure to demur would authorize
the court to convict the defendants for as many offenses as there are charged in
the information and proven (37 Phil., 260, 305; 50 Phil., 771; 53 Phil., 583; 57
Phil., 587) are applicable only where two offenses are clearly charged in the
information and the accused proceeded with the trial without objection on the
ground of duplicity,—conditions not existing in the present case.
Wherefore, the Provincial Fiscal is hereby required to choose which of the
two offenses, robbery in the house of Inocencio Mateo or the robbery in the
house of Leonides Pablo, he could elect to stand on, reserving to the Government
the right to prosecute the other crime not so elected.
It is so ordered.
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, March 18, 1947.
| JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ | ||
| Judge | ||