G.R. No. L-30887. December 24, 1971
FELIPE RAYMUNDO, CESAR OBLIGACION, AND PEDRO GARCIA, WHO DIED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THEIR APPEAL IN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SUCCEEDED BY HIS WIDOW, TRINIDAD ALTESA AND …
MAKASIAR, J.:
In their brief which is partly quoted in the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 35640-R,
(pp. 39-43, rec. of L-30887),
petitioners-appellants in L-30887, who are also plaintiffs-appellants in L-29754, claim that the factual
background of these two cases now before US, is as follows:
x x x x x x
“Lot 3 is owned,
possessed, and occupied by the defendant Felipe Raymundo
who is paying taxes
thereon while Lot 2, same block, belongs to the defendant Pedro Garcia. Both defendants have their respective houses thereon and have been living and residing
therein for more than thirty (30) years each.
x x x x x x
“Before the last World War, the Filipino employees of the San Francisco del Monte, Inc. organized from
exclusively among themselves a mutual aid association which they named “Tiyaga at Pagtitipid.” The plaintiff and the two defendants
above-named were among the members of that association.
x x x x x x
“With its funds, the
association purchased lots from the San Francisco del
Monte, Inc. for resale to its members on the installment plan. Among the lots acquired by the said
association are the two now in question.
In turn, Lot 3 was purchased from the association by the herein
defendant Felipe Raymundo while Lot 2 was bought by the defendant Pedro Garcia.
Both were able to
complete paying their respective lots before the aforesaid World War broke out. Not
long after completing payments,
the said war begun.
x x x x
x x
“This state of facts was known to the plaintiff Feliciano
Felipe. He knew the defendants very well
as they have been neighbors in San Francisco
del Monte since boyhood; they had been co-workers in San Francisco del Monte Subdivision and they have been co-members in the association “Tiyaga
at Pagtitipid“. He
knew also very well the two lots in question; he knew that the said lots have been purchased and
fully paid for by the defendants. But he
knew very well too that the said defendants
have not as yet acquired their respective certificates of title over their
respective lots.
“His knowledge of all these facts nurtured in him a selfish
desire to appropriate the said lots for his own benefit. He then devised fraudulent means to
accomplish his knave purpose. How did he
do it?
“For Lot 3, Block 159, which belongs to
the defendant Felipe Raymundo, the plaintiff-appellee employed the following devise:
“He gathered a group of his close relatives and friends, such
as his own wife Faustina Contreras, his sister Ana Salonga, his brother-in-law Ernesto Salonga,
his nephews and trusted friends who willingly connived with him and all of them
made it appear in public instrument denominated “Deed of Quitclaim”
that they were all pre-war members – even
if they were not – of the association “Tiyaga at
Pagtitipid” and in that instrument they allegedly quitclaimed to and in favor of
the plaintiff Feliciano Felipe their supposed rights, interests, and
participation in the said Lot 3, Block 159.”
x x x x x x
“For Lot 2, Block 159, which belongs to the defendant Pedro
Garcia, the herein plaintiff contrived a different cunning scheme, as
follows: In another public instrument
captioned ‘Deed of Assignment’ the
said plaintiff allegedly as President of the association ‘Tiyaga
at Pagtitipid‘ allegedly assigned to his willing tool, Alfredo G.
Villanueva, the said Lot 2, Block 159.”
x x x x x x
“Armed with the ‘Deed of Assignment’ and the ‘Deed of
Quitclaim’, Feliciano Felipe and Alfredo G. Villanueva, as plaintiffs, instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch IV) an action for specific performance,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-6882, of the said Court, against the San Francisco del Monte, Inc., wherein the title to the two lots in
question then still resided, to compel the said corporation to convey to the first (Feliciano
Felipe) Lot 3, Block 159, and to the second (Alfredo G. Villanueva) Lot 2, the
same block;
“The defendants in the present
case, Felipe Raymundo and Pedro Garcia, owners of Lots 3 and 2,
respectively, were not made parties in that action, despite the fact that
the plaintiffs therein well knew that those lots are owned by the said Raymundo and Garcia and knew well that they have been in
possession of their respective lots for more than 30 years already to the
present; nor did these two ever acquire knowledge of the institution and
prosecution of the said action until they have been brought to Court in the present case; they were thus
never in a position to protect their respective rights in that action;
“The decision rendered in the said case ordered the defendant
therein, San Francisco del Monte, Inc. to convey Lot 3, Block 159 to the
plaintiff Feliciano Felipe and Lot 2, same block, to the plaintiff Alfredo G.
Villanueva, the dispositive portion of the decision
reading as follows: (N.B. – this decision
was rendered on March 14, 1963; p. 6,
Petition for Review)
‘WHEREFORE, this Court finding that all the material allegations of
the complaint have been substantiated, hereby orders the defendant (a) to
execute the necessary final deeds of sale for Lot No. 20, Block 82, and Lot No.
3, Block 159, of the San Francisco del Monte Subdivision for the consideration
of 1 peso per square meter leading to the issuance of separate titles in favor
of plaintiff Feliciano Felipe xx xx (b) another final
deed of sale and title for the same consideration of 1 peso per square meter
for Lot No. 2, Block 159, in favor of plaintiff Alfredo G. Villanueva, married
to Pura C. Villanueva, 2226-A Narra,
Manila upon payment of the amount of P25.00 for each lot and without pronouncement
as to costs.’
“The required deeds of conveyance were executed by the
defendant San Francisco del Monte, Inc., as ordered in
the decision. Pursuant to the said
deeds, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 68207 to Feliciano Felipe for Lot
3, Block 159, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 68296 to Alfredo G. Villanueva for Lot 2,
same block.
“Feliciano Felipe then mortgaged Lot 3,
Block 159, to the Rural Bank of San Juan,
Rizal for P3,500.00, which
mortgage is still in full force and effect to this day;
“Felipe’s tool, Alfredo G. Villanueva, transferred back to the
said Felipe Lot 2, Block 159 and the Register of Deeds for Quezon
City issued Transfer Certificate No. 70981 for the said lot, in the name of
the said Feliciano Felipe, who, in turn sold same to the spouses Simeon B.
Samson and Brigida V. Samson who bought the same from
Felipe even if they knew that the said lot belongs to the herein defendant
Pedro Garcia who is in possession of the same for over thirty years already;
“Then after the lapse of 104 days from the sale of Lot 2,
Block 159 to the spouses Samsons, Feliciano Felipe,
who was no longer the owner of the said Lot 2, if the sale to the Samsons were
genuine and true, nevertheless, instituted the present action for the recovery
of the possession of the said lot from the herein defendant Pedro Garcia, on
the theory that he is still the owner of the said Lot 2, x x
x” (pp. 11-29, Brief of Defendants-Appellants in
CA G.R. No. 35640; p. 28, rec., L-30887, underlining supplied).
G.R. No. L-30887
This is a petition for
review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No.
35640-R, affirming in toto the decision rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City Branch IV) in Civil case No. Q-7668.
After securing titles in his name pursuant to the decision of the
trial judge of Branch IV of the Quezon City Court of
First Instance, as above intimated, respondent-appellee
or defendant-appellee Feliciano Felipe filed on
November 27, 1963 a complaint for the recovery of possession (accion publiciana) of two parcels
of land with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IV (Civil Case No. Q-7668), and prayed,
among others, that herein petitioners-appellants (defendants in the lower
court), who have been illegally occupying since 1953 and 1955, be ordered to
vacate, Lots Nos. 2 and 3, Block 159, San Francisco Subdivision, covered by
transfer certificates of title nos. 70981 and 68207, respectively, of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City (pp.
1-5, rec. on appeal).
On December 19, 1963, defendants filed their answer, denying the
material allegations of the complaint, and alleging that they are the true owners
of the lots respectively occupied by them (lot No. 2 by defendant Pedro Garcia
and lot No. 3 by defendant Felipe Raymundo), having
bought the same from “Tiyaga at Pagtitipid,” its former owner, and that in 1933 they
entered into the possession of the same peacefully and the full knowledge and
consent of “Tiyaga at Pagtitipid
(pp. 6-8, rec. on appeal).
On July 3, 1964,
defendants filed a motion for leave to amend their answer alleging that plaintiff
perpetrated fraud in securing the certificates of title covering said lots, and
as the answer does not allege the fraud with sufficient fullness and
particularity, said answer needs to be amended.
Also on the same day,
July 3, 1964, defendant Pedro Garcia filed a motion for leave to file a
third-party complaint against one Simeon B. Samson as a buyer in bad faith of
lot no. 2, attaching to said motion a true copy of the deed of sale of
August 15, 1963, executed by vendors spouses Feliciano Felipe and Faustina Contreras in favor of vendees-spouses Simeon
Samson and Brigida Samson (pp.12-19, rec. on appeal).
On July 6, 1964, the defendants’ two motions hereinabove
mentioned were both orally and simultaneously denied, the trial court ruling
that the certificates of title being relied upon by the plaintiff cannot be
attacked collaterally but only by means of a separate action to that
effect. The court directed that the
trial proceed at that very moment as scheduled, and a subsequent motion for
reconsideration of the ruling met the same fate. As trial could not be finished that day,
continuance thereof was set for the next day, July 1964, despite defendants’
plea for postponement of the trial to a later date to afford them time to file
a separate action for annulment of title or reconveyance
as ruled (pp. 19-20, rec. on
appeal).
On July 7, 1964,
defendants instituted their separate action, Civil Case No. Q-8114
of the same court, for annulment of title or reconveyance
of the lots in question. When the
continuation of the hearing of Civil Case
No. Q-7668 was called that morning, defendants moved that said hearing be held in
abeyance, to be consolidated with the action just instituted. This motion for consolidation of trial was
denied, trial proceeded as scheduled, and was continued on July 8,
1964, when said
trial was terminated and Civil Case No. 7668 was submitted for decision (p 20,
rec. on appeal).
On July 20, 1964, defendants filed a motion to hold the instant
case in abeyance until after the action for annulment or reconveyance
should have been terminated and disposed of, alleging that “x x x there is therefore that
necessity x x x because,
should the defendants be now
ordered to vacate the premises in
question but will later succeed in annulling plaintiff’s title or in having the
lots reconveyed to them, irreparable injuries would
have been unnecessarily inflicted upon them x x x” (pp. 21-23, rec. on appeal).
On July 25, 1964,
plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to hold in abeyance, alleging that
said motion is merely dilatory, that the claim of defendants over the lots in
question is without any legal or factual basis, and that it is contrary to the
constitutional precept of speedy administration of justice (pp. 24-31, rec. on
appeal).
On July 27,
1964, defendants
filed their rejoinder to plaintiff’s opposition to their motion to hold in
abeyance (pp. 31-26, rec. on appeal).
On August 12, 1964, defendants filed a motion to drop defendant
Pedro Garcia from the case on the ground that plaintiff does not have any cause
of action against him because plaintiff
had already sold lot No. 2, and, consequently, cannot be prejudiced anymore by
the possession of said lot by defendant Pedro Garcia (pp. 36-37, rec. on
appeal; Exhibit D).
Finally, on October 18,
1964, the trial court rendered the following decision:
x x x x x x
“The defense interposed by the defendants, particularly Felipe
Raymundo and Pedro Garcia, is that they, on the contrary, and not the plaintiff, are the
respective owners of Lots 3 and 2 of the San Francisco del Monte Subdivision,
having been purchased from the mutual loan and savings association ‘Tiyaga at Pagtitipid‘ composed
exclusively of employees of the said San Francisco del Monte Subdivision, and
to this effect they exhibited the receipts for installment payment (Exhs. 1, 1-A and 1-B) issued by ‘Tiyaga
at Pagtitipid’ in favor of defendant Felipe Raymundo, as well as the tax declaration and a certificate
of tax payment of Lot 3; that
said defendants have been in possession openly, continuously and in concept of
owner for more than 30 years,
and that all these facts were known to
the plaintiff as he was their co-employee in the ‘Tiyaga
at Pagtitipid‘, reason for which they were never
asked by him to vacate the premises in question until he filed the present
action.
“This being an ejectment case, the
Court believes and so hold, that the only question to be determined is whether
the plaintiff is the registered owner of the lots under litigation and whether
the defendants unlawfully entered into possession of said lots. While on one hand, the plaintiff presented
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 70981 and 68207, which shows that he is the
absolute owner of the land in litigation, the defendants on their part failed
to introduce any evidence or document with any color of title. The possession of the plaintiff is an
attribute of ownership, and the contention of the defendants that they have
purchased said lots from “Tiyaga at Pagtitipid” without having been issued any valid title
to the property, cannot in any way operate to legalize the occupation and
enjoyment thereafter of the premises by said defendants who are mere intruders
in the land. Hence, conformably with an
owner’s right to possess his property, plaintiff, as the registered owner, has
the right to possess and enjoy subject land to the exclusion of the
defendants. Their efforts to amend the
answer to allege that said titles were obtained thru fraud, cannot be brought
up as an issue in the present case, this being a mere action for ejectment. That
issue should be brought in an independent action.
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants Felipe Raymundo,
Cesar Obligacion and Pedro Garcia, and all persons
claiming under them, ordering said defendants to vacate their respective lots
in question and to remove their houses and other construction therefrom; ordering the aforesaid defendants to pay such to
the plaintiff the sum of P20.00 per month by way of rentals from the date of
their respective occupation above-stated until the plaintiff is restored to the
possession thereof, plus the amount of P500.00 as attorney’s fees, and to pay
the costs x x x.” (pp. 39-42, rec. on appeal.)
Defendants appeald to the Court of Appeals, and contended, among
sixteen (16) errors assigned, that the trial court erred in not declaring them
to be the true owners of the disputed lots and “in turning down the
repeated requests of the defendants?appellants
for the suspension of the proceedings in the present case in order to
consolidate the trial thereof with that of Civil Case No. Q-8114
of the same court for the annulment of plaintiff’s title over the lots in
question, or for reconveyance, the parties and the
subject matter in both cases being the same”.
In its decision of May 22, 1969, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the trial court in toto thus:
x x x x x x
“From the aforesaid decision, defendants appealed to this
Court assigning several errors. One of
the error raises the issue as to whether or not the lower court was right in
turning down the repeated requests of the defendants-appellants for the
suspension of the proceedings in the present case in order to consolidate with
it the trial of Civil Case No. Q-8114 for the annulment of
plaintiff’s title over the lots in question, or for reconveyance.
“Essentially the present case is one of ejectment. And so the only issue here is whether the
plaintiff is the registered owner of the lots in litigation and whether the
defendants unlawfully entered into the possession of said lots. Plaintiff’s ownership of the lots in dispute
is amply proven by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 70981 and 68207 of the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City.
Defendants have nothing to offer and show any color of title on their
part over the disputed lots. They claim
they have purchased said lots from the mutual loan and savings association known as “Tiyaga at Pagtitipid” but
they could not present any Deed of Sale in their favor. All they have shown to the court are the
supposed receipts for installment payment (Exhs. 1,
1-A and 1-B) issued by the “Tiyaga at Pagtitipid” in favor of the defendant Felipe Raymundo and the tax declarations and certificate of
payment of tax for Lot No. 3. All these
documents are hopelessly inadequate to defeat the title and right of ownership
of plaintiff over the lots under litigation as evidenced by his certificates of title over the disputed
lots. As registered owner of the same
their right to the possession and enjoyment of the property to the exclusion of
all other persons cannot be questioned. And so even the
claim of defendants that they have been in possession of the lots for a period
of thirty (30) years will prove unavailing to the title of ownership of
plaintiff over the lots in dispute.
(Barcelona vs. Barcelona,
53 O.G. No. 2, 373.) For by express provision of Sec.
46 of Act No. 496 no title to register land in derogation to that of the
registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Corporacion de PP. Recoleto
vs. Crisostomo, 32 Phil., 427.) It was therefore no mistake for the lower court to
rule out defendants’ claim that their possession of the property for over 30
years has ripened into title of ownership over the said lots.
“But defendants-appellants want to dispute the title of plaintiff-appellee
on the ground of fraud. Note must
be taken of the manner by which the latter acquired his title over the lots
under litigation. In their own brief, defendants-appellants narrated: (as quoted on pp. 1-5 hereof) x x x From
defendants-appellants’ own brief we can gather that plaintiff-appellee’s acquisition of the lots in question was pursuant
to a judicial decision. If there was
anything irregular or illegal in the manner by which plaintiff-appellee was able to acquire said lots defendants-appellants
should have ventilated the matter with the court in the same proceedings.
It is too late for them now to question the decision of the court
ordering the San Francisco del Monte, Inc. the former
owner of the lots in question, to convey Lot 3, Block
159 to the plaintiff-appellee and Lot
2 of the same Block to one Alfredo G. Villanueva. Even on the ground of fraud, they are given a
limited period within which to attack the judgment which defendants-appellants did not take advantage of. We are not a bit surprised therefore that the
lower court refused to allow defendants-appellants to amend their answer to the
plaintiff-appellee’s complaint so as to seek the
annulment of tht title of the latter to the lots in
question.
“Defendants-appellants also blame the lower court for denying
the motion of defendant-appellant Pedro Garcia to be dropped from the
action. He claims that no cause
of action exists against him anymore because the plaintiff-appellee had no more title
over Lot No. 2 at the time he instituted the present action. An examination of the Deed of Sale of Lot 2,
Block 159 in favor of Simeon B. Samson and his wife show that plaintiff-appellee warrants that the lot is free from all liens and
encumbrances, and guarantees the free and peaceful possession of the same by
the vendees. He even agreed to bear the
expenses for the ejectment, removal, and demolition
of any construction whatsoever on the lot, including the expenses and costs of
litigation. With the above-warranty, the
plaintiff-appellee has every right to institute the
present action for ejectment against whoever occupies
the lot he sold to Simeon B. Samson and his wife. The lower court therefore committed no error
in not allowing defendant Pedro Garcia to be dropped from the action of the
plaintiff x x x (pp. 12-16
and 20-24, rec., L-30887).”
Hence, this present
appeal by certiorari to this Court.
G.R. No. L-29754
This is an appeal from the order dated June 22, 1967 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City Branch IX) dismissing the complaint of herein plaintiffs-appellants in
Civil Case No. Q-8114.
As heretofore stated, a complaint for annulment of title or reconveyance was filed by herein appellants (plaintiffs in
the lower court) Felipe Raymundo and Pedro Garcia
against herein appellee (defendant in the lower
court) Feliciano Felipe on July 7, 1964,
which was assigned to Branch IX (pp. 1-9, rec. on appeal).
On August 8,
1964, defendant
Feliciano Felipe, on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action,
filed a motion to dismiss the
same (pp. 10-11, rec. on appeal). An
opposition thereto was interposed by plaintiffs on August 15, 1964 (pp. 12-13, rec. on appeal), and on September
28, 1964, the trial
court issued an order denying said motion to dismiss (p. 13, rec. on appeal).
Defendant Feliciano Felipe filed his answer on October 3, 1964 (pp. 14-16, rec. on
appeal), denying the material allegations of the complaint and asserting that
his certificates of title over the lots in question were not secured through
fraud but pursuant to court order.
On February 2, 1965, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (pp.
16-40, rec. on appeal), alleging that they are the true and lawful owners of
their respective lots, having acquired the same from the San Francisco del
Monte, Inc., the registered owner thereof, through their pre-war mutual savings
and loan association “Tiyaga at Pagtitipid”, as evidenced by various receipts issued in
their favor by said association; that defendant Feliciano Felipe obtained
certificates of title covering said lots in his own name by using two false
quit-claim deeds as evidence in obtaining a favorable decision in Civil Case
No. Q-6882 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
entitled “Feliciano Felipe and Alfredo Villanueva vs. San Francisco del
Monte, Inc.”, an action to compel the latter to convey lot No. 3 to Felipe
and lot No. 2 to Villanueva; that afterwards, Alfredo Villanueva transferred
back lot No. 2 to Felipe, who in turn sold the same to the spouses Simeon and Brigida Samson; and that they were not made parties and
were therefore unaware of and cannot be bound by said Civil Case No. Q-6882.
On March 27, 1965,
defendant Alfredo Villanueva filed his answer denying the material allegations
of the complaint and praying for the dismissal of the same (pp. 41-45, rec. on appeal).
On March
31, 1965, defendants
Simeon and Brigida Samson filed their answer,
likewise denying the material allegations of the complaint, and alleging that
no cause of action exists against them (pp. 45-48, rec. on appeal).
On April 3, 1965,
defendant San Francisco del Monte, Inc. filed a motion
to dismiss, alleging that the complaint states no cause of action against it,
and the alleged cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations (pp.
48-54, rec. on appeal).
On April 5,
1965, defendant Conrado Faustino filed his answer denying the material
allegations of the complaint and his alleged complicity with defendant
Feliciano Felipe in consummating the alleged fraud (pp. 54-62, rec. on appeal).
On April 8, 1965,
plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss interposed by defendant
San Francisco del Monte, Inc. (pp. 62-65, rec. on
appeal). The trial court denied said motion in an order dated July 10, 1965 (pp. 65-66, rec. on
appeal).
On August 18, 1965, defendant San Francisco del Monte, Inc. filed
its answer, alleging affirmative and special defenses, and stating, among other
things, that “even before the Pacific War, in 1934, the said lots were
already sold to, and fully paid by, the “Tiyaga
at Pagtitipid” (pp. 66-69, rec. on appeal).
On January 26, 1966,
plaintiffs filed a motion to declare defendants Faustina
Contreras, Ana Salonga, Ernesto Salonga,
Matias Santos, Ambrocio
Cruz, and Gabriel Dionisio in default for having
failed to answer within the reglamentary period. Accordingly, said defendants were declared in
default in an order of the trial court dated January 28, 1966 (pp. 70-71, rec. on-appeal).
Then on June 22, 1967,
after a pre-trial but without any trial on the merits, the trial court issued
an order dismissing the complaint, thus:
x x x x x x
“When this case was called for pre-trial, counsel for
plaintiffs, inviting the attention of the Court to an order of default against
defendant Feliciano Felipe and several others, manifests that the only
defendants left who now have a standing in Court are Conrado
Faustino, Brigida V. Samson, Simeon B. Samson, San
Francisco del Monte, Inc., and Alfredo Villanueva, all of whom are represented
by counsel today with the exception of Villanueva. Counsel for San Francisco del Monte, Inc.
then manifested that the subject-matter of this suit has already been the
object of a final judgment by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch IV requiring and ordering the San Francisco
del Monte, Inc. to transfer the property to Feliciano Felipe, and that in
consonance therewith the San Francisco del Monte, Inc. executed a deed of sale, as a result of which a TCT was
issued in the names of Feliciano Felipe and Alfredo Villanueva. It is also manifested now that after the
title was issued in the names of these two persons, both of whom are now
defendants in this case, Feliciano Felipe filed a suit of recovery of
possession against herein plaintiffs who were then and still are in possession
of the land; that a decision was rendered in favor of Felipe, and that Felipe Raymundo and the other defendants in that case have
appealed to the Court of Appeals, and that this appeal is still pending.
“In view of these circumstances and facts about which all of
the parties are agreed, the Court feels that it has no jurisdiction to hear
this case it having been decided not only once but twice, by a court of equal
jurisdiction and it being at present the subject of an appeal” (pp. 71-73,
rec. on appeal).
A motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order filed by
plaintiffs on August 7, 1967,
was denied by the trial court in an order dated December 8, 1967 (pp. 73-91, rec. on appeal).
Hence, this present
appeal direct to this Court.
1. The trial judge in Civil Case No. Q-7668 grossly exceeded his
authority when he denied the motion of the petitioners or the
plaintiffs-appellants to amend their answer in said case for recovery of
possession (accion publiciana)
in order to allege with particularity and precision the defense of fraud in
addition to their claim of ownership over the two lots in question. These defenses of ownership and fraud are
compulsory counter-claims against the pretension of respondent or defendant-appellee Feliciano Felipe that he owns the two disputed
lots as the basis of his right to recover possession (Gojo
vs. Goyala et al., L-26768, Oct. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA
557, 563-564; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Sanvictores, L-16836, Jan. 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 123).
Counter-claims, other than money claims – which were not
permitted by the old Code of Civil Procedure – are now allowed under the rules of court (Sec. 1, Rule 10, Rules of
Court of 1940, Sec. 6, Rule 6,
Revised Rules of Court of 1964; Matela vs. Chua Tay, L-16407, May
30, 1962, 5 SCRA 163, 168-169; Pongos vs. Hidalgo etc. et al., 47 O.G. 733; Vol. 1, Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 264).
“The object of a
counterclaim is to prevent multiplicity of suits by allowing the determination in one action of the entire controversy between the parties, thus avoiding inconvenience,
expense, waste of the court’s time and injustice. A
counterclaim also enables a defendant to make his defense more complete and
effectual than it would be if he stood on one answer alone” (Vol. 1, Martin,
Rules of Court, 1969 ed., p. 274-citing
80 C.J.S. 22; 47 Am. Jur. 712;
Merchant’s Nat. Bank vs. Clark Parker Co., 215 Cal. 296; 9 P. (2d.) 826,
81 ALR 778; Hoffman vs. Maloratsky, 164-A. 260; 112
RJ Eq. 333).
The herein petitioners or plaintiffs-appellants could have been spared
so much expense, anxiety and anguish and the delay in the disposition of the
two cases could have been averted, if the lower court in said Civil Case No.
Q-7668 correctly appreciated the nature and purpose of the counter-claims
interposed therein as envisioned by the Rules of Court.
In ordering the petitioners to file a separate action for
annulment of title or reconveyance, the trial court
in Civil Case No. Q-7668, committed a grave error; because under the rules the
compulsory counterclaim would be barred if not interposed in the answer (Sec.
4, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court)
2. The grave error committed
by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-7668 was compounded by its refusal to
consolidate Civil Case No. Q-7668 with Civil Case No.
Q-8114, which consolidation should have been ordered as allowed under section 1
of Rule 31 of the Revised Rules of Court and controlling jurisprudence,
immediately after the institution of Civil Case No. Q-8114 pursuant to the
ruling of said trial court.
Although consolidation of several cases involving the same
parties and subject-matter is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial
court, joint hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are tried
before the same judge, or even if filed with the different branches of the same
court of first instance, provided one of such cases has not been partially
tried (PAL, et al. vs. Teodoro, et al., G. R. No. L-6698, Aug. 30, 1955, 97 Phil. 461).
True it is that on July
6, 1964, the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-7668 was commenced in
Branch IV, while Civil Case No. Q-8114
was filed the following day, July 7, 1964, when the trial of Civil
Case No. Q-7668 was continued. Although
the latter was assigned to Branch IV of the Rizal
Court of First Instance, Quezon City, the trial judge
presiding over Branch IV of the same court and trying Civil Case No. Q-7668
should have granted the motion of the counsel for petitioners Felipe Raymundo, Pedro Garcia and Cesar Obligacion,
for a joint hearing by him of the two cases; because both cases involve the same parties, the same subject-matter (the two disputed lots), and the same issues of
ownership and possession of the two questioned lots, and are handled by the same lawyers. There can therefore be no confusion in the
presentation of the evidence or in the appreciation of such evidence or of the
witnesses by the same trial judge hearing both cases. The trial judge presiding over Branch IX will
have no reason to object to such consolidation of the hearing of the two cases in Branch IV.
Such a consolidation of
the two cases will achieve the
purpose or rationale of a joint hearing authorized by Rule 31 of the Rules of
Court, namely, to avoid duplication of suits, guard against oppression or
abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial
court, and save unnecessary costs and expenses, thus attaining justice with
maximum speed and with the least expense and vexation to the litigants. (Palanca
vs. Querubin, G.R. No. L-29510-31,
Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 739, 745.)
The fact that Civil Case No.
Q-7668 was already partly tried on July 6, 1964, should not justify the refusal of the trial
judge in consolidating the same with Civil Case No. Q-8114, which was filed on
July 7, 1964; because the evidence already submitted by the plaintiffs in the
first case could be submitted as part of the evidence in the second case,
without further need of re-taking the testimonies of the witnesses, in view of
the fact that both cases involve as hereinbefore stated the same parties, the
same subject-matter and the same issues.
Pursuant to section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the rules of consolidation should be liberally construed to achieve the
object of the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of their cases. (Palanca vs. Querubin, supra; Sideco vs. Paredes, 74 Phil. 6, 7.)
Consolidation of the two
cases might not be proper, if the joint hearing were to be conducted by the
judge presiding over Branch IX to which Civil Case No. Q-8114 was assigned, under the principle enunciated in the case of PAL vs. Teodoro (supra.); because the judge presiding over Branch IX
was not the one who partly tried Civil Case No. Q-7668 and therefore did not
observe the witnesses who testified on July 6, 1964 in Civil Case No. Q-7668
before the trial judge of Branch IV.
But that is not so in these two cases where precisely Civil Case No. Q-8114 was to be transferred to Branch IV and consolidated
with Civil Case No. Q-7668, which was then already partly
tried by the trial judge presiding over Branch IV the same Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City.
3. After denying the
separate motions of Feliciano Felipe and San Francisco del Monte, Inc., to
dismiss the complaint filed by Felipe Raymundo, Pedro
Garcia and Crispulo D. Felipe in Civil Case No.
Q-8114, the trial judge presiding over Branch IX of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Quezon
City), after conducting a pre-trial of said Civil Case
No. Q-8114 and without a hearing on the merits, erred in
dismissing said Civil Case No. Q-8114 thru the order dated June 22, 1967
on the ground that “it has no jurisdiction to hear this case it having
been decided not only once but twice, by a court of equal jurisdiction and it
being the subject of an appeal” referring to Civil Cases Nos. Q-6882 and
Q-7668, which were both decided by the trial judge
presiding over Branch IV the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, with Civil Case No. Q-7668 having been appealed to the
Court of Appeals (now L-30887 before US) by Felipe Raymundo,
Pedro Garcia and Cesar Obligacion. It seems that the trial judge of Branch IX
misapprehended the nature and purpose of the complaint filed by herein
appellants Felipe Raymundo, Pedro Garcia and Crispulo Felipe in Civil Case No. Q-8114. Pursuant to the ruling of
the trial judge in Case No. Q-7668 that the herein plaintiffs-appellants
should institute a separate action for annulment or reconveyance,
Civil Case No. Q-8114 was precisely filed by said plaintiffs-appellants to annul
the titles over the two disputed lots, issued in the name of the defendant
Feliciano Felipe and his successors-in-interest Alfredo G. Villanueva, Simeon
B. Samson and Brigida V. Samson on the ground that
said titles were secured fraudulently by said defendant Feliciano Felipe in
Civil Case No. Q-6882, in which the aforesaid plaintiffs
were not parties and were not even notified of the pendency
of said Civil Case No. Q-6882. The herein plaintiffs-appellants (in L-29754)
were again denied their day in Court in Civil Case No. Q-8114, for the simple
reason that their complaint was dismissed without giving them the opportunity
to submit evidence to demonstrate their claim of ownership and of fraud
allegedly perpetrated by the herein defendant-appellee
Feliciano Felipe in securing the titles to the two disputed lots, which they
allegedly have been possessing since 1933, when they purchased the same from
the defendant-appellee San Francisco del Monte, Inc.
thru their association known as “Tiyaga at Pagtitipid,”
which was their pre-war mutual savings and loan association composed of
employees of the San Francisco del Monte Subdivision, Inc. The plaintiffs-appellants were vexed by and
exposed to a long and expensive litigation; because thru deceit, Feliciano
Felipe despoiled them of their lots in Civil Case No. Q-6882 in which they were
not parties and about which they were not notified, aggravated by the unjust
refusal of the trial judge presiding over Branch IV to consolidate the hearing of the two Civil Cases Nos. Q-7668 and
Q-8114, with the latter case precisely having been filed pursuant to the order
of said trial judge that any claim for the annulment of the titles of Feliciano
Felipe and for the conveyance or the lots and of the said titles to
plaintiffs-appellants should be thru a separate action. And the unkindest cut of all was the
dismissal without a trial on the merits of said separate action in Civil Case
No. Q-8114 by the
presiding judge of Branch IX of the same Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City).
Consequently, the
decision dated May 22, 1969 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-7668 (L-30887) should be reversed, the order dated June 22, 1967 of the trial judge in Civil Case No. Q–8114 (L–29754) should be set
aside, and the records of both cases Nos. Q-7668 and Q-8114 should be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings, if justice were not to be
denied to herein plaintiffs-appellants in G.R. No. L-29754 or
petitioners in G.R. No. L-30887.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated Nay 22, 1969 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby reversed; the judgment dated October
18, 1964 of the
trial lower court in Civil Case No. Q-7668 (G. R. No.
L-30887) and the order dated June 22, 1967 of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q–8114
(G.R. No. L-29754) are hereby set aside as null and
void; the records of both civil cases Nos. Q-7668 and Q-8114 are hereby
consolidated and remanded to Branch IV of the Quezon
City Court of First Instance; and the trial judge presiding over said Branch IV
is hereby directed to try on the merits Civil Case No. Q-8114 and to render only one judgment in both Civil Cases Nos.
Q-7668 and Q-8114 on the basis of the evidence submitted in both cases. Costs against respondent in
L–30887 and defendants-appellees in
L-29754.
So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.