PELAGIO YUSINGCO, ALFONSO YUSINGCO, JR., CONSUELO YUSINGCO, PATRICK YUSINGCO, HENRY YUSINGCO, AND ASUNCION N. VDA DE YUSINGCO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. ONG HING LIAN, IN HIS B…

Appeal from the order
dated June 17, 1965
of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte dismissing
Civil Case No. 1645 for recovery of ownership on the ground that the same is
now barred by prior judgment.

This present case is a sequel of a previous suit — Cadastral
Case No. 12, Record No. 1364 — for the recon­stitution of certificates of title under Republic
Act No. 26 — decided by the Court of First Instance of Suri­gao
del Norte against Pelagio Yusingco
and denying said petition for reconstitution, which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals in its decision dated July 30, 1964 in C.A.G.R. No. 24964-R.

In the said previous case, Pelagio Yusingco, as one of the
children of the late Alfonso Yusingco, filed
on February 13, 1952 a petition under Republic Act No. 26 for the
reconstitution of certificates of title covering lots nos. 519, 520, 1014, 1015,
1016, and 1020, alleging, among others, that Alfonso Yusingco
having died, his children formed a partnership called Alfonso Yusingco Hermanos to continue the
business of their deceased father Alfonso Yusingco;
that the certificates of title to the said lots had also been transferred to Yusingco Hermanos and prayed
therefore, that the transfer certifi­cates of title in the name of the Yusingco
Hermanos which had
been lost or destroyed be reconstituted and the same be cancelled and in
lieu thereof transfer certificates of title be issued in the name of the
heirs of Alfonso Yusingco, namely:  Porfirio Yusingco, Pelagio Yusingco, Alfonso Yusingco, Jr.,
Corazon Yusingco, Consuelo Yusing­co,
and Patrick Yusingco (rec. on appeal, pp. 73-74; Deci­sion
of the Court of Appeals, C.A.G.R. No. 24964-R).

The said petition was opposed by Ong Hing Lian, as administrator of
the estate of the late Ong Bonpin, alleg­ing in effect
that he and his co-heirs are the
lawful owners and possessors of the lots covered by the certifi­cates of title
sought to be reconstituted as successors
of Ong Bonpin, who at the time of his death was the lawful owner
thereof.

After due hearing, the
lower court (Court of First Instance of Surigao del
Norte) issued an order denying the petition for reconstitution, said denial
being predi­cated on a finding that Ong Bonpin and his heirs exercised possession of the lots in
concept of owners.

Pelagio Yusingco
appealed the order of the lower court to the Court of Appeals which was therein
docketed as G.R. No. 13033-R.  On April 29, 1955, the Court of Appeals,
after passing upon the merits of the petitioner’s appeal,
adopted a resolution “remanding the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence or any ‘other or further evidence which may help in the
complete and final determination of the case’ xx xx,”
particularly as to the status of the mortgages in favor of Philippine Refining
Company and Carlos Palanca.  The lower court, as directed, received
evidence and thereafter, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals without,
however, rendering any judgment.  Thus,
the Court of Appeals, by another resolution dated November 5, 1957, remanded
the case for the second time to the lower court with specific instruc­tion for
the latter court “to render judgment in the light of all the evidence thus
presented and make a pronouncement as to whether or not the aforementioned
mortgages have already been satisfied and such other pronouncement as would be
justified by the whole evidence.” Accordingly, the lower court rendered
judgment holding, among others, that “the mortgages in favor of the
Philippine Refining Company and Carlos Palanca were
no longer existing at least, insofar as their recording and
annotation on the back of the certificates of title sought to be reconstituted is concerned; “and forthwith denied petitioner’s petition for
reconstitution.  Again, Pelagio Yusingco appealed to the
Court of Appeals.

In a decision promulgated
on July 30, 1964,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court (rec. on appeal,
pp. 44–46;
Decision of the Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 24964-R).

In affirming the decision
of the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated its findings of facts and con­clusions
thus:

“xx xx The spouses Ong Qui Cua and Yu Biao Suntua and the spouses Alfonso Yusingco
and Ong Ya Cua acquired lots nos. 519, 520, 1014 and 1015 sometime in the
year 1922 which were later
originally registered in their name, each couple owned to the extent of one-half undivided share of
said lots as per Original Certificate of Title No. 44 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Surigao
Province.  Subsequently, Lot
No. 1020 was registered exclusively in the name of Yusingco
Hermanos.  In 1927, Yu Biao
Suntua Hermanos, to
whom the share of the spouses Yu
Biao Suntua and Ong Qui Cua was transferred,
mortgaged their undi­vided half to Luis Mirasol for
P10,000.00, who in turn transferred his rights as mortgagee of the aforesaid undivided halves in favor of the Yusingco Hermanos, the ones who
acquired the remaining half share of the spouses Alfonso Yusingco
and Ong Ya Cua after their death. 
As the mortgagor Yu Biao Suntua
Hermanos failed to pay the mortgage, Yusingco Hermanos then
foreclosed the mortgage in
1931, thereby acquiring one-half of their undivided share originally
belonging to Yu Biao Suntua
Hermanos.

“It also appears that the Yusingco Hermanos prior to their acquisition of the undivided half
of the property of Yu Biao Suntua
Hermanos had mortgaged their original undivided
one-half in favor of P.R.C. in consideration of the sum of P39,000.00 by way of
first mortgage, and later on in favor of Carlos Palanca
in consideration of the sum of P40,000.00. 
Further, the one-half undivided property which the Yusingco Hermanos
acquired from Yu Biao Suntua
Hermanos was similarly mort­gaged in favor of Carlos Palanca for the sum of P10,000.00.

“xx                 xx                     xx                     xx

“The decisive issue now to be threshed out in this proceeding
is whether there had been an extrajudicial sale held on August 11, 1936
by Notary Public Hernando J.C. Corvera covering the
one-half undivided interests over lots nos. 519, 520, 1014 and 1015 of the
cadastral survey of Surigao, which properties were
acquired by Ong
Bonping for P25,000.00 and whether a
publication sale by virtue of a judicial foreclosure in Civil Case No.
1465 was held on November 11, 1941 covering the remaining half interests
of the aforesaid lots of 1016 and 1020 of the same cadastral survey.  From the additional evidence presented by the oppositors
which con­sisted of the deposition of Atty. J.C. Corvera,
who as aforestated above was the one who conducted the extrajudicial
sale covering lots nos. 519, 520, 1014 and 1015 which is described as
parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the extrajudicial sale (Exh.
4), it appear that the undivided halves of the aforesaid lots were sold at
the extrajudicial sale held on August 11, 1936 by Hernando J.C. Corvera who was then commissioned as Notary Pub­lic of Surigao during the years 1933 to 1941.  That by virtue of that extrajudi­cial sale,
the one-half undivided interests in lots nos. 519 520 1014 and 1015 of the
Cadastral Survey of Surigao were acquired by Ong Bonping for P25,000.00;
that all the legal requirements to conduct the extrajudicial sale, were duly
complied with by said notary public before he made the said extrajudicial sale in
favor of the only highest bidder who was then Carlos Palanca
as shown by a copy of the document of said notary public duly identified and
marked as Exh. 4.  The mortgagor-debtor having failed to
redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, a final deed of
sale was executed by the officiating officer in favor of said Carlos Palanca thus making him the absolute owner of the undivided
half of the four lots (Lots No. 519, 520, 1014 and 1015), and in turn sold the
same to Ong Bonping.  Both extrajudicial sale and the corresponding
final deed of sale were duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Surigao and duly annotated on the back of the
certificate of title covering the aforesaid lots.  We are inclined to give cre­dence to this
additional evidence presented by the oppositors
relating to the actual transactions held on August 11, 1936 by the very notary
public Hernando J.C. Corvera who affirmed that all
the legal requirements to conduct said extrajudicial sale were duly complied
with before an extrajudicial sale was held and before the execution of a final
deed of sale in favor of Carlos Palanca.  In giving full weight to the testimony of the
deponent Hernando J.C. Corvera, the trial court
observed that no sufficient justification (existed) to doubt the veracity of
the testimony or the facts as alleged by the deponent J.C. Corvera
who was a member of the Bar and a well-known figure, respected both in private
and public circles.  Indeed, the trial
court was perfectly right in considering and in giving full weight to this
additional evidence presented by the oppositors which
consisted of the deposition of Hernando J.C. Corvera
(Exh. 10-A). 
For the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, they clearly show
that on August 11, 1936 an
extrajudicial sale was held relating to the undivided halves of lots nos. 519,
520, 1014 and 1015.  In fact Ong Bonping and his heirs assumed
possession over the property in concept of owners ever since the disputed lots were acquired by Ong Bonping from Carlos Palanca, which aforesaid lots in question together with the
rights and interests over the same was
subsequently sold by Carlos Palanca to
the late Ong Bonping.  Apart from taking possession of the
undisputed lots the heirs of Ong Bonping
had constructed big buildings thereon, among them, the warehouses now occupied
by the Compania Maritima,
the General Shipping Company and the El Oriente
Hotel.  Such substantial improvements
intro­duced and strong structures built thereon are indicative that the
possessor of the lots could not obviously be a squatter in the area for no one
in his right sense would have invested so much amounts for the construction of
these buildings if the lots where the buildings are now constructed do not
belong to the oppositors, unless of course there is
an evidence showing that there was a
lease contract executed between
the owner of the lot as lessor and
the owner of the building as lessee
which has not been shown in this case.  Significantly, it is to be pointed out that
herein petitioner knew pretty well of the construction of the buildings being
undertaken by the oppositors on the lots in
question.  Now, if actually petitioner
herein still retained ownership over the lots in question they should have
protested on time and availed of the proper course of action to vindicate their
rights.  Certainly, this is to be expected from an owner of the
land whose rights over the same had been violated or trespassed, and not for the petitioners to have tolerated
the constructions thereof through their acquiescence and knowledge with­out
questioning the right of possession of the oppositors
at the outset over the disputed lands. 
The evidence shows that oppositors herein ever
since the acquisition of the disputed lots through extrajudicial sale had been
in continuous possession of the premises through exclusion of herein
petitioner.  Besides, one circumstance
which may be treated as an indication that the petitioner herein had already
relinquished ownership over the disputed parcels and had not retained any right
whatsoever thereto is the
undisputed fact that he even failed to pay the corresponding taxes of the said lots, that is, if he actually
exercised an act of dominical ownership
over the lots in question.

“Apart from the foregoing observation, our attention is
invited to such a trenchant notation appearing at the foot of page 3 of Exhibit 4 written in Spanish
which reads as follows:  ‘Vendido en publica subasta el once de Agosto l936.’ The oppositors
maintain that this notation was written by the late Ong Bonping
in his own handwriting which contention
of the oppositors apparently seemed to be true for
a reference to this written annotation
on this Exhibit 4 and comparing the same to the handwriting of Ong Bonping appearing in Exhibit
3 which has been satisfactorily established by the oppositors
to be the penmanship and
notation of Ong Bonping,
the similarity in style and penmanship on these two exhibits is evident,
indicating that both handwritings were written by one and the same hand.  So that if no extrajudicial sale was indeed
held on August 11, 1936 there would have been no reason for Ong
Bonping to have made an annotation at the foot of
Exhib­it 4.

“We agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court that
by issuing a new certificate of title covering the disputed lots in question
will only give rise to more confusions, since it is evident that the aforesaid
lots are now held in possession and held adversely by the oppositors
who exercised ownership over the same.  Consequently,
ownership over the
disputed parcels cannot just be brushed aside for the evidence is indicative
that the oppositors therein acquired ownership over the disputed lots by
virtue of the extrajudicial sale held on August 11, 1936.

“With respect to the alleged auction sale held on November 11,
1941, relating to the remaining half over lots nos. 519, 520, 1014 and 1015 and
the whole of lots 1016 and 1020 of the Cadastral Survey of Surigao
which were acquired by the late Ong Bonping for P30,000.00, there is a dearth of evidence to
show the alleged auction sale or November 11, 1941.  However, as Ong Bonping and his heirs, the herein oppositors
had assumed possession of the premises in question and occupied the same
openly, continuously and adversely for more than twenty years in concept of
owners and above everything had constructed thereon buildings and introduced
structures of strong materials, such situation obtaining is a patent indication
of their ownership over the disputed remaining half-portion of the aforesaid
lots, especially so, when the construction thus under­taken by the oppositors was with the knowledge and acquiescence of
herein petitioner who mutely stood supinely and allowed the construction to be
finished.  The lots in question as
observed by the trial court consist of the choicest and most valuable pieces of
real estate to be found in the town of Surigao and if
petitioner’s contention that they still retain ownership over these lots in question is true they would not
have tolerated or agreed for the oppositors to have
introduced sub­stantial improvements consisting of buildings and other structures thereon and they would not have allowed their
rights to be invaded or trespassed flagrantly and openly without taking the necessary and proper action to vindicate
their rights and interests over the disputed lots.  As underscored above, petitioner herein even
failed to pay the corresponding taxes due for the lots in question.

“We now come to the existence of the alleged mortgage in favor
of the Philippine Refining Company and Carlos Palanca,
the very issue on which this case was remanded by this Court to the court of
origin for the purpose of determining the existence or non-existence of this
mortgage credit.  xx xx,
when this case was remanded to the court of origin for this purpose there was
no appearance on the part of the mortgage creditors, the Philippine Refining
Company and Carlos Palanca or their representatives,
so much so that the court below was constrained to rule that:

‘xx xx considering the absolute failure of the said mortgage
creditors, the Phil­ippine Refining
Company, Inc. and Carlos Palanca, their coun­sels or
duly authorized repre­sentative to come and present any evidence they have on
the matter, xx xx said mortgage credits of
P39,000.00, in favor of the said Philippine Refining Company, Inc. and Carlos Palanca, respectively, are not existing any more, at least
insofar as their recording and annotation on the back of the certificate or
certificates of title sought to be reconstituted are concerned.  The mortgage credits and its in­terest due
Carlos Palanca (now deceased) or due his estate had
been fully settled, as shown by the evidence, and as to the mortgage credit in favor of the Philippine Refining Company, Inc., the same is considered by
the Court to have been totally settled and liquidated.  The absolute failure of this mortgage
creditor to produce any evidence to prove the existence and non-payment of the
obligation gives rise to the strong pre­sumption that, as of the present, the
said obligation is no more existing and that upon the reconstitution of the
certificate or certifi­cates of title covering the property in question, the
said obligation, although previously recorded and annotated on the back on the
corresponding certificate or certificates of title years before the out­break
of the last World War as lien and incumbrances, has
no more reason or justification to be recorded and annotated on the
reconstituted title.”

“We find the observation and the conclusion reached by the
trial court to be well-founded and in accordance with the material
circumstances of this case.  Moreover, at
this stage of the proceed­ings the petitioner, appellant herein does not insist
on this issue that the aforesaid mortgage in favor of the Philippine Refining
Company and Carlos Palanca had been fully satisfied
with or paid up by petitioner.  Stated in
another word, petitioner herein abandoned this theory.” (Decision of the
Court of Appeals in G.R. No. 24964, underscoring supplied).

The aforequoted
decision of the court of Appeals was not appealed and ultimately became final.

On October 30, 1964,
plaintiffs-appellants filed this second civil complaint (Accion
Reivindicatoria with damages and preliminary injunction)
with the Court of First Instance of Surigao
del Norte against defendant-appellee, in his own
behalf and/or as administrator of the estate of Ong Bonpin, to recover possession and ownership of Lots Nos.
519, 520, 1014, 1015, 1016 and 1020, alleging, among others, that all the
plaintiffs are the children of the late Alfonso Yusingco,
except plaintiffs Henry Yusing­co and Asuncion N. vda. de Yusingco who are the only
child and widow, respectively, of the late Porfirio Yusingco, deceased brother of the rest of the plaintiffs;
that the lots in question are registered in the name of Alfonso Yusingco under the
Land Registration Act, otherwise known as Act 496; that upon the death of
Alfonso Yusingco, his children formed a partnership
called Alfonso Yusingco Hermanos
to continue the business of their deceased father, and the certificates of
title of the abovementioned lots were duly transferred to the name of Alfonso Yusingco Hermanos, which title
continued to be in the name of said Alfonso Yusingco Hermanos when world War II broke out in December, 1941;
that said certificates of title were lost
and destroyed during the last world war; that as a result of the war, the
herein Yusingco brothers were separated for which
reason the partnership known as Yusingco Hermanos was not recons­tituted nor its business continued;
that defendant took possession of some portions of the lands in question by
surreptitiously entering the same in the absence of the Yusingco
brothers by taking advantage of the troubled conditions during the war and
after the liberation under a false color of title and other pretenses; that
such pre­tensions of the defendant have no basis in fact because his evidence
to the alleged public auction are hazy and inconclusive and Ong
Bonpin at the time of the alleged acquisition of the
lots in question until the time of his death was a Chinese citizen and being so, no title can pass to him; and
prayed therefore that defendant be ordered to vacate the premises of the lots
in question so that plaintiffs, as registered owners thereof under Act 496, can
enjoy possess­ion of the same in concept of owners (pp.2-15, rec. on appeal of
present case).

On January 12, 1965,
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the present action contending that the
same is barred by prior judgment or by the statute of limitations (pp. 15-20,
rec. on appeal of present case).

On February 23, 1965, defendant filed an amended motion to
dismiss, alleging further that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue,
the complaint states no cause of action, the cause of action has been
abandoned, and the plaintiffs are in estoppel and/or guilty of laches.  (pp.
23-25, rec. on appeal of present
case).

In an order dated June 17,
1965,the lower court
dismissed the case.

Plaintiffs appealed to
this Court.

During the pendency of this appeal in this Court, counsel for
defendant-appellee filed a notice of death and motion
for substitution dated November 8,
1967 alleging that defendant-appellee Ong Hing
Lian died on May 25, 1967, and prayed that the heirs of
the deceased Ong Hing Lian be substituted as defendants-appellees
(p. 100, rec.).

On November 14, 1968, Aniceto Bonpin, thru counsel,
filed in this Court a motion for substitution alleging that Ong
Hing Lian died on May 29, 1967 (death certificate attached to motion shows
May 25, 1967 as date of death of Ong, p.
104, rec.), and that he has been appointed administrator of the
intestate estate of Ong Bonpin
in place of the deceased defendant-appellee Ong Hing Lian
(copy of his oath of office attached to motion), and praying that he be substituted for the deceased defendant-appellee
(pp. 103-104, rec.).  Subsequently, another motion for substitution dated April 12, 1971 was filed by the counsel of defendant-appellee praying that Aniceto Bonpin, the new administrator of the estate of Ong Bonpin, be substituted as
defendant-appellee in lieu of the deceased (p. 115, rec.).

In a resolution of this
Court dated May 3, 1971, Aniceto Bonpin
was substituted as defendant-appellee in lieu of the
deceased Ong Hing Lian, only
as such admin­istrator of the
estate of the deceased Ong Bonpin.  In the same resolution, in view of the fact
that the deceased Ong Hing Lian was also sued in his personal capacity, his legal
representative was directed to appear and be substi­tuted as defendant-appellee, or in the absence of a legal representative, his
heirs should be substituted as defend­ants-appellees in lieu of the deceased defendant-appellee (p. 118, rec.).

Complying with the
abovementioned resolution, the legal heirs of the deceased Ong
Hing Lian appeared through
counsel in a pleading dated June 25,1971, and
prayed that they be substituted as defendants-appellees
in place of the deceased Ong Hing
Lian (p. 119, rec.).

On July 1, 1971,
this Court resolved that the deceased Ong Bing Lian be substituted by his legal heirs, namely:  Azucena Goh Ong, Alice, James, Dolores, Ildefonso, Florencio, Herman,
Victoria, Josephine and Marylin,
all surnamed Ong (p. 125, rec.).

I

1.  The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties
from relitigating issues actually litigated and
determined by a prior and final judgment. 
It is “a rule pervading every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation — republicae ut sit finis
litium; the other, the hardship on the individual
that he should be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo
debet bis vexari et eadem causa.  A
contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and
neglect of indivi­duals and prefer the gratification of a litigious disposi­tion
on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and
happiness.”^[1]

2.  For a prior judgment to
constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisite must
concur:  (1) It must be a final judgment
or order; (2) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the sub­ject
matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judg­ment or order on the merits;
and (4) there must be bet­ween the two cases identity of parties, identity of
sub­ject matter and identity of action.^[2]

3.  It is equally
well-settled that a prior judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit between
the same parties on the same subject matter, and on the same cause of action,
not only as to matters which were decided in the first action, but also as to
every other matter which the parties could have properly set up in the prior
suit.^[3]

4.  It is not, disputed that
the judgment in the reconstitution case was on the merits and is now final and
that the reconstitution court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the parties.

5.  Plaintiffs-appellants,
however, contend that there is no identity of subject matter and causes of
action.  As to identity of subject
matter, herein plaintiffs-appellants argue that “res judicata
cannot be sustained in the instant case because the subject matter in
the proceeding for reconstitution of certificates of title under R.A. No. 26 is
different from an action for reivindicatoria,
which is both for ownership and possession”.

It must be remembered that the subject matter of an action is
different from the cause of action. 
Thus:  “The cause of action
is the legal wrong threatened or committed, while the object of the action is
to prevent or redress the wrong by obtaining some legal relief; but the subject
of the action is neither of these since it is not the wrong or the relief
demanded, the subject of the action is the matter or thing with respect to
which the controversy has arisen, concerning which the wrong has been done, and
this ordinarily is the property, or the contract and its subject matter, or the
thing in dispute.”^[4]

The present case and the reconstitution suit refer to the same
subject matter — Lots Nos. 519, 520, 1014, 1015, and 1020.

6.  Appellants dispute the
identity of cause of action between the two suits, for the reason that the
first action was merely for the reconstitution of cer­tificates of title of the lands in dispute, wherein
the question of possession and ownership cannot be validly passed upon; whereas
the present action is an accion reivindicatoria, the proper action to determine the
question of possession and ownership (pp. 29-32, rec. on appeal).

In the petition for reconstitution of certificates of title of
the lands in dispute, appellant Pelagio Yusingco not only asked for the reconstitution of the
certificates of title in the name of Yusingco Hermanos but went further to pray that the certificates,
once reconstituted, be cancelled
and new ones be issued in the name of the heirs of Alfonso Yusingco
(pp. 9-10, rec. on appeal in CA G.R. No. 24964-R;
pp. 73-74, rec. on appeal in this case), asserting in effect their right
of ownership over the disputed parcels of lands, and the same was opposed by Ong Hing Lian,
who also asserted his right of ownership over the lands.  It is patent that the issue of ownership
became the determinative factor in the success of the petition for
reconstitution.

The decision of the Court of Appeals in the pre­vious case for
reconstitution of titles (C.A.G.R. 24964-R), now final and unappealable,
shows that petitioner Pelagio Yusingco
endeavored to obtain judgment in their favor by proving their rights of
ownership over the disputed parcels of land as successors of the late Alfonso Yusingco
and as organizers of the Alfonso Yusingco Hermanos, while the oppositor
claimed ownership of the same as successor of the late Ong
Bonpin; and both parties freely offered evidence in
support of their respective positions. 
In that previous petition, petitioner Pelagio Yusingco alleged that after Alfonso Yusingco
died they formed a partnership called the Alfonso Yusingco
Hermanos, that they are the children of the late
Alfonso Yusingco, that the certificates of title
covering the disputed lots were transferred in the name of the partnership, and
that the said certificates of title were lost and destroyed during the
war.  Said allegations are substantially the
same allegations made in the present accion
reivindicatoria, wherein appellant further
alleged that the appellees surreptitiously took
possession of the parcels of lands during the Japanese occupation by taking
advantage of the absence of the Yusingco Hermanos.

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that, as between the
two suits, there is identity of cause of action– the plaintiffs-appellant claim of ownership over the disputed lots as
opposed by Ong Hing Lian.

Thus, the Court of Appeals, in the light of the evidence
presented by both parties, was able to determine the present status of the
disputed parcels of land, the previous liens and encumbrances thereon as well
as their present real owners.  It traced
out how the predecessors of the herein appellants disposed of their ownership,
and how the predecessor of Ong Hing
Lian acquired ownership, over the disputed parcels of
land.

What is different here is the form of action.  But the employment of two different forms of
action, does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle that one
and the same cause of action shall not be twice liti­gated.^[5]

7.  But the parties in the
two cases are not entirely identical. 
The only petitioner in the reconstitution case was appellant Pelagio Yusingco, one of the heirs of the late Alfonso Yusingco.  Although
in his petition for recon­stitution he prayed that the certificates of title in
the name of Yusingco Hermanos,
once reconstituted, be cancelled and new ones issued in the names of the heirs
of the late Alfonso Yusingco, such circumstance did not
thereby implead his co-heirs as co-petitioners.  The pleadings in the recon­stitution case and the action for recovery of
ownership neither state nor intimate that Pelagio Yusingco was autho­rized expressly or impliedly by his co-heirs
to file the petition for reconstitution for and in behalf of all the heirs of
Alfonso Yusingco. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the said reconstitution case, CA
G.R. No. 24964, therefore does
not bind his co-heirs, his co-plaintiffs in the second case for reivindicacion; said decision therefore can only be
considered as res judicata
as far as Pelagio Yusingco
is concerned, but not as against his co-heirs.

II

1.  To further strengthen
their position on the question of res judicata, plaintiffs-appellants argue that the Court
of First Instance of Surigao in the hearing of the
petition for reconstitution of certificates of title under Rep. Act. No. 26,
acted as a Land Registration Court of a limited and special jurisdiction
without power to decide questions of ownership.

But said rule on limited
and special jurisdiction of a
Court of First Instance acting as a Land Registration Court is not without exceptions.  Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the 1960 case of Aglipay, et al. vs. De Los Reyes, Jr.^[6] formulated the exceptions thus:

“True it is that there have been instances wherein this Court
sanctioned deviations from the otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of a
Land Registration Court, being special and limited in char­acter and
proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not extend to cases involving
issues properly litigable in other independent suits or ordinary civil actions
(see Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Serafica,
61 Phil. 19; Caoibes vs. Sison,
102 Phil. 588; Gurbax Singh Pabla
& Co., et al. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil.
177; Cruz vs. Tan, 93 Phil., 348; 49 Off. Gaz.,
2254).  From those cases, however, we may
at once gather that the peculiarity of the excep­tions is based not alone on the
fact that Land Registration Courts are likewise the same Courts of First
Instance but also on the following premises: 
(1) mutual consent of the parties or their acquiescence in submitting
the aforesaid issues for determination by the court in the registration
proceedings; (2) full opportunity given to the parties of their respective
sides of the issues and of the evidence in support thereto; and consideration
by the court that the evidence already of record is sufficient and adequate for
rendering a decision upon those
issues.  The latter condition is a matter
that largely lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge xx xx.” underscoring
supplied)

The exception, as
above-stated, was not applied in said Aglipay case
because the last requisite was not present. 
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, however, subsequently applied the same in the
1963 case of Franco vs. Monte de Piedad and Savings
Bank.^[7] In this case, plaintiffs
appealed from the order, of the Court of First Instance dismissing Civil Case
No. Q-5009 (which was designated by plaintiffs as action for reformation, but
declared by the court to be one for declaratory relief) on the ground of res iudicata, The prior final judgment pleaded as a bar
to the second action was an action for consolidation (G.R. 0. Rec. No. 3563),
where Monte de Piedad petitioned the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City acting as a land
registration court, “to declare the ownership of the assigned
properties consolidated in it; to order the cancellation of the titles in the
name of the spouses; and the issuance of a new certificate in the name of
Monte.” The said petition was opposed by the spouses Franco, therein
plaintiffs-appellants, but the court overruled their objection, and ordered the
cancellation of the certificates and the issuance of new ones in the name of
Monte.  No appeal was made.  In answer to the argument of Franco that they
could not have raised the issues of their present action in the previous case
(G.L. RO Case) “xx xx because a Land Registration Court has no power to decide cases involving
issues properly litigable in ordinary civil actions”, this Court, through
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, citing the Aglipay case,
ruled that:

“xx xx Such is the general rule; but
because in this jurisdiction it is the courts of first instance that also
function as courts of land registration, our jurisprudence recog­nizes
exceptions to the rule above-stated, where the parties have acquiesced in
submitting the issues for the determination in the registration proceedings and
they are given full opportunity to present their respective sides and submit
their evidence xx xx.”

Therefore, it appearing
from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of
certificates of title, the
parties acquiesced in submitting
the issue of ownership for determination in the
said petition, that they were given the full opportunity to
present their res­pective sides of the issues and evidence in support there­of,
and that the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a
proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was
valid and binding.  It being a valid
judgment, res judicata
applies.

2.  Furthermore,
plaintiffs-appellants seek to challenge the application of the principle of res judicata in the
case at bar by contending that the petition for reconstitution under R.A. No.
26 is merely of an ad­ministrative nature. 
It must be emphasized that R.A. No. 26 provides for two ways or
methods of reconstituting certificates of title, namely, judicial and
Administrative reconstitution is covered by sections 5 and 6 of the said Act
while judicial reconstitution is covered particularly by Sections 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 22 and 23 of the same Act. 
Judicial reconstitution was the method availed of by appellant Pelagio Yusingco in the first
case they instituted.

Moreover, it must be
remembered that generally “xx xx the fundamental
principle of res judicata
applies to all cases and proceedings,”^[8] including land registration or cadastral
proceedings.^[9]

III

The claim of ownership of
appellant Pelagio Yusingco
over the disputed lots is also barred by the equitable principle of laches, which requires the following essential elements:

“(1)  conduct on the part of the defendant, or one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that led to the complaint
and for which complaint seeks a remedy;

 (2)   delay
in asserting the complainant’s
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

 (3)   lack
of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and

 (4)   injury
or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held barred.”^[10]

The first element is present because the appellees
and their predecessors took possession in 1936 of the disputed parcels of land
and since then have been exercising acts of ownership over the same, which
constitute an inva­sion of said appellant Pelagio Yusingco and his predecessors’ alleged rights of ownership
and possession.

The second element is also present because from 1936 appellant Pelagio Yusingco could have
instituted the proper action to recover possession and ownership of the
disputed lots, but notwithstanding the invasion of their alleged rights of
possession and ownership, appellant Pelagio Yusingco who should have known of the intrusion into their
right of possession and ownership because of the open, adverse and continuous
possession by the appellees and their predecessors of
the disputed lots in concept of owners, instituted a suit to recover the
disputed lots for a period of 28
years from 1936 until October 30, 1964 when the present case for recovery of
ownership was filed.  The fact that a
petition for reconstitution of certificates of title was filed by the appellant
Pelagio Yusingco on
February 13, 1952 (p. 9, second par. of the Record of Appeal of the previous case CA G.R. 24964-R), does not
alter the situation; because even if we count as of that date (Feb. 13, 1952),
the fact of delay as an element of laches
still obtains considering that as of that date a period of 16 years had elapsed
from 1936.

The third element is
likewise present, considering that from
the time Ong Bonping and his
predecessors took possession of the disputed lots openly, adversely and con­tinuously
in concept of owners, no voice of protest was raised by the appellant Pelagio Yusingco.  And this is more patent when we consider the
fact that, as stated in the decision in the previous case, said appellant Pelagio Yusingco knew of the
construction of the buildings being undertaken by the appellees
on the disputed lots and in spite of such knowledge never raised any protest
against the same.  There is no evidence
hinting that appellees as well as their
predecessors had any notice or knowledge that appellant Pelagio
Yusingco would assert the right on which the present
suit is based.

Clear also that the
fourth element is present in this instant case, considering that the appellees will, in the event relief is granted to the appellants, be deprived not only of the lots which they
acquired for valuable con­sideration but also of the valuable and permanent
improve­ments which they have introduced on the disputed lots.

But, as in the case of res judicata, laches can be taken against only plaintiff-appellant Pelagio
Yusingco and not against his co-heirs who were not
the parties in the reconstitution case as aforestated
and, therefore, should not be bound by the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid reconstitu­tion case.100

As a necessary
consequence, the dismissal by the trial court thru its order of June 17,
1965, of the second
civil case for reivindicacion
is only valid as against
appellant Pelagio Yusingco,
whose co-heirs are entitled to file their answer in the second civil action for
recovery of ownership.

WHEREFORE, the
order dated June 17, 1965, of the lower court is hereby affirmed only insofar
as plaintiff– appellants Pelagio Yusingco
is concerned; but set aside with respect to the other plaintiffs-appellants;
and the records of this case are hereby remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings as regards the other plaintiffs’-appellants.  No costs.

Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, and
Villamor, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the separate opinion of Justices Teehankee and  Barredo.

Teehankee, J., concurs with Justice Barredo’s
reservation, in a separate opinion.

Barredo, J., concurs with reservations in a separate opinion.

^[1]
Sta. Ana vs. Narvadas, et al., L-24390, Nov. 8, 1969,
30 SCRA 456, Zambales Academy, Inc. vs. Vilanueva, L-19884, 28 SCRA 1; Perkins vs. Benguet, 93 Ph 1. 1035; Oberiano vs.
Sobremesana, 91 Phil. 921; America
& English Encyclopedia of Law, Second Edition, Vol. 24, p. 714.

^[2]
Malvar, et al, vs. Pallingagan,
et al., L-24736, Sept. 27, 1966,
18 SCRA 121, 124-25; Nator vs. CII, L-16671, March 30, 1962, 4 SCRA, 727, 733.

^[3]
Gonzales vs. Gonzales, L-22717, Nov.
27, 1968, 26 SCRA 72, 77; Aguila vs.
J.M. Tuason, L-24223, Feb. 22, 1968, 22 SCRA 690, 694.

^[4]
Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. 11, 1966 ed., p. 866, citing American cases;
see also Racoma vs. Fortich,
39 SCRA 520, 524; Azur vs. Pray, Board,
L-22333, Feb. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 50, 57.

^[5]
Gonzales vs. Gonzales, Nov. 27, 1968, 26 SCRA 72, 76; Aguilar vs.
Tuason Co., Feb. 22, 1968, 22 SCRA 690; Albano vs. Colome, 1967, 21
SCRA 411, 418; Sumerariz vs. Development Bank of the Phil., 21 SCRA
1378; Abes, et al. vs. Rodil,
et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. vs. Cruz, et al., 106 Phil. 68;
Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco vs. Go Fay, 81 Phil.
258; San Diego vs. Cardona, et ,a1., 70 Phil.
281.

^[6]
March 23, 1960, 107 Phil.
335,

^[7]
Apr. 22, 1963, 7 SCRA 660.

^[8]
Albano vs. Coloma, 21
SCRA 418, citing the case of Brillantes vs.
Castro, 99 Phil. 497; and, 60 CJS 31, 267.

^[9]
Abes, et al. vs. Rodil,
et al., L-2099b, July 30, 1966,
17 SCRA 822.

^[10]
Nielson & Company vs. Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Co., Dec. 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1053; Custodio vs.
Casiano, Dec. 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 845; Vergara vs. Vergara, May
18, 1962, 5 SCRA 56; Vda. de Abraham vs.
Estate of Ysmael, Jan. 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 303; Z.E. Lothe, Inc.
& Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., Dec. 28, 1961, 3 SCRA 744; Viloria vs. Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Apr. 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 883–884; de Lucas vs. Gamponia,
Oct. 31, 1956, 100 Phil. 277; Go Chin Gun, et al. vs. Co Cho, et al., Feb.
28, 1955, 96 Phil. 637.

Clean

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