CONCORDIA CAGALAWAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CUSTOMS CANTEEN, FRANCISCO YU AND RAMONA PASTORAL, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On December 24, 1957, Concordia Cagalawan, filed a claim against the
Manager, Customs Canteen (Ramona Pastoral), before the Regional Office
No. 8, Department of Labor, Davao City for Separation Pay, Overtime Pay
and underpayment (Case No. LSV-23). The hearing officer held that the
claim for overtime pay and underpayment did not lie and dismissed the
same for lack of merit, but ordered the payment of separation pay in
the sum of P104.00, if she would not be reinstated, and recommended the
filing of an action for a violation of section 11 (b) and 4(c) of the
Women and Child Labor Law. No appeal was taken from this ruling to the
Labor Standard Commission.

On January 16, 1958, the same Concordia Cagalawan filed a complaint
against the Customs Canteen, Francisco Yu and Ramona Pastoral, before
the CFI of Davao (Civil Case No. 2554).

She alleged in her complaint that on February 20, 1957, defendants
contracted her to work on the Customs Canteen, as a waitress; that she
was receiving a monthly salary of P30.00, much below the minimum
required by the Minimum Wage Law (Rep. Act No. 602); that she had
rendered overtime work for which she was not paid compensation (Comm.
Act No. 444); that in June, 1957, she complained with the Police
Department of Davao City regarding a quarrel she had with one of the
boys in the canteen, which act displeased the manager, defendant Yu
who, without cause, compelled her to leave her employment; that she was
not formally and actually notified by defendants at least one month in
advance that her services was to be terminated, “in gross violation of
Republic Act No. 1052, as amended and as such, she is entitled to
reinstatement, including back salaries until she is returned to her
work”; and that due to the refusal of defendants to pay her claim,
despite demands, she was compelled to hire a lawyer to protect her
interest for P200.00 and that she suffered moral damages in the sum of
P1,000.00. Plaintiff prayed that defendants be ordered: (1) to pay her
the amount corresponding to her overtime pay and the differential pay
between her actual salary and the minimum provided for by Act No. 602;
(2) to pay “her one month separation pay or in the alternative, back
salaries and wages until her reinstatement”; and (3) to pay her the sum
of P200.00 and P1,000.00 for attorney’s fees and moral damages,
respectively.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that (1)
the value of the subject matter sought to be recovered is less than the
minimum requirement; and (2) even assuming the value is more than
P2,000.00, the Court has no jurisdiction over the action (amended
petition to dismiss). It is contended that the subject matter of the
complaint being money claim, such as separation pay, overtime pay and
underpayment, the regular courts of justice have no original
jurisdiction and that the Regional Office No. 8 of Davao City should
try and determine such claims, as such office alone has the original
and exclusive jurisdiction on all money claim cases.

The court dismissed the case, without costs, holding that “the claim
of the plaintiff here does not fall under the original jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance because the claim is less than P2,000.00”
and suggesting that what the plaintiff should have done “was to elevate
the case to the Labor Standard Commission and after the final decision
in accordance with the Rules and Regulations 1, an appeal can be
interposed to the Court of First Instance”.

The appeal taken from said judgment by the plaintiff to the Court of
Appeals, was elevated to us, as the same involves the question of
jurisdiction.

We recently held:—

“* * *. So that it was not the intention of
congress, in enacting Rep. Act No. 997, to authorize the transfer of
powers and jurisdiction granted to courts of justice from these, to the
officials to be appointed or offices to be created by the
Reorganization Plan.
* * *. The Legislature could not have intended
to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission, an executive
body, as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its powers to
legislate or create courts of justice to any other agency of the
Government.
* * * the
provision of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, ‘particularly Sec. 25, which
grants to the regional offices original and exclusive jurisdiction over
money claims of laborers, is null and void, said grant having been made
without authority by Rep. Act No. 997″ (Corominas, Jr., et al. vs. Labor Standards Commission, et al., MCU vs. Calupitan, et al., Wong vs. Carlim, et al., Balrodgan Co., et al., vs. Fuentes, et al., 112 Phil., 551; 59 Off. Gaz., [43] 7432) (See also Pitogo vs. Sen Bee Trading Co., et al., 112 Phil., 842; 59 Off. Gaz. [43] 7446).

As the provision of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which grants to
the regional offices (in this case Regional Office No. 8, Department of
Labor, Davao City), original and exclusive jurisdiction over money
claims of laborers, is null and void, what court, should entertain the
present claim?

Under the law and jurisprudence the Court of Industrial Relations’ jurisdiction extends only to cases involving (a)
labor disputes affecting an industry which is indispensable to the
national interest and is so certified by the President to the Court
(Sec. 10, Rep. Act No. 875); (b) controversy about the minimum wage, under the Minimum Wage Law, Rep. Act No. 602; (c) hours of employment, under the Eight-Hour Law, Comm. Act No. 444 and (d)
unfair labor practice (Sec. 5[a], Rep. Act No. 875). And such disputes,
to fall under the jurisdiction of the CIR, must arise while the
employer-employee relationship between the parties exists or the
employee seeks reinstatement. When such relationship is over and the
employee does not seek reinstatement, all claims become money claims
that fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts (Sy Huan vs.
Judge Bautista, et al., 112 Phil., 941; 61 Off. Gaz. [20] 2942, and
cases cited therein).

In the case at bar, admittedly there is no labor dispute; no unfair
labor practice is denounced by any of the parties; the cause of the
dismissal of the petitioner was the displeasure caused upon the
respondent manager, by the act of the petitioner for having brought a
quarrel between her and another employee, to the attention of police
authorities; and when the claim was filed, there was no longer any
employer-employee relationship between the parties. While it may be
true that the complaint, alleged that she was not notified by
defendants, at least one month in advance, that her services were to be
terminated “in gross violation of Republic Act No. 1052, as amended,
and as such she is entitled to reinstatement, including back salaries
until she is returned to her work” and that in her prayer she asked for
the granting of such relief, it is equally true that it is not within
the authority of the Court of Industrial Relations, to reinstate her
and pay her back wages, in the event that she had a right to a
separation pay, there being no allegation nor proof that defendant had
committed unfair labor practice. In the recent case of National Labor
Union vs. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corporation, 112 Phil., 821; 58 Off.
Gaz. (40) 6447, it was ruled the absence of unfair labor practice, the
CIR has no power to grant remedy under its general powers of mediation
and conciliation, such as reinstatement or back wages. Moreover, a
violation of the law on separation pay (Rep. Act No. 1052, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 1787), involves, at most, a breach of an obligation of
the employer to his employee or vice versa, to be prosecuted like an
ordinary contract or obligation—a breach of a private right which may
be redressed by a recourse to the ordinary courts. Hence, the case at
bar is cognizable by an ordinary court, the Court of First Instance of
Davao, in this particular case, it appearing that the amount involved
herein, is within the jurisdiction of said pourt, as per findings of
the Court of Appeals.

In view hereof, the order appealed from, dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction, is reversed, and the same is remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.