G.R. No. L-15934. October 31, 1961
CARMEN PLANAS, PETITIONER, VS. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Tax Appeals directing the execution of a judgment of the defunct Board
of Tax Appeals.
In February 1950, petitioner Carmen Planas received a communication
from the then Collector (now Commissioner) of Internal Revenue,
advising her that her war profit tax and surcharge had been assessed at
P81,723.30. Upon reinvestigation, on her request, the assessment was
reduced to P77,991.35. Petitioner asked another reinvestigation, in
consequence of which her war profit tax assessment was further reduced
to P47,847.15, computed as follows:
“Assets
_______________“Liabilities
_______________
_______________
_______________
_______________
_______________
_______________
_______________
Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Finance, but, before the
latter could dispose of the matter, the Board of Tax Appeals was
created by Executive Order No. 401-A, dated January 5, 1951. This
notwithstanding, she insisted that a decision be rendered by said
officer, who eventually affirmed the action taken by the Collector of
Internal Revenue. Petitioner brought the case on appeal to said Board
of Tax Appeals, which, on May 29, 1952, after appropriate proceedings,
affirmed the decision of said two (2) officers, except as to the value
of petitioner’s jewels, which was increased from P8,000.00 to P15,000.
Petitioner appealed from the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals to
the Supreme Court, where the case was docketed as G. R. No. L-5866. By
a minute resolution, dated March 30, 1954, this Court dismissed the
appeal, without prejudice, “following the decision in the case of
University of Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil.,
376; 49 Off. Gaz. (6) 7745.” The Solicitor General moved for a
reconsideration of said resolution, but the motion was denied on
February 11, 1955.
Meanwhile, or on June 16, 1954, Republic Act No. 1125 creating
respondent Court of Tax Appeals had been approved. On or about
September 9, 1958, the Solicitor General filed with such Court, a
motion for the execution of the aforementioned decision of the Board of
Tax Appeals. Despite petitioner’s objection thereto, the motion was
granted in a resolution adopted on June 10, 1959, with the concurrence
of the Presiding Judge and an Associate Judge of the Court of Tax
Appeals, and the dissent of the other Associate Judge thereof. A
petition for reconsideration of said resolution had the same result.
Petitioner maintains that the resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals
directing the issuance of a writ of the execution of the decision of
the Board of Tax Appeals should be reversed, because said decision was
neither valid nor final or executory, and because respondent is
estopped from enforcing said decision.
In University of Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals supra,
we granted a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the
Board of Tax Appeals from hearing an appeal of the University of Santo
Tomas from an income tax assessment of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, upon the ground that the provisions of the Executive Order No.
401-A conferring upon said Board exclusive jurisdiction over all
appeals from decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments and other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code, in effect deprived courts of first
instance of their jurisdiction to act on such cases; that the grant of
said jurisdiction “comes within the exclusive power of Congress”; and
that said provisions are, accordingly, “null and void” insofar as they
interfere with the jurisdiction of said courts of first instance. This
implied that said Board had no jurisdiction over said internal revenue
cases, and that, necessarily, its decisions therein are null and void,
subject only, pursuant to section 21 of Republic Act No. 1125, to two
(2) exceptions, namely: (a) cases previously decided by the Board of
Tax Appeals and thence appealed to the Supreme Court, which shall
decide said cases as if said Executive Order No. 401-A had been duly
enacted by Congress; and (b) cases pending in the Board of Tax Appeals
at the time of the approval of said Act, which “shall be transferred to
the Court of Tax Appeals and shall be heard and decided by the latter
to all intents and purposes as if they had been originally filed
therein”.
As a consequence, when, relying upon the U.S.T. case, this Court, in
its resolution of March 30, 1954, dismissed, without prejudice,
petitioner’s appeal from the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals dated
May 29,1952, it implied that such decision was, as it is, null and
void. Indeed, the case at bar does not fall under the above-mentioned
exceptions. It was not pending in this Court at the time of the
approval of Republic Act No. 1125. Neither was it then pending in the
Board of Tax Appeals, for the same had decided it two (2) years prior
to the approval of said legislation.
The Court of Tax Appeals held that this case should be considered
pending in the Board of Tax Appeals in May 1954, because its decision
was then pending execution. This theory is, however, untenable, for:
(1) our aforementioned resolution of March 30, 1954, dismissing the
appeal from said decision, without prejudice, in line with
the doctrine laid down in the U.S.T. case, necessarily implied that
said decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was null and void, and,
hence, it could never be executed; (2) the theory that it was then
pending execution is predicated upon the assumption that the decision
had already become executory, which is inconsistent with said dismissal
of the appeal, without prejudice, since the same implied a recognition
and a reservation of petitioner’s right to still question, by
appropriate proceedings, her alleged liability for war profit tax; and
(3) the second exception under section 21 refers evidently to cases,
not, as yet, heard and decided by the Board of Tax Appeals, for such cases were still to be “heard and decided” by the Court of Tax Appeals.
It is next urged by the government that section 21 of Republic Act
No. 1125 had the effect of validating all acts of the Board of Tax
Appeals, and that petitioner having failed to appeal from the decision
thereof, either to the Court of Tax Appeals, or to a court of first
instance, said decision had become final and executory. The first part
of this pretense is inaccurate. Said section 21 virtually validated the
proceedings of the Board of Tax Appeals in the two (2) cases therein
specified—which do not include the one at bar—not all acts of said
Board. The second part of respondent’s pretense overlooks the fact that
a decision that is null and void, such as that rendered by the Board of
Tax Appeals in the present case, for want of jurisdiction, is not a
decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become
executory.
It is true that in Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, G. R. No. L-9833 (December 21, 1957), we ruled that:
“As indicated by the Tax Court, after dismissal of
its appeal the Sta. Clara’s remedy was to sue in the Manila court of
first instance, after paying the assessment. Thereafter, upon the
establishment of the Court of Tax Appeals, its remedy was an appeal to
such Court within the thirty-day period.”
and that, seemingly, petitioner herein, has taken none of the steps
thus adverted to. Still said void decision of the Board of Tax Appeals
did not, and could not have, become executory in consequence of said
omission. Viewed from any angle, there was, therefore, no decision of
the Board of Tax Appeals that respondent Court of Tax Appeals could
have ordered executed.
This conclusion renders consideration of appellant’s plea of estoppel unnecessary.
Wherefore, the resolution of June 10, 1959, is hereby set aside, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.