SAN PABLO OIL FACTORY, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners appealed by certiorari from the resolution of the
respondent court en banc, Judge Tabigne dissenting, granting the motion
filed by the herein respondent, Kapatirang Manggagawa Association (NLU)
dated July 6, 1959, and, as a result, amending its resolution of
October 29, 1958 by granting back wages to the workers involved in the
case corresponding to the period of their unemployment due to the
discriminatory lockout declared by their employer.

Our decision promulgated on November 28, 1962 reversed the appealed
resolution because, upon the facts then clearly disclosed by the
record, we held that when the same was issued, the resolution of the
court of October 29, 1958, holding herein petitioners guilty of unfair
labor practice, but without making any pronouncement as to backwages,
had already become final and executory and that said court had
therefore no authority in law to amend the same in any substantial
respect.

For a better understanding of the case, we reproduce here the following portions of the original decision:

“On February 25, 1957, the Union thru its president,
presented to the Company a petition for the renewal of the collective
bargaining agreement entered into by and between them on July 6, 1955.
The petition contained twelve new demands.

“Inspite of a
series of negotiations and conferences in the course of which proposals
and counter-proposals were submitted and discussed, the parties were
unable to reach any agreement. Consequently, the Union filed a notice
of strike with the Department of Labor on April 22, 1957, effective May
22, 1957. Three days laters the Company, thru its president, likewise
filed a notice of lockout with the Department of Labor to be effective
on May 27, 1957. These notices notwithstanding negotiations between the
parties went on until the afternoon of May 27, 1957 when, upon closing
of working hours, the Company declared a lockout against the members of
the Union, of which the latter was notified.

“After the
lockout, the negotiations continued, and in the course of one of the
conferences between the parties, the workers offered to return to work
but without signing a new contractùunless their additional demands were
granted. The Company insisted, however, as a condition precedent to
their returning to work, that they sign a new contract embracing no
more than the provisions of the old contract.

“On July 26,
1957, the Union, filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial
Relations (Case No. 1350-ULP) charging the Company with unfair labor
practice under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 and praying that
its members be allowed to return to work and be paid their work wages
from the time, they were locked out to the time they will be allowed to
resume their jobs.

“The Company’s answer alleged that the
lockout was legal, having been declared in accordance with the
provisions of the Industrial Peace Act, and that it was the members of
the Union who refused to work under the terms of employment offered to
them.

“On September 8, 1957, the parties having agreed upon
mutually acceptable terms of employment, signed a new collective
bargaining agreement. This notwithstanding the case for unfair Labor
Practice (Case No. 1350-ULP) was continued, but after due trial
thereof, the Court of Industrial Relations, on March 21, 1958, issued
an order dismissing the case. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above-mentioned order and on October 29, 1958,
the Court en banc issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

‘Wherefore, let the
order of the Trial Court, dated March 21, 1958, be as it is hereby,
reversed and respondents should be”, as they are hereby iheld, guilty
of unfair labor practice as charged in the complaint.’

“An appeal was taken by the Company from the above-mentioned resolution, but we dismissed it for lack of merit.

“More
than eight months afterwards, that is, on July 6, 1959, tile Union
filed a motion with the Court of Industrial Relations praying that, in
view of its resolution finding the Company guilty of unfair labor
practice, back wages be awarded to the workers during the period of the
lockout.

“After a hearing on the motion, on March 15, 1961,
the Court of Industrial Relations issued the resolution subject matter
of the present appeal.”

There is, therefore, no question that on March 21, 1958, after
appropriate proceedings, the complaint for unfair labor practice
against herein petitioners was dismissed by Judge Tabigne, but that the
court en banc, by its resolution of October 29, 1958, reversed the
order of dismissal and held petitioners guilty of unfair labor
practice; that on July 6, 1959-more than eight (8) months after the
date of the resolution just mentioned, the Union filed a motion with
the court praying that, in view of the finding of unfair labor practice
against petitioners, back wages be awarded to the laborers involved in
the case, corresponding to the duration of the lockout.

In the original decision we held, as already stated, that the motion
for back wages was filed out of time, and, as a result, we reversed the
appealed resolution. But the Union claims in its motion for
reconsideration that although the resolution appealed from was dated
October 29, 1958, it was only on July 1, 1959 that the parties
received due notice thereof, and that such being the case, its motion
for back wages filed on July 6, 1959, or only five (5) days after
notice, was filed before the resolution of October 29, 1958 could
become executory. Petitioners expressly admit in their opposition to
the motion for reconsideration that the Union—in fact, even they—were
served with notice of the resolution of October 29, 1958 only on July 1, 1959.
In the face of these facts that now clearly appear on record, the
conclusion becomes inescapable that the motion for back wages filed on
July 6, 1959 was timely filed. Consequently, at the time of its filing,
the respondent court still had control and jurisdiction over its
resolution of October 29, 1958 finding herein petitioners guilty of
unfair labor practice.

The petitioners herein claim that the motion for back wages of July
6, 1959 was not a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
October 29, 1959. We find no merit in this contention. The aforesaid
resolution was obviously incomplete because the court, having found the
Company guilty of unfair labor practice, should have made an award of
back wages in favor of the laborers who were the victims of the lockout
(Section 15, Act No. 875). In view of this, the Union filed its motion
for back wages which, in legal effect, was one to reconsider, to amend
or complete the original resolution.

In view of all the foregoing, our decision promulgated on November
28, 1962 is hereby amended, by reaffirming, as we hereby affirm, the
resolution of the respondent court subject of this appeal.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.