IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF ROBERT MCCULLOCH DICK DECEASED, FRANCIS THEOBALD ROGERS, EXECUTOR AND PETITIONER, VS. HELEN C. DICK AND HON. ANDRES REYES, JUDGE, COURT OF…

This is an original action for certiorari to annul certain orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

It appears that on October 20, 1960, petitioner Francis Theobald Rogers
filed with said Court, a petition, which was docketed therein as
Special Proceedings No. 3433, for the probate of a document said to be
the last will and testament of Robert McCulloch Dick, who allegedly
died in Quezon City, Philippines, on February 14, 1960. It was alleged
in said petition that the decedent at the time of his death was a
British subject domiciled in the Philippines and a resident of
Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal.” On or about December 2, 1960, respondent
Helen C. Diek, one of the persons named in said Will as heirs, legatees
or devisees of the decedent, filed a “Manifestation and Motion” praying
that the aforementioned petition “be corrected so that it will state
that the decedent was a British subject of Scottish nationality and/or
citizenship.’ Despite petitioner’s opposition thereto, Respondent Hon.
Andres Reyes, as Judge of said Court, Branch VI, granted said motion by
an order dated January 4, 1961. A reconsideration of this order having
been denied by respondent Judge, in another order dated February 9,
1961, the petitioner instituted the present action upon the ground that
respondent Judge had gravely abused his discretion in issuing said
orders of January 4 and February 9, 1961.

Section 4 of Rules 17 of the Rules of Court, upon which respondents rely, reads:

“Sec. 4. Amendment to conform to evidence.-When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result
of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings,
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely
when the presentation of the merits of the action will he suhserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.”

Respondents maintain that the phrase “any party” contained in this
section justifies the orders complained of. Such pretense is clearly
untenable, for it overlooks the spirit and purpose of the above
provision and the nature and character of pleadings under our
procedural laws.

To begin with, pleadings “are written
allegations of what is affirmed on one side or denied on the other.”
(Words & Phrases, Vol. 32A, p. 251, citing Tiffin vs. Hendricks, 271 p. 2d, 683, 44 Wash. 2d. 837). Hence, a party may amend his own pleading, but not that of his opponent, for otherwise the pleading would not reflect the claim, allegations or defenses of the pleader.

Secondly, pleadings serve to determine the issues of law and/or fact
raised by the respective pleaders. Accordingly, there must be, and
there is a limit as to the time at which a party may amend, his own
pleading. Amendments may be made, therefore, within the time and under
the conditions prescribed in the Rules of Court, generally, before the
trial or hearing of the case or issue on the merits. Indeed, otherwise,
there would be no way to determine and limit the nature of the evidence
to be presented or admitted or of the arguments that the parties may
adduce. This, notwithstanding, “when”, as provided in the above-quoted
section 4, “issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall, be treated, in all
respects, as if they had been made in the pleadings,” and “such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion
ofrany party even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues.” This provision confers
upon the Court discretion to permit a party to amend its own pleading, at any time, under the circumstances therein adverted to.

Thirdly, if respondent Helen C. Dick deems it necessary, for the
protection of her right, to allege and prove, or feels she has proven,
that the decedent is of “Scottish nationality and/or citizenship”, she
may so allege in her own
pleading and urge the court, at the proper time, to declare that said
allegation has been established and is a fact, regardless of whether or
not petitioner has alleged it in his own petition. She cannot compel
the petitioner to allege what he is unwilling to allege or
believes-even though erroneouslyùmot to be a fact.

Wherefore, the aforementioned orders of respondent Judge, dated January
4 and February 9, 1961, are hereby annulled, with costs against
respondent Helen C. Dick. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angela, Barrera, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.