GUIA S. JOSE DE BAYER AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. ERNESTO OPPEN, JR. AND MARGARITA CUYUGAN OPPEN, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by certiorari against a decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on January 29, 1948, affirming with some modification a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering petitioner to vacate
the premises in question, located at the corner of Ta nduay and Tuberias
Streets, Manila.

The decision of the Court of First Instance, rendered on August
27, 1946, ordered the defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of P60 per month beginning January 1, 1942, the case
having been initiated in said court with an action filed on March 16, 1943.

On July 11, 1940, plaintiffs demanded from defendants to vacate
the premises and to pay a monthly rental of P150 beginning July, 1940.
Defendants wrote plaintiffs refusing to agree to the increase of the monthly
rent from P60 to P150. Plaintiffs continued collecting rents at the rate of P60
a month until October 25, 1940, when plaintiffs again demanded from defendants
to vacate the premises and insisted on the monthly rent of P150.

Defendants raised the question of jurisdiction of the trial
court, alleging that the case was a simple one of ejectment falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court of Manila. The question was
dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila, and was agian raised before
the Court of Appeals, which disposed of it as follows:

“Now, going to the errors assigned by the
defendants-appellants, and starting with the first one, we cannot agree to the
contention of the said defendants that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
try and decide this case. It is true that the question involves the ejectment of
tenants, and the recovery by the landlord of the rentals thereof. According to
law, within one year form the time that premises unlder lease are dtained
unlawfully the action should be brought in the Municipal Court, and, thereafter,
it has to be brought in the Court of First Instance for the action would then be
in the nature of an accion publiciana for the recovery of possession. It
will be remembered that the defendants-appellants were required to vacate the
premises since July, 1940, and, therefore, the demand was more than once
repeated. The defendants neither vacated the premises nor paid the amount of
P150 demanded by the owners as rentals. From that time, they were in default and
were detaining the premises unlawfully. The present action was brought only on
March 16, 1943, i.e., more than two years after the commencement of the
unlawful detainer. It is clear that the municipal court would not have
jurisdiction and that the action could be brought only in the Court of First
Instance.”

We do not see valid reason to reverse the action taken by the
Court of Appeals. The action filed on March 16, 1943, was intended not only to
eject petitioners but also to collect from them rents at the rate of P150 a
month form July 1940, including damages in the amount of P5,000 based on the
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in the preparation of the plan and
specifications for the construction of an eighteen-door apartment on the lot, as
well as the profits they expected to make form the rents, and it is clear from
the plaintiffs’ action and from the facts as found by the Court of Appeals that
the illegal possession by defendants of the premises in question started from
July 1, 1940, or, at least, from October 25, 1940, as the record will show, when
plaintiffs again demanded from defendants to vacate the premises and insisted on
the payment of a monthly rentals of P150, that is to say, much more than two
years before the action was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila over forcible entry and
detainer cases is circumscribed to illegal possessions not exceeding one year
before the action is initiated. Beyond that period, the jurisdiction to
entertain an ejectment case belongs to the Court of First Instance.

Petition for certiorari is denied with costs.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and
Reyes, JJ., concur.

Paras, J.:

I concur for the reason stated in my dissenting opinion in
Cananay vs. Sarmiento, G. R. No. L-1246.