SILVERIO MARCHAN AND PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS CO., INC., PETITIONERS, VS. ARSENIO MENDOZA, LEONARDA ILAYA, AND ZENAIDA MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners, the driver of the passenger bus responsible for the
injuries sustained by respondents for which he was duly prosecuted and
thereafter convicted for serious, less serious, and slight physical injuries,
and the bus firm, the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, seek the reversal of a Court
of Appeals decision of December 14, 1964 and a resolution of March 31, 1965,
holding them liable both for compensatory and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees. it is the contention of petitioners
that errors of law were committed when, in the aforesaid decision, it was held
that there was an implied contract of carriage between the petitioner bus firm
and respondents, the breach of which was the occasion for their liability for
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals follow:  “In the even­ing of February 22, 1954,
between 9:00 and 9:30 o’clock, a passenger bus No. 141 of the Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, bearing Plate No. TPU-708 which was then driven by Silverio Marchan fell into a
ditch somewhere in barrio Malanday, Polo, Bulacan, while travelling on its
way to Manila; as a result of which plaintiffs-appellees
Arsenio Mendoza, his wife and child, [respondents in
this proceeding], who were then inside the bus as passengers were thrown out to
the ground resulting in their multiple injuries.  Plaintiff Arsenio
Mendoza suffered the most serious injuries which damaged his vertebrae causing
the paralysis of his lower extremities which up to the time when this case was
tried he continued to suffer.  The
physician who attended and treated plaintiff Arsenio
Mendoza opined that he may never walk again. 
Consequently, the driver of said bus Silverio Marchan [now petitioner] was prosecuted for serious, less
serious and slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before the
Justice of the Peace Court of Polo, Bulacan, and
thereafter convicted as charged on June 29, 1956 * * *, which judgment of
conviction was subsequently affirmed by the Court of First Instance of same
province * * *.  In this present action
before us, plaintiffs-appellees Arsenio
Mendoza, his wife and child sought to recover damages against the
defendant-appellant Silverio Marchan,
then the driver of bus No. 141 of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, and from
defendants-appellants Bienvenido P. Buan and Natividad Paras in their capacity as administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the estate of the late Florencio P. Buan, doing business
under the style name of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, predicated not only on
a breach of contract of carriage for failure of defendants operator as well as
the defendant driver to safely convey them to their desti­nation, but also on
account of a criminal negligence on the part of defendant Silverio
Marchan resulting to plaintiff-appellee’s
multiple physical injuries.”^[1]

The Court of Appeals in the decision under review found that
there was a preponderance of evidence to the effect that while respondents Arsenio Mendoza, his wife, Leonarda
Ilaya, and child, Zenaida
Mendoza “were waiting for a passenger bus on January 22, 1954 at about
9:00 in the evening at Malanday, they boarded
defendants-appellants’ bus bearing No. 141 of the Philippine. Rabbit Bus Lines
with Plate No. TPU-708 bound for Manila.  And they were treated as passengers thereto,
for they paid their corresponding fares. 
As they travelled along the highway bound for Manila,
said bus was traveling at a high rate of speed without due regard to the safety
of the passengers.  So much so that one
of the passengers had to call the attention of Silverio
Marchan who was then at the steering wheel of said
bus to lessen the speed or to slow down, but then defendant Silverio
Marchan did not heed the request of said passenger;
neither did he slacken his speed.  On the
contrary, defendant Silverio Marchan
even increased his speed while ap­proaching a six-by-six truck which was then
parked ahead, appa­rently for the purpose of passing the said parked truck and
to avoid collision with the incoming vehicle from the opposite direction.  But, when appellant Silverio
Marchan veered his truck to resume position over the
right lane, the rear tires of said truck skidded because of his high rate of
speed, thereby causing said truck to fall into a ditch.  Substantially, the happening of the accident
resulting to the multiple injuries of plaintiffs-appellees,
was explained by defendant Silverio Marchan who declared that while he was driving his bus from
barrio Malanday bound towards Manila
on a road test, he suddenly noticed an oncoming vehicle.  He thus shifted his light from dim to
bright.  Just then, he noticed a
six-by-six truck parked on the right lane of the road where he was driving.  Confronted with such situation that if he
would apply his brake he would bump his bus against the parked truck he then
increased his speed with the view of passing the said parked truck, and
thereafter he veered to negotiate for the proper position on the right lane,
but in so doing he swerved to the right in order to avoid collision from the
oncoming vehicle the rear portion of the bus skidded and fell into the
ditch.”^[2]

Hence the finding of negligence in the decision
under review.  Thus:  “From the facts as established
preponderantly by the plaintiff and substantially corroborated by the defendant
Silverio Marchan, it is
clear that the cause of the accident was the gross negligence of the defendant Silverio Marchan who when driving
his vehicle on the night in question was expected to have employed the highest
degree of care; and should have been assiduously prudent in handling his
vehicle to insure the safety of his passengers. 
There is no reason why he could not have stopped his vehicle when
noticing a parked truck ahead of him if he was not driving at a high
speed.  His admission to the effect that
if he would apply his brake he would bump or hit the parked truck ahead of him,
since there was no time for him to stop the bus he was driving, is a patent
indication that he was travelling at a high rate of
speed without taking the necessary precaution under the circumstance,
considering that it was then nighttime. 
It is our considered view that under the situation as pictured before us
by the driver of said bus, he should not have increased his speed and by-­passed
the parked truck obviously with the view of preventing a collision with the
incoming vehicle.  Any prudent person
placed under the situation of the appellant would not have assumed the risk as
what appellant did.  The most natural
reaction that could be expected from one under the circumstance was for him to
have slackened and reduced his speed. 
But this was not done simply because defendant-appellant could not
possibly do so under the circumstance because he was then travelling
at a high rate of speed.  In fact, he had
increased his speed in order to avoid ramming the parked truck without,
however, taking the necessary precaution to insure the safety of his
passengers.”^[3]

On the above facts, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of
December 14, 1964, affirmed the amount of P40,000.00
awarded by the court below as compensatory damages modifying the appealed lower
court decision by holding petitioners to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages and sustaining the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of
P5,000.00.  Then came
the reso­lution of March 31, 1965
by the Court of Appeals, where the motion for reconsideration of petitioners
was denied for lack of merit.

In their brief as petitioners, the first error assigned is the
alleged absence of an implied contract of carriage by the petitioner bus firm
and respondents.  On this point, it was
the holding of the Court of Appeals: 
“Since it is undisputed by the evidence on record that appel­lant Silverio Marchan was then at the
steering wheel of the vehicle of the defendant transportation company at that
moment, the riding public is not expected to inquire from time to time before
they board the passenger bus whether or not the driver who is at the steering
wheel of said bus was authorized to drive said vehicle or that said driver is
acting within the scope of his authority and observing the existing rules and
regulations required of him by the management. 
To hold other­wise would in effect render the aforequoted
provision of law (Article 1759) ineffective.”^[4]
It is clear from the above Civil Code provision that common carriers cannot
escape liability “for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence and wilful acts of the former’s
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders * * *.”^[5] From Vda. de Medina v. Cresencia,^[6]
where this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stressed the “direct and
immediate” liability of the carrier under the above legal provision,
“not merely subsidiary or secondary,” to Maranan
v. Perez,^[7] a
1967 decision, the invariable holding has been the responsibility for breach of
the contract of carriage on the part of the carrier.  According to the facts as above disclosed,
which this Court cannot disturb, the applicability of Article 1759 is
indisputable.  Hence,
the total absence of merit of the first assignment of error.

The next two errors assigned would dispute the holding of the
Court of Appeals in imposing liability in the respective amounts of P40,000.00 for compensatory damages and P30,000.00 for
exemplary damages.  Again, such
assignments of error cannot be looked upon with favor.  What the Court of Appeals did deserves not
reprobation but approval by this Court.

As to why the amount in compensatory damages should be fixed in
the sum of P40,000. 00 is explained in the appealed
decision thus:  “Likewise, it is our
considered view that the amount of P40,000.00 awarded by the court below as
compensatory damages is quite reasonable and fair, considering that plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza had suffered paralysis on the lower
extremities, which will incapacitate him to engage in his customary occupation
throughout the remaining years of his life, especially so if we take into
account that plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza was only 26
years old when he met an accident on January 22, 1954; and taking the average
span of life of a Filipino, he may be expected to live for 30 years more; and
bearing in mind the earning capacity of Arsenio
Mendoza who before the happening of this accident derived an income of almost
P100.00 a month from the busi­ness of his father-in-law as Assistant Supervisor
of the small [fairs] and his income of P100.00 a month which he derived as a
professional boxer.”^[8]
Considering that respondent Arsenio Mendoza was only
in his middle twenties when, thru the negligence of petitioners, he lost the
use of his limbs, being condemned for the remainder of his life to be a
paralytic, in effect leading a maimed, well-nigh useless existence, the fixing
of such liability in the amount of P40,000.00 as
compensatory damages was well within the discretion of the Court of Appeals.

As to the finding of liability for exemplary damages, the Court
of Appeals, in its resolution of March
31, 1965, stated the following: 
“We now come to the imposition of exemplary damages upon
defendants-appellants’ carrier.  It is
argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate this
exemplary damages since there was no allegation nor prayer, nor proof,
nor counterclaim of error for the same by the appellees.  It is to be observed, however, that in the
complaint, plaintiffs ‘prayed for such other and further relief as this Court
may deem just and equitable.’ Now, since the body of the complaint sought to
recover damages against the defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs prayed for
indemnification for the damages they suffered as a result of the negligence of
said Silverio Marchan who
is appellant’s employee; and since exemplary damages is intimately connected
with general damages, plaintiffs may not be expected to single out by express
term the kind of damages they are trying to recover against the defendant’s
carrier.  Suffice it to state that when
plaintiffs prayed in their complaint for such other relief and remedies that
may be availed of under the premises, in effect, therefore, the court is called
upon the exercise and use its discretion whether the imposition of punitive or
exemplary damages even though not express­ly prayed or pleaded in the
plaintiffs’ complaint.”^[9]

In support of the above view, Singson
v. Aragon was
cited by the Court of Appeals.^[10]
As was there held by this Court: 
“From the above legal provisions it appears that exemplary damages
may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others,
to compensatory damages, but that they cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, their determination depending upon the dis­cretion of the court.  It further appears that the amount of
exemplary damages need not be proved, because its determination depends upon
the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant.  If the amount of exemplary damages need not
be proved, it need not also be alleged, and the reason is obvious because it is
merely incidental or dependent upon what the court may award as compensatory damages.  Unless and until this premise is determined
and established, what may be claimed as exemplary damages would amount to a
mere surmise or speculation.  It follows
as a necessary consequence that the amount of exemplary damages need not be
pleaded in the complaint because the same cannot be predetermined.  One can merely ask that it be determined by
the court if in the use of its discretion the same is warranted by the
evidence, and this is just what appellee has
done.”

Such a principle has been repeatedly upheld.^[11]
In Corpus v. Cuaderno,^[12]
this Court, again through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, made clear that the amount
“lies within the province of the court a quo, * * *.”
It must be admitted, of course, that where it could be shown that a tribunal
acted “with vindictiveness or wantonness and not in the exercise of honest
judgment,“ then there is room for the interposition of
the corrective power of this Tribunal.

No such reproach can be hurled at the decision and resolution now
under review.  No such indictment would
be justified.  As noted earlier, both the
second and the third assignments of error are devoid of merit.

Nor is there any occasion to consider further the fourth assigned
error, petitioner being dissatisfied with the award of P5,000.00
as attorney’s fees to respondents.  On
its face, such an assignment of an alleged error is conspicuously futile.

The judgment, however, must be modified in accordance with the
ruling of this Court in Soberano v. Manila
Railroad Co.^[13]
Respondents are entitled to interest for the amount of compensatory damages
from the date of the decision of the lower court and legal interest on the
exemplary damages from the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, as thus modified, the decision is affirmed,
petitioners being liable for the sum of P40,000.00 in
the concept of compensatory damages with interest at the legal rate from and
after January 26, 1960, and the sum of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages with
interest at the legal rate from and after December 14, 1964, as well as for the
sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees, likewise earning a legal rate of interest
from and after January 26, 1960.  Costs against petitioners.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, J.J., concur.

Reyes, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Annex A, Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 71 to 72.

^[2] Ibid,
pp. 73 to 74.

^[3] Ibid,
pp. 76 to 77.

^[4] Ibid, p. 80.

^[5] Article 1759, Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[6] 99 Phil. 506 (1956).

^[7] G.R. No. L-22272, June
26, 1967.

^[8]
Annex A, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 90.

^[9]
Ibid, pp. 103 to 104.

^[10] 92 Phil, 514, 518 (1953).

^[11] Ventanilla v.
Centeno, G.R. No. L-14333, January 28, 1961; Goleongco   v. Claparols, G.R. No. L-18616, March 31, 1964; Corpuz v. Cuaderno, G.R.
No. L-23721, March 31, 1965;
General Enterprises Inc. v. Llanga Bay Logging
Co., G.R. No. L-18487, August 31, 1964; Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No.
L-20089, December 26, 1964; Lopez v.
Pan American World Airways, G.R. No. L-22415, March 30, 1966; Air France v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438,
September 28, 1966.

^[12] G.R. No. L-23721, March
31, 1965.

^[13] G.R. No. L-19407, November 23, 1966, 18 SACRA 733, 744, per Castro, J.