G.R. No. L-24165. August 30, 1968
JUAN M. SERRANO, PETITIONER, VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, CHAMBER OF TAXICAB SERVICES, INC., ADMIRAL TAXI CO., INC., LITA ENTERPRISES COMPANY, INC., SABINO GONZALES, ET AL., …
FERNANDO, J.:
A joint decision of respondent Public Service Commission,[1]
passing on the claim of 99 applicants for certificate of public convenience to
operate and maintain taxicab service within the city of Manila and suburbs and
from there to any point in the Island of Luzon, specifying by name those
granted such certificates of public convenience, sixty in number, but failing
to refer individually to the unsuccessful ones, their fate being indicated by
the curt and summary statement, “the applications not included in the list
of those granted are either [dismissed] for lack of interest or failure to
prosecute or [denied] for failure to qualify,” is assailed in this
petition for review by Juan M. Serrano, one of those who failed in his bid to
obtain a certificate of public convenience.
According to petitioner, he “filed an application with the
Public Service Commission requesting authority to operate a taxicab automobile
service within the City of Manila
and from said city to any place in the Island
of Luzon open to motor vehicle
traffic and vice versa, with the use of fifty (50) units.”[2]
He “alleged in his application
that he is of age, Filipino citizen, married and a resident of 121 Minnesota, Quezon City; that he is a public service bus operator in
the City of Manila and environs being the holder of several certificates of
public convenience embracing different lines; that he desires to operate a taxicab service in the City of
Manila and environs and proposes to utilize fifty (50) units of bantam closed
cars of the Toyopet type; that public convenience and
necessity demand the immediate approval of the application; that the applicant
is financially capable to establish and maintain the proposed service; that
the applicant will charge the rates that are at present charged by existing
taxicab operators in the City of Manila and environs; and that the applicant is
ready and willing to comply with the Public Service Act as amended and all such rules and regulations of the Public Service Commission now existing or
which may be promulgated from time to time.”[3]
His application “was heard by Associate Commissioner Gregorio C. Pañganiban. The
record of the case shows that the petitioner completed the presentation
of his evidence, but the oppositors did not present
any evidence to rebut the evidence
of the petitioner as to his qualification and financial capacity.”[4]
Nonetheless, “the Public Service Commission denied completely [his]
application * * *. It is not known from
the decision appealed from whether the application of the petitioner was dismissed for lack of interest or
failure to prosecute or denied for failure to qualify.”[5]
A motion for reconsideration was filed and denied by respondent
Public Service Commission. Hence the
present petition for review.
In his brief, petitioner
alleged as the first error committed by the
Public Service Commission its failure to make “a statement of facts
as to each case regarding the qualification and financial ability of the applicant and the other
factors constituting the criterion used as basis in granting the application,
in whole or in part, on the one hand, and dismissing or denying the application
on the other.”[6] Petitioner, in support of the above
assignment of error, relies on the constitutional provision that “no
decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.”[7]
The above constitutional
mandate does not lend support to petitioner’s plea. Its wording is clear and definite. The obligation to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the
decision is based is incumbent on a court of record.
The Public Service Commission is not a court of record within the
meaning of the above constitutional provision.
So it was held by us in Dagdag v. Public
Service Commission,[8]
with its categorical pronouncement of the Commission not being “a judicial
tribunal,” its functions being “limited and administrative in
nature.” Reference was made in the above decision to the earlier case of Filipino
Bus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co.,[9]
where not once but twice it was explicitly stated that the Public Service
Commission is “not a court.”
It does not mean,
however, that the non-inclusion of the administrative tribunal within the scope
of the above constitutional provision justifies the summary disposition of
petitioner’s application in the manner followed by respondent Public Service
Commission. In Ang
Tibay v. Court,[10] speaking of the Court of Industrial
Relations, which is likewise an administrative tribunal possessed of quasi?judicial
powers like the Public Service Commission, we made clear that while it is
“free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements,” it does not
mean “that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirement of due process * * *.” Seven cardinal primary rights,
which, this Court held, must be respected, are enumerated, the last being
“that quasi-judicial
tribunals,” and the Public Service Commission is one of them,
“should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.”[11]
It does not admit of doubt that when in a decision under review respondent
Public Service Commission did not even bother to refer individually to
petitioner and state why his application is either dismissed or denied, there
was a violation of the above cardinal primary right.
The failure to respect
such cardinal primary right of petitioner to have his application decided in
such a manner as to inform him not only of the issues involved but the reasons
for the decision, which necessarily would likewise require a finding of facts,
cannot receive judicial approval. The
error of the Public Service Commission is thus marked and manifest.
The gravity of such a
failing is underscored not only by deprivation of a right to which petitioner
is entitled, but also by the obstacle placed on the responsibility entrusted to
us of reviewing decisions and orders of the Public Service Commission. Only the other month, in Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Gabatin,[12]
a study of our decisions from
Philippine Shipowners‘ Association v. Public Utility
Commissioner,[13]
to Robles v. Blaylock,[14]
a period covering more than 45 years, yielded the conclusion that invariably
this Court accords deference to a finding of facts of respondent Commission,
unless it could be shown that evidence in support thereof is lacking. It is all the more essential then that each
and every application should be considered strictly on its merits and the
relevant facts in support of an order, ruling or decision be carefully inquired
into and clearly set forth. Otherwise,
the exercise of the power of review by this Court might be condemned to
futility. Necessarily then, such an arbitrary fiat as the denial or dismissal of an
application without any statement as to why under the evidence such a result is
called for is plainly bereft of support in law.
Even if, as was noted in the joint decision, there was a lack of
interest or failure on the part of an applicant calling for a dismissal of his
petition, such a conclusion must find support in the competent evidence before
the respondent Commission and must be so indicated in the order.
In the second assignment of error, petitioner would have this
Court pass on the sufficiency of his evidence to show that he has all the
qualifications required to entitle him to a certificate of public
convenience. The evaluation of the
evidence is primarily for the respondent Public Service Commission. The summary denial of his petition, as above
noted, was plain and palpable error. There
is a need then to remand the matter to respondent Public Service Commission so
that it could consider the evidence and discharge the function committed to it
by law. Only after it has rendered its
decision setting forth the facts on which it is based does the power of review
on the part of this Court come into play.
As of this stage then, it is premature to consider the second assignment
of error.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Public Service Commission
of September 7, 1964 insofar as it dismissed or denied the application of
petitioner Juan M. Serrano, is set aside and the case remanded to respondent
Public Service Commission to consider the evidence submitted by him and
thereafter to render a decision either approving or denying the same based on the
facts as found which must be set forth therein.
Without pronouncement
as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Angeles, JJ., concur.
[1]
Macario A.
Abad, Jr. and 98 other applicants, PSC Cases Nos.
62-6717, from Sept.
7, 1964.
[2]
Brief for Petitioner, p. 2
[3]
Ibid, pp. 2-3.
[4]
Ibid, pp. 4-5.
[5]
Ibid, p. 5.
[6]
Ibid, p. 6.
[7]
Article VIII, Section 12, Constitution
of the Philippines.
[8]
104 Phil. 162, 168
(1958).
[9]
57 Phil. 860 (1933). CF.
Hoc Lian Ho Dry Goods Club and Tan v. Manila
Electric Co., 63 Phil. 804, 808 (1936), where it was held: “The Public Service Commission is not a judicial tribunal, and its functions are
limited and administrative in nature.”
[10]
69 Phil. 635 (1940). The
doctrine in the Ang Tibay
case has been followed in subsequent decisions, the latest of which is Phil.
Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, G.R. No. L-24321, July 21, 1967.
[11]
Ibid, p. 644.
[12]
G.R. No. L-24472,
July 31, 1968.
[13]
43 Phil. 328 (1922).
[14]
G.R. No. L-24123,
March 27, 1968.