EDUARDO P. LIM, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), AND BSM CREW SERVICE CENTRE (PHILS.), INC., RESPONDENTS.
DIMAAMPAO, J.:
The factual backdrop of the case unfolds as follows:
Petitioner Eduardo Lim (petitioner) was engaged as Chief Cook by private respondent BSM Crew Service Center (Phils.), Inc. for and in behalf of its foreign principal, co-private respondent Bernhard Schulte Shipmanagement, Ltd., under an employment contract for nine months. Petitioner left Manila on 17 March 2010 and boarded the vessel Ocean Elegance in Cuba on 19 March 2010. On 26 January 2011, he returned to Manila after completing his contract. Inevitably, petitioner instituted a Complaint[4] for payment of permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees. In his Complaint, petitioner averred, inter alia, that his illness was acquired during the term of his contract. While on board the vessel lifting heavy cooking materials, he sustained a fall after which he experienced severe chest pains, dizziness and abdominal pain radiating down to his right lower extremity. He reported his condition to the superior officers, but he was only given pain reliever which afforded temporary relief. As his condition worsened, he was examined at the Ship Clinic and later on at a Port Clinic in Curacao. He was diagnosed to have Cardiovascular Disease and Uncontrolled Hypertension, and was advised to be repatriated for further evaluation and management.
When petitioner arrived in Manila, he reported to the local manning agency for referral of his condition. His plea fell into deaf ears as his ailments were not work-related. He consulted a cardiologist, Dr. Josette Villanueva-Cristobal. After two months of treatment, he was declared unfit for sea duties in any capacity.[5] Another internist, Dr. Eduardo Yu, confirmed this finding and likewise opined that petitioner was physically unfit to go back to work. He demanded payment of disability benefits from the manning agency but his entreaty remained unheeded.
Au contraire, private respondent asseverated that petitioner is not entitled to disability compensation inasmuch as his repatriation was due to completion of contract and not to any medical reason. Petitioner failed to adduce proof that he contracted an injury/illness while on board the vessel and during the effectivity of his contract. Likewise, he did not proffer any evidence that he complied with the three-day mandatory post-employment examination.
Confronted with the diverse postures of the parties, the Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioner’s Complaint as he was found to be disqualified to receive any benefits for failure to comply with the compulsory reporting requirement. The Labor Arbiter ratiocinated and disposed in this wise—
“The cornerstone of award of disability benefits under the POEA SEC is the sufferance by a seafarer aboard ocean going vessel of a work-related illness or injury during the term of his employment contract. Stripped to its elements, the claimant must prove that – 1. he suffered a work-related injury or illness on board and 2. the injury or illness was contracted or aggravated during the term of the contract of employment. As a safeguard against fraudulent claims, the seafarer shall(,) however(,) submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
Those requisites were not proven in this case with sufficient evidence.
|
x x x
|
x x x
|
WHEREFORE, premised (sic) considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
All other claims are likewise denied for being bereft of merit.
SO ORDERED.”[6]
Nonplussed, petitioner appealed the propriety of the denial of his claim for disability benefits to the NLRC. In the challenged Decision, the NLRC affirmed on appeal the judgment of the Labor Arbiter.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied in the assailed Resolution, petitioner commenced the instant Petition anchored on the following postulations:
I
THE ILLNESSES/CONDITIONS OF PETITIONER ARE CLEAR-LY WORK-RELATED AND WORK-AGGRAVATED, THEREFORE CLEARLY COMPENSIBLE UNDER THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.
II
A FINDING OF “FIT TO WORK” IN THE PRE-EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION DID PROVE THAT THE ILLNESS/ CONDITION THAT WAS DISCOVERED AT THE TIME OF EMPLOYMENT IS WORK-RELATED AND COMPENSIBLE.
III
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSI-CIAN MUST NOT BE GIVEN CREDENCE AND MUST NOT BE UPHELD AS MANDATED BY THE BINDING PROVISIONS OF THE POEA CONTRACT AND THE CBA.
IV
THERE IS ABSOLUTELY LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.
The Petition is barren of merit.
Discernibly, the lis mota of the controversy is whether or not petitioner is entitled to disability compensation and other benefits.
Case law teaches Us that the terms and conditions of a seafarer’s employment are governed by the provisions of the contract he signs at the time he is hired. But unlike that of others, deemed written in the seafarer’s contract is a set of standard provisions set and implemented by the POEA called the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which are considered to be the minimum require-ments acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels.[7]
Paragraphs (1) and (3), Section 20(B) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract (SEC) unequivocally state:
“B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows
|
x x x
|
x x x
|
- upon sign off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one-hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.”[8]
From the foregoing, it is as clear as day that the employer is liable only when the seafarer sustained a work-related injury or illness during the term of employment. For an injury or illness to be duly compensated under the POEA SEC, it must be shown that such injury/illness occurred or was suffered during the effectivity of employment contract.[9]
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to establish that he indeed contracted his injury/illness while on board the vessel and during the period of his employment. The Master’s report or the vessel’s log of medical complaints divulged no account of injury/illness. Neither did petitioner adduce evidence that he was examined at a Port Clinic in Curacao or by a ship’s physician. It is primal that one who makes an allegation must support his allegation with substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process.[10] Moreover, self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence.[11] The oft-repeated rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.[12]
Invariably, We reverberate the disquisition of the NLRC that petitioner was repatriated due to completion of contract and not to any medical condition, viz—
“On the other hand, on record is a Disembarkation Report dated 28 January 2011, showing that complainant disembarked due to ‘COC’ or Completion of Contact, and that he indicated that he will be available for re-employment in ‘March 2011’. There is nothing in said Disembarkation Report, or in any other report for that matter, showing that complainant was suffering from any illness at the time of his disembarkation, or that he reported the same to respon-dents.”[13]
In the same vein, petitioner propounded no cogent proof that he complied with the compulsory three-day post-employ-ment examination.
Section 20(3) of the POEA-SEC provides that it is mandatory for a seaman to submit himself to a company-designated physician for post-employment examination within three days from his repatriation. If he were physically incapacitated to do so, he should submit a written notice to the manning agency within the same period. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits.[14]
Here, the records are devoid of any showing to bolster petitioner’s claim that he reported to the manning agency for such mandatory reportorial requirement or, at the very least, informed the latter through a written notice about his alleged condition. His disputation that his ailments were work-related is self-serving, baseless and unsubstantiated. He has nary a scintilla of evidence to substantiate his assertion. Ineluctably, his claim for disability benefits and other monetary awards falls through.
Assuming ex argumenti that petitioner was repatriated for medical reasons, We perceive no compelling reason at all for him to dispense with the mandatory nature of the reportorial requirement. He should have reported to the company-designated physician for post-employment examination and not to his physician of choice. Petitioner having failed to faith-fully adhere to the established procedure, he deprived private respondent of the opportunity to assess and evaluate his condition, and eventually issue a disability grading. Thence, his claims for disability benefits merit no approbation.
While We empathize with petitioner’s plight, We are constrained to deny his claims for disability compensation and other benefits absent of proof of compliance with Paragraph 3, Section 20(B) of the POEA-SEC. To disregard this rule would set a precedent with negative repercussion because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits.[15] Admittedly, strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits, but the Court cannot altogether disregard the mandatory provisions of the law.[16]
In sooth, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed against the NLRC for having upheld the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated 7 March 2012. Suffice it to say that the denial of petitioner’s claim for permanent disability benefits was valid, just and reason-able as it was based on applicable laws and prevailing jurisprudence.[17]
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Ybañez and Manahan, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-45.
[2] Id., pp. 46-61.
[3] Id., pp. 62-63.
[4] Rollo, pp. 210-213.
[5] Id., p. 199.
[6] Rollo, pp. 155-157.
[7] See Nisda v. Sea Serve Maritime Agency, 593 SCRA 668, 693 (23 July 2009).
[8] Cootanco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc., 615 SCRA 529, 543 (15 March 2010).
[9] Id., p. 545.
[10] See UST Faculty Union v. UST, 584 SCRA 648 (7 April 2009).
[11] See Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Esguerra, 655 SCRA 300, 309 (10 August 2011).
[12] Cootauco v. MMS Phil Maritime Services, Inc., 615 SCRA 529, 545 (15 March 2010).
[13] Rollo, p. 60.
[14] Cootauco v. MMS Phil Maritime Services, Inc., 615 SCRA 529, 544 (15 March 2010), citing Nisda v. Sea Serve Maritime Agency, 593 SCRA 688, 689 (23 July 2009).
[15] Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc., 615 SCRA 529, 546-546 (15 March 2010).
[16] Id., p. 547.
[17] See Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Beneficiaries of the late Second Officer Anthony S. Allas, 542 SCRA 593, 603 (28 January 2008).