SEBASTIAN PELIGRINO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GENERAL BASE METALS INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal (originally taken to the Court of Appeals but certified
to Us by virtue of its resolution of March 10, 1964) from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Bohol, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court
renders judgment giving the defendant a period of one (1) year, from the date of entry of this judgment,
within which she will continue possessing the land in question.  After the expiration of this period of one year, de­fendant shall vacate
the land and deliver its possession to plaintiff.  The Court has fixed such period in order to
give defendant the chance to look for another land which she may need for her
business.

In fairness to plaintiff, however, the Court sentences defendant to
pay said plaintiff a rental of P15.00 a month, from the date of the promulgation
of this judgment, while said defendant remains in the possession of the land in question.

Inasmuch as plaintiff’s claim for damages is unfounded, the Court
relieves the defendant from the obligation to pay any amount of damages.

The present judgment is rendered with­out special pronouncement as
to costs.”

On February 4, 1960,
appellee filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of
Guindulman, Bohol,
a complaint for the ejectment
of appellant General Base Metals Inc. from a parcel of land of a little less
than one hectare situated in barrio Basdio of said
municipality.  Appellant answered the
complaint alleging, inter alia, that it
had received appellee’s letter demanding payment of
an increased month­ly rental which it refused to pay because it deemed it
excessive; that it had the legal right to remain in possession of the leased
property because it had never failed to pay the rent agreed upon; that the
court had no juris­diction to hear and decide the case, not only because it had
never defaulted in the payment of rents, but also be­cause the dispute between
the lessor and the lessee over the increased rental
was not within the purview of an action for unlawful detainer
but a matter within the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance.

After trial the Justice of the Peace Court rendered judgment
ordering appellant to vacate the property and restore its possession to appellee; to pay the latter the monthly rent of P8.00 from
the time of the filing of the complaint until possession of the land aforesaid
has been restored to appellee, and to pay the latter
the sum of P50.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.

Not satisfied with the above decision, the defendant corporation
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Bohol
where it filed an answer alleging therein the same defenses relied upon by it below.

It appears that on January 15, 1948, appellee
leased the property described in the complaint unto Castrodes
& L. C. Hudson, for a monthly rent of P7.00.  On May
19, 1949, Hudson sold its mining claims, tools, etc.,
including its leasehold rights on appellee’s property
to appellant, and since then the latter had been occupying said property.  It is not disputed that the contract of lease
was for an indefinite period of time and that the rents agreed upon were
payable on a monthly basis.  Neither is
it disputed that appellant had paid all the monthly rents agreed upon from the
time it acquired Hudson‘s leasehold rights.

In a letter dated January 4, 1960 appellee
demanded from appellant the payment of an increased monthly rental   of P100.00, or that appellant vacate the
property before the end of that month should the increased rental not be acceptable to it.  As appellant refused to pay the increased
rental and to vacate the premises, the corresponding action for unlawful detainer was filed.

Considering the nature of the lease contract between the parties
– which, as stated heretofore, was on a monthly basis – it seems clear that appellee had the right to ter­minate the same at the end of
any given month, giving time­ly notice thereof to appellant.  This appellee did,
giving appellant, however, an opportunity to continue with the lease by paying
the increased monthly rental.  Therefore,
when appellant refused to do so, appellee had the
right to eject it from the leased property.

The trial court held, however, that considering the period of
time that appellant and its predecessor had been in occupancy of the leased
property, and the fact that it was in dire need of it in connection with the
development and operation of its mining claims, it was entitled, in equity, to
have its right of possession extended so that it may have an opportunity to
look for another suitable pro­perty.  For
this purpose, the court gave appellant a pe­riod of one year from the date of
entry of its final judg­ment, with the understanding that, upon the expiration
of such period, appellant should vacate the land in question and deliver its
possession to appellee.  As that period expired years ago, equity
likewise demands that appellant’s right to remain in possession of the leased
property must be deemed as having expired with it.

With respect to the increased rental demanded by appellee, the trial court sustained appellant’s contention
that the same was excessive considering the area and value of the leased
property, and held that the reasonable monthly rental is the sum of P15.00
payable from the date of promulgation of its decision (February 1, 1962).  This amount is fair and reasonable considering
the circumstances of the case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from being in accor­dance
with law, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro, J., no part.