PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CESARIO C. GOLEZ, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAPIZ, BRANCH I, AND ISAGANI ROBLETE, RESPONDENTS.

Original petition for certiorari – filed by the People of
the Philippines – seeking to annul the
order of dismissal as well as the subsequent order denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof issued by the
Court of First Instance of Capiz in its Criminal Case
No. 4220 – commenced therein by an Information filed by the Assistant
City Fiscal of Roxas City against private respond­ent
for alleged violation of the Revised Election Code – which said court based on
the ground that under Section 187 of the said Code, courts of first
instance have exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary
investigations, issue warrants of ar­rest and try and decide any criminal
action or proceed­ing for violations of the election law and, therefore, the
proceeding undertaken by the above-mentioned as­sistant city fiscal in
conducting his own preliminary investigation of the charge and in subsequently filing the corresponding
Information with the court a quo, being without authority of law, the only jurisdiction the said
court thereby acquired was to declare the said proceeding illegal and dismiss
the criminal action.

The following antecedent facts of the case are gleaned from the
pleadings of the parties:  Sometime
before March 25, 1966, the Office of the Election Re­gistrar of Roxas City lodged with the Office of the Fiscal of said
city, a complaint against private re­spondent for alleged violation of Section
92 of Repub­lic Act No. 180, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised
Election Code.  Thereupon, Assistant City
Fis­cal Sergio Pestaño of Roxas City
conducted a preliminary investigation of the indictment wherein the ac­cused
(private respondent), through counsel, volunta­rily appeared and cross-examined
the witnesses for the prosecution (Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 48–49, Rollo).  Convinced after the termination of the preli­minary
investigation that a prima facie case existed against said respondent, on March 25, 1966, the above-named
assistant city fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz the corresponding Information, worded as follows:

“INFORMATION

“The undersigned accuses ISAGANI ROBLETE of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 92 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 180, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED
ELEC­TION CODE, committed as follows:

“That on the 4th day of September, 1965, which was a registration
day for the 1965 elections, in the City of Roxas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, without any autho­rity or permission to enter and participate in the
registration proceedings then being conducted by the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 74 of
this City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
polling place of said precinct and while there shouted, insulted, berated, and
threatened one Editha Anonat,
then acting in her official capacity as chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors of said precinct, thus causing a commotion inside the pol­ling place
and disturbing and interrupting the orderly and peaceful registration of new
voters then be­ing conducted by said Board of Elec­tion Inspectors.

“Contrary to law.”

“Roxas City,
Philippines, March 22, 1966.

(Sgd.) SERGIO PESTAÑO

Asst. City Fiscal

“Pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act 603, in relation to
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, a preli­minary investigation has been con­ducted
in this case under my direct­ion having examined the witnesses under oath and
having afforded the accused a chance
to appear in person or by counsel in said preliminary in­vestigation.

(Sgd.) SERGIO PESTAÑO

Asst.
City Fiscal

“SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25th day of
March, 1966, at Roxas City,
Philippines.

(Sgd.) LEOPOLDO B. DORADO

Clerk of Court

CFI, Capiz, Roxas City

“WITNESSES:

1.     
Atty. Jose Ma. Castillo -COMELEC, Roxas City

2.     
Editha Anonat – Roxas City

3.      Cirila Mesada – Roxas City

4.      Nenita Ariñez – Dinginan, Roxas City

AND
OTHERS.

“BAIL RECOMMENDED:  – –
– P3,000.00“

To prevent his subsequent arrest and detention, private
respondent seasonably posted a bail bond in the amount of P3,000.00; when
called for arraignment on April
1, 1966, however, he moved to quash the Information and all the proceedings had
in the case on the ground that Assistant City Fiscal Pestaño
had no legal authority to file the Information above-quoted; and acting upon
that motion to quash, the respondent judge of the court a quo
issued, on even date, an order quashing the Information and dismissing the
case.  In said order of dismissal, His
Honor reasoned thus:

“It appears that Isagani Roblete was made defendant in a charge of violation of
Section 92 of the Re­vised Election Code (RA-180, as amended).  The charge was filed with the Office of the
City Fiscal of Roxas City.  Assistant City Fis­cal Sergio Pestaño
conducted the preliminary investigation thereon in accordance with section 24,
RA-603, in relation
to Rule 112, Rules of Court; after which he filed the within information on
March 25, 1966, charging said Isagani Roblete with violation of the Revised Elec­tion Code; and
which information is now the subject of said defendant’s motion to quash on the
ground that the said information was filed by Assistant City Fiscal Sergio Pestaño without proper authority to do so.

“In regard to cases involving election offenses, the Court of
First Instance has exclusive original juris­diction to make preliminary investi­gations,
issue warrants of arrest and try and decide any criminal action or proceeding
for violation of the election law.  (Section 187, RA-180, as amended.)

“When the prosecuting City Fiscal herein conducted the
preliminary in­vestigation and pursuant to the same he filed the within
information, he acted plainly without jurisdiction and all his actuations in
the said proceeding were done by him without
authority of law.

“Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by the parties.  It remains where the law has placed it.  And the law has placed the conducting of
preliminary investigations of election offenses
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance.  By the language of the law, no other courts
or officers may exer­cise the power and authority to conduct preliminary
investigations of such cases.

“The proceeding in question having been conducted obviously
without authority of law, the only jurisdiction
acquired by this Court is to declare it illegal and dismiss this action.

“WHEREFORE, the entire proceeding leading to the filing of the
within information is hereby
quashed and this case dismissed with costs de officio.  The bail bond posted for the accused herein
is hereby cancelled and dis­charged.”

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal above-quoted, pointing out in its motion that respondent judge should
not have ordered the outright dismissal
of the case but should have conducted,
instead, his own preliminary investiga­tion on the basis of the Information
filed with his court (Memorandum for Respondent, p. 41 – last para­graph – Rollo).  That motion
failed to move the trial court
which, in an order dated May 3,
1966, denied the
motion for reconsideration referred to for lack of
merit.  Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

To be sure, the ruling of the respondent judge that only his court, to the exclusion of the City Fiscal,
had authority to conduct preliminary investigations is unassailable.  (Tagayuma
vs. Lastrilla, et al., L-17501, August 30, 1962, 5
SCRA 937, 940-942; Sec, 187, Rule 180, Revised Election Code, as amended).  Under the circumstances of this case,
however, it was an abusive resort to technicality for the said respondent judge
to have dismissed the criminal case outright merely because, before it was
filed with him, the fiscal had, perhaps in an excess of caution, con­ducted a
preliminary investigation of his own, which was unnecessary since, anyway, such
preliminary investigation could not have, in law, finally terminat­ed the
matter either way.  As suggested by the
fiscal in his motion for reconsideration filed with the respondent judge, the
simple remedy was for the court to have conducted its own preliminary
investigation without regard to the one undertaken by the fiscal.  Had the respondent judge acceded, as he
should have done, to said suggestion, the valuable time and effort of everyone
concerned, including this Court, could have been saved and the merits of the
complainant’s charge, affecting as it does an alleged viola­tion of the
Election Law which public interest requires to be settled as soon as possible,
could have been determined and the public interest as well as the interests of
justice would have been best served.  No
question, the herein petition must be granted.

There are incidental issues extant in the plead­ings, among them,
the propriety of the present remedy of certiorari instead of appeal,
particularly, be­cause there is no allegation of grave abuse of discretion in the
petition, and the matter of waiver by the accused, respondent Roblete, of his right to the preliminary investigation
provided by Section 187 of the Revised Election Code, even if it is therein spe­cified
that it should be the proper court of first instance that should conduct it,
said accused having voluntarily appeared in the investigation in the fis­cal’s office and cross-examined the witnesses of the
prosecution and also filed bail for his provisional release, but We do not see
the necessity of passing upon them now. 
Suffice it to say, in connection with the nature of the present remedy,
that grave abuse of discretion is apparent in the recital of facts in the
petition and an allegation regarding such abuse is no more than a legal conclusion
which generally need not be alleged in a pleading.  Besides, since in the climate of waning faith
that prevails these days re­garding the efficacy of our election laws and proce­dures
in eradicating malpractices frustrating the popular will, certiorari
instead of appeal would seem to be the more speedy and adequate remedy, in
appro­priate cases like the one at bar, if only to dispell
as quickly as possible any doubt about alleged viola­tions of the right of
suffrage and the laws governing the same.

We may add, for clarification, that in election cases, the
criminal prosecution may be initiated by filing either a criminal complaint
subscribed and sworn to by the offended party, any peace officer or any duly
authorized representative of the Comelec (sec. 2,
Rule 110) or an information signed by the fiscal, who need not necessarily
conduct the preliminary investigation since pursuant to Sec. 14 of Rule 112, a
fiscal may file an information even without conducting a prelimi­nary
investigation when such investigation is required by law to be undertaken by a
judge or another officer.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders are reversed, and the
respondent court is ordered to proceed consistently with the above opinions,
without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.