PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SANTOS CABANERO Y MARIVELES, ACCUSED, CONSOLACION INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC., BONDSMEN-APPELLANT.

Appeal from an order of partial confiscation of a bail bond filed
by appellant Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co.,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the bondsman) for the provisional liberty of
accused Santos Cabanero y Mariveles,
who had earlier been charged with the crime of theft before the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

The facts are not disputed. For failure of the accused to appear
before the court a quo on the date of the trial (July 20, 1963),
it issued an order which reads as follows:

“When this case was called for trial this morning, the accused
failed to appear notwithstanding due notice to the bonding company.

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the confiscation of the bond filed for the provisional
liberty of the accused and the Consolacion Insurance
& Surety Co., Inc. is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof
within which to produce the person of the accused and show cause why judgment
should not be rendered against said bond.”

Before the expiration of the 30-day period allowed in the order
the bondsman moved for and was granted an extension of time within which to
comply with its undertaking.  Within the
extended period, more specifically, on September 4, 1963, the bondsman moved
that the previous order of confiscation be lifted, explaining that after receiving
the same it exerted efforts to locate the accused, only to discover later that
he was already confined in the provincial jail of Meal.  Finding the motion not to be well-founded,
the court a quo denied the same.

On September 13, 1963
appellant filed and moved for reconsideration and on the same date the court a
quo issued an order which reads as follows:

“In view of the explanation of bondsmen, forfeiture is hereby
reduced to 20% of the band and judgment is hereby rendered for said
amount.”

Failing to have this last order reconsidered, the bondsman
interposed the present appeal.

Appellant submits that the trial court erred: (1) in rendering
judgment for 20% of the bail bond before the termination of the period granted
for the production of the accused; (2) in finding the appellant negligent; and
(3) rendering such judgment inspite of the fact that
the accused was under the custody and power of the Government.

The first assigned error is untenable.  Under the rules (section 15, rule 114), when
the appearance of a defendant is
required by the Court, his surety shall be notified to produce him before the
court on a given date.  If the defendant
fails to appear as required, the bond is declared forfeited and the bondsman is
given 30 days within which to produce the defendant and to show cause why
judgment should not be rendered against for the amount of the bond.  Within the said period of 30 days, the bondsman
(a) must produce the body of the defendant or give the reasons for his
non-production; and (b) must explain satisfactorily why the defendant did not
appear before the court, when first required to do so.

“If upon the expiration thereof neither of the requisites is
complied with, judgment against the bondsman shall be rendered as a matter of course.  This however does not mean that if the
principal is produced before the period expires and the explanation is
submitted for his non-appearance when required the court will have to wait
until the expiration of such period before it may render judgment on the
bond.  There is no point at all in
deferring judgment since the matter is already submitted to the court on the
only question of whether or not the explanation is satisfactory and whether Or
not the bondsman should be held liable.” (People vs. del Carmen, et al.
L-22 82, October 30, 1967)

With respect to the second assigned error, the fact is that on
the date of the trial the accused did not appear, and neither was appellant
bondsman then aware as to his whereabouts. 
It was only after more than 30 days from the date of the trial when the
bondsman informed the court a quo that the accused was actually confined in the provincial jail of
Rizal in Pasig.  Bearing in mind that in bail matters the
surety is considered as the jailer of the principal, it clearly devolves upon
the bondsman to keep careful track of his movements.  The apparent lack of information by the
bondsman here of the whereabouts of the accused at a time when the latter’s presence in court was urgently required
indicates a certain degree of negligence in the performance of a bondsman’s
fundamental undertaking.

With reference to the third assigned error, even Assuming that in
the present case the accused was all along in the custody of the government,
the fact remains that the bondsman committed a breach of its obligation when it failed to provide the court a
quo with a timely
explanation for the accused’s non-appearance when it
was first required.  True, we have had
occasions in the past to take a more liberal attitude towards bondsmen (see
People vs. Puyal, 98 Phil. 415).  But “that liberality cannot go to the
extent of totally exonerating a bondsman who fails to produce the accused when
required, thereby causing a delay
in the trial and disposition of the criminal case; it would be placing defaulting bondsman on the same level is a non-defaulting one” (People vs. Familiar,
L-17124, June 30, 1966).

At any rate, under the circumstances of this case the most that the bondsman is entitled to is a
reduction of the amount to be forfeited. 
Since appellant was adjudged liable for only 20% of the actual amount of
the bond we see no reason, to disturb the order appealed from.  The same is therefore affirmed, with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.