APOLONIO GALOFA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NEE BON SING, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Direct appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in Civil Case No.
145 (Ni. 1737-Sorsogon) of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon
on the issue of whether or not the defendant’s answer to the complaint tendered
a genuine issue.

The plaintiff-appellee Apolonio Galofa filed a complaint
against the defendant-appellant Nee Bon Sing^[1]
for the recovery of possession of and to quiet title over a certain parcel of
land in Sta. Lourdes, Barcelona, Sorsogon, alleging
therein the prior ownership and possession of the land by his late father,
Francisco Galofa, and its adjudication in favor of
the plaintiff in an oral partition among his co-heirs.  The complaint alleges further:

“4.  That plaintiff however, despite the foregoing,
was unable to take actual possession of the above-described property due to an
unwarranted adverse claim of rights of ownership and possession by the
defendant and/or his tenant or encargado, Abion Pantilone, alleging sale by
a certain Fe Nicolas of said property to defendant, which if true, had no right
whatsoever to legally dispose the above-described property not being the owner
thereof, aside from the fact that the defendant is not allowed under the law to
own and possess real properties being an alien, pursuant to the Constitution
and/or the Krivenko case:

“x       x         x          x          x          x          x          x          x;

“x       x         x          x          x          x          x          x          x;

“9.  That as a result thereof, plaintiff was
compelled to ventilate this case to court and in so doing has to retain the
services of counsel for the contracted amount of no less than P1,500.00 and/or
spent or will spend the sum of P500,00 because of this case which could have
been avoided had the defendants been more fair and just in his dealings with
your plaintiff.

“x       x         x          x          x          x          x          x          x.”

In his answer corresponding to the above-quoted allegations in
the complaint, the defendant-appellant Nee Bon Sing manifested as follows:

“3.  That the defendant denies the material
averments contained in paragraph 4 of the Complaint, the truth being, that the
defendant never asserted title of ownership to the property described in the
Complaint to anybody, much less to the herein plaintiff in virtue of any deed
of conveyance executed in favor of the defendant by one Fe Nicolas, nor claimed
any possessory right over the said property, either
by himself or through another:

“x        x         x          x          x          x          x          x          x;

“5.  That if in fact the plaintiff had contracted,
as alleged in paragraph 8 of the Complaint, the services of counsel and will
spend the amounts therein specified occasioned by the institution of the
action, the same is his own personal responsibility, for which reason,
defendant denies any part and assumes no liability therefor
in any manner whatsoever;

“x        x         x          x          x          x          x          x          x.”

Upon motion by the plaintiff that the defendant’s answer failed
to tender an issue, the lower court rendered judgment on the pleadings,
declaring the plaintiff the owner of the property “free from any cloud
arising from any assertion of adverse claim or interest whatsoever on the part
of the defendant”, ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the
property to the plaintiff, and to pay attorney’s fees and costs.

We find that the lower court committed no reversible error in
rendering the appealed judgment.

It is to be noted that, to the plaintiff’s allegation of his
inability to take actual possession of the parcel of land due to “an
unwarranted adverse claim of rights of ownership and possession by the
defendant x x x“,
followed by an allegation of how such claim was exercised, the defendant’s
denial is as to the materials averments contained in paragraph 4 of the
Complaint, x x x”
conjoined with his disclaimer of dominical or possessory
rights in the manner alleged in the complaint. 
The defendant’s denial is, therefore, a negative pregnant, which is
equivalent to an admission.

“A denial in the form of a negative
pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot be ascertained whether it is
the fact or only the qualification that is intended to be denied.” (41 Am. Jur. 429)

“Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or modifying
language, and the denial is conjunctive, a ‘negative pregnant’ exists, and only
the qualification or modification is denied, while the fact itself is admitted.  Ison v. Ison, 115 SW 2d. 330, 272 Ky.
836.” (28 Words & Phrases 314)

As to the plaintiff’s allegation of his having contracted a
lawyer for a fee, the defendant does not deny the alleged fact;
what he denies his liability therefore, which is an issue of law.  Since the defends neither denies nor admits
the material allegation about the services of plaintiff’s counsel, judgment on
the pleadings is proper.  (Alemany vs. Sweeney, 3 Phil. 114)

The defendant, however, had specifically denied the plaintiff’s allegations
in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint. 
He traversed these allegations in his answer by stating that he
“does not possess any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the
(original) Complaint and therefore, denies the same.” But paragraphs 6 and
7 of the Complaint referred to damages, while paragraph 5 of the complaint
merely alleged a conclusion that by defendant’s acts a cloud over plaintiff’s
title had been raised) so that the defendant’s specific denials served no
purpose at all.  As to the amount of
damages, alleged in paragraph 6 of the complaint (P2,000.00 per agricultural
year) and specifically denied by the defendant, as aforesaid, a specific denial
is not required by the Rules.  (Sec. 1,
Rule 9, Rules of Court) At any rate, the appealed judgment did not condemn the
defendant-appellant to pay damages.

The defendant should have no complaint about the Court’s finding,
described in his second assignment of error, that –

“the lower court erred in concluding
that the allegations in defendant-appellant’s answer to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7
of the complaint are mere general denials and not specific denials under the
Rules of Court”

because, aside from what has been
previously stated, the plaintiff is barred from recovery of his alleged damages
for having prayed for a judgment on the pleadings, as thereby he is deemed to
have admitted the truth of the defendant’s denial on the alleged damages and to
have rested his motion for judgment on those allegations taken together with
such of his own as are admitted in the pleadings.  (Bauermann v. Casas, 10 Phil. 386; Evangelista v. De la Rosa, et al., 76
Phil. 115)

The defendant’s motion for reconsideration and/or new trial
furnished no justification to the lower court to set aside or re­consider its
judgment.  Said motion prayed that the
defendant be allowed to amend his answer but annexed to it is the defendant’s
own affidavit (Annex A, Rec. on Appeal, p. 57) reiterating that he had “no
real right or interest whatsoever not having been involved in any way with any
transaction affecting the title or possession of the same.” Definitely,
therefore, there was no issue to be tried and the court’s denial of the motion
was proper.  And why should the defendant
resist the judgment when he simultaneously asserts that he has no right to the
land?

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed judgment is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Amended later to include one Maria Castro who could not be served with summons
and was, presumably, a fictitious person x x x (Defendant-appellant’s Brief, p. 2) and one Apion Pantilone, who was dropped
and excluded as a party defendant by order of the court dated 15 November 1962.