FABIAN GARCIA, ANATALIA GARCIA AND BENJAMINA GARCIA., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ELOY B. BELLO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN AND PEDRO DE GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari and prohibition and for preliminary injunction.

On July 3, 1965 Fabian, Anatalia and Benjamina, all surnamed Garcia, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with this Court against Judge Eloy Bello of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, and Pedro De Guzman, docketed as
L-24702, praying that the respondents be restrained from enforcing the
order of the respondent Court of May 29, 1965, quoted hereunder:

“As prayed for in the motion for execution, let a
writ of possession issue, but the oppositors, Benjamina Garcia,
Anatalia Garcia, and Fabian Garcia, are hereby given a period of twenty
(20) days from receipt of this order within which to remove their
respective houses from the land subject of this case.”

By resolution of July 12, 1965 this Court dismissed the petition
“for insufficient allegations and for lack of supporting papers.” On
July 29, 1965 the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
wherein they alleged that the “lack of supporting papers” was an
inadvertence on their part; to said motion were attached the aforesaid
supporting papers.

By resolution of August 2, 1965 the resolution of July 12, 1965 was
reconsidered, the petition was given due course, and the respondents
were ordered to file an answer.

It is alleged in the petition that the respondent Judge issued the
afore-quoted order with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of its
jurisdiction, because the decision of this Court in “Benjamina Garcia,
Anatalia Garcia, Fabian Garcia and Vicente Garcia, petitioners, versus
Hon. Eloy B. Bello, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
and Pedro de Guzman, respondents”, G. R, L-21355, promulgated on April
30, 1965, has not yet become final and executory, as there is pending
adjudication by this Court a motion for reconsideration thereof; that
on June 2, 1965 the same petitioners, as oppositors in Land
Registration Case 765 of the respondent Court, filed therein a motion
for reconsideration of the order of May 29, 1965 (appendix C), wherein
they alleged that of the 84 hectares of land, subject-matter of
litigation in the said case, de Guzman is already in possession of 67
hectares thereof which he leased to Amado Fernandez and Teodorico
Paragas on December 12, 1960 (appendix D); that the remaining 17
hectares do not belong to de Guzman because he sold them to Juan
Garcia, father of the herein petitioners (appendices E and F); and that
de Guzman being already in possession of the aforesaid 67 hectares, and
not being the owner of the remaining 17 hectares, the writ of
possession prayed for by him has become moot and academic.

On August 20, 1965 de Guzman filed his answer to the petition
wherein he traverses the allegation of the petitioners that they are
the absolute owners of the 17 hectares claimed by them, pointing to the
final and executory decision of this Court in L-21355, April 30, 1965,^[1]
which dismissed a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the
same petitioners against the respondent Judge Eloy B. Bello of the same
respondent Court for the purpose of restraining the latter from further
proceeding in Land Registration Case 765, G.L.R.O. Record 15485. De
Guzman argues that the respondent court did not abuse its discretion in
issuing the order complained of as this was issued pursuant to the
judgment of this Court in L-21355, which upheld the authority of the
respondent court to proceed with the issuance of the writ of
possession; and that the present petition which poses the issue of
ownership of the 84 hectares of land, is barred by prior judgment,
involving the same parties and the same subject-matter, in Land
Registration Case 765, G.L.R.O. Record 15485. De Guzman prays that the
petition be denied.

The case was set for hearing on October 11, 1965. The attorney for
the respondents appeared and submitted the case for decision without
oral argument. There was no appearance for the petitioners, although on
February 3, 1966 they filed an ex-parte petition, praying that
a writ of injunction issue pending the resolution of the case, which
petition was denied by this Court’s resolution of February 9, 1966.

On August 1, 1966 the same petitioners filed a petition against the
same respondent Judge Eloy B. Bello, docketed as L-26357, praying that
pending the resolution of L-24702 a writ of preliminary injunction
issue to restrain the said Judge from enforcing his order of May 29,
1965.

By resolution of August 8, 1966 this Court required the respondent
Judge to answer the petition, which he did, on August 31, 1966.

The vital issue posed by the present petition is whether the
respondent Judge abused his discretion in issuing the writ of
possession prayed for by De Guzman.

This self-same issue has already been resolved in the negative in
L-21355, April 30, 1965, wherein this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Roberto Concepcion, now Chief Justice, said:

“The record shows that, on October 18, 1918,
respondent Pedro de Guzman instituted said proceeding for the
registration, in his name, of a tract of land situated in the
municipality of San Carlos, Province of Pangasinan; that, on January
30, 1923, judgment was rendered in said proceeding as prayed for by De
Guzman; that on July 18, 1923, Original Certificate of Title No. 25381
was, accordingly, issued in his favor; that on March 24, 1959, herein
petitioners instituted Civil Case No, 13847-II of the said court,
against De Guzman, for the reconveyance of the aforementioned land in
favor of herein petitioners; that on April 4, 1959, De Guzman moved to
dismiss said case No. 13847-II upon the ground that the same is barred
by the judgment rendered in Land Registration Case No. 765, that
petitioners have no cause of action and that the alleged right of said
petitioners and their action based therein are barred by the statute of
limitations; that on April 27, 1959, said motion to dismiss was
granted; that, on appeal taken by herein petitioners, the case was
docketed in the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-15988; that on September 1,
1959, respondent Judge had authorized, in said land registration case,
the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of De Guzman; that this
writ of possession was not, however, executed, owing to the pendency of
said appeal in the Supreme Court; that the latter rendered, on August
30,1962, a decision affirming the order of dismissal appealed from;
that soon thereafter, or on December 29,1962, respondent De Guzman
reiterated in the aforementioned land registration case, his motion for
issuance of a writ of possession in his favor; that on January 2, 1963,
petitioners herein objected to said motion of De Guzman, which was
granted by respondent Judge on February 2, 1963; and that, accordingly,
on June 4, 1963, petitioners herein instituted the present original
action for certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondent Judge from
enforcing said writ of execution and further proceeding in said case,
upon the ground that the decision rendered in the land registration
case is not binding upon them because they were not parties therein and
because they had taken possession of the land in question after tile
rendition of said decision.

“The petition herein is patently devoid of merit. To begin with, a land registration case is a proceeding in rem,
and accordingly, the decision therein rendered is binding upon the
whole world (Soroñgon vs. Makalintal et al., 80 Phil. 259). Secondly,
in civil case No.13847-II of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
petitioners herein sought to compel De Guzman to reconvey the land in
question upon the theory that the decree of registration thereof in his
name was based upon a deed of donation dated June 1, 1918 which had
been fraudulently secured by De Guzman from Juan Garcia, the father of
petitioners herein, who, allegedly, were in possession of said land at
that time, and remained continuously in possession thereof. Apart from
the fact that petitioners’ complaint in said case indicated that
petitioners were in possession of the land prior to and at the time of
the institution of the land registration proceedings – thus refuting
their allegation in the present case to the effect that the decision in
the land registration case does not bind them because their possession
is subsequent to said decision – the trial court, whose decision was
affirmed by this Court, held that the alleged fraud in the execution of
the aforementioned deed of donation had been disproved by the fact
that, although petitioners’ father Juan Garcia, did not die until 1950,
or thirty-two (32) years after the execution of said deed, he neither
sought to annul the same nor opposed De Guzman’s petition for the
registration of the land in question in his name. Lastly, it was held
in said case No. 13847-II of the lower court and G.R. No. L-15988 of
this Court that the decree of land registration in favor of De Guzman
bars the claim of petitioners herein.”

It may be argued that the present opposition to the issuance of the
writ of possession is based, not on any of the grounds relied upon in
L-15988^[2] and in L-21355,
but on the theory that of the land subject-matter in Land Registration
Case 765, G.L.R.O. Record 15485, covering a total area of 84 hectares,
only 67 hectares belong to de Guzman and the rest (17 hectares) belongs
to Juan Garcia, father of the herein petitioners, de Guzman having
allegedly sold the same to him, as evidenced by an “ESCRITURA DE COMPRA
VENTA” supposedly executed by de Guzman on May 3, 1916 (appendix F),
and by an “ESCRITURA. DE COMPRA VENTA DEFINITIVA”, also allegedly
executed by de Guzman on April 4, 1938 (appendix E).

These two documents can not avail the petitioners any. If Juan
Garcia did acquire a 17-hectare portion of the land subject-matter of
the said land registration case sometime in 1916, he should have
opposed de Guzman’s petition for the registration of the entire land in
question in his name, which petition was filed on November 18, 1918.
Nor did Juan Garcia ever seek annulment of the registration
proceedings. He never brought action for the enforcement of his alleged
rights from 1918 to his death in 1950; neither did the present
petitioners ever invoke these documents in L-15988 and in L-21355.

At all events, the question of ownership of the land with a total
area of 84 hectares in Land Registration Case 765, G.L.R.O. Record
15485, has been finally determined by this Court in L-15988 and in
L-21355, both involving the same parties and the same subject-matter.
In these two cases this Court declared that the decree of land
registration in favor of de Guzman bars the claim of the petitioners
over the same land, including the 17-hectare portion thereof.

This Court also observed in L-15988 that even if the land in dispute
was not registered in the name of de Guzman under the Torrens system,
he had already acquired the same by prescription “no matter how the
possession thereof had originated or begun.” Said this Court in L-15988:

“In their brief the appellants contend that the
trial court admitted a reversible error when it dismissed the complaint
without trial or hearing the evidence of the parties, as there is no
evidence or fact by which it could determine the truthfulness of the
allegations of the complaint. There is no merit in this error assigned
by the appellants, because the deed of donation executed by Juan Garcia
in favor of Pedro de Guzman on 1 June 1918 and acknowledged before a
notary public on the same date (Appendix A); a petition for the
registration of the parcel of land dated 18 October 1918 by Pedro de
Guzman, the appellee (Appendix B); judgment rendered on 30 January 1923
in land registration case No. 765, G.L.R.O. Record No. 15485, decreeing
the registration of the parcel of land in the name of the appellee
(Appendix D); original certificate of title No. 25381 issued on 18 July
1923 by the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan
upon the decree just referred to (Appendix C), all attached to the
complaint, indubitably show that the action brought by the plaintiff is
barred by a prior decree entered in land registration case No. 765,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 15485, Pedro de Guzman, applicant.

“The
appellants also claim that the trial court erred in holding that an
action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud is barred after the
lapse of four years from the time the right of action accrued and that
for that reason this action was brought beyond the 4-year period
prescribed by law. There is also no merit in this claim, for the reason
that, as correctly held by the trial court, from 1 June 1918 to 1950 or
for a period of 32 years Juan Garcia, the appellants’ father who
donated to the appellee the parcel of land, could have asked for the
annulment of the deed of donation and yet did not do so. He had another
opportunity to annul such deed when in 1929 a survey of the lands in
San Carlos was begun. He should have had the parcel of land surveyed in
his name and his answer filed in the cadastral court claiming it as his
property but he did not do so. As regards the appellants, after their
father’s death in 1950, they should have taken steps or filed an action
to annul the said deed of donation on the ground of fraud. Even if the
parcel of land were not registered in the name of the appellee under
the Torrens system he would have acquired title to it by prescription
no matter how the possession thereof had originated or begun, which
precludes an action for its recovery on the ground of fraud.”

ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is hereby dismissed for being patently unmeritorious, with double costs against the petitioners.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, JP, Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., no part.

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^[1] Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the decision in L-21355 was denied by this Court in a resolution dated June 2, 1965.

^[2] “Vicente Garcia, Benjamina Garcia, Anatalia Garcia, Fabian Garcia and Tranquilino Reyes vs. Pedro de Guzman”, August 30, 1962.