REMEGIA RIEGO AND AGAPITO REVILLOSA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. PABLO RIEGO, JACINTO RABE AND CATALINA PADOLINA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

The complaint filed by the spouses Remegia Riego and Agapito
Revillosa on September 5, 1961 was for the exercise of the right of
pre-emption over two parcels of land which were among the properties
left by the deceased father of plaintiff Remegia Riego and assigned to
her brother, defendant Pablo Riego, in the deed of extrajudicial
partition entered into by the heirs of said deceased. The deed contains
a stipulation granting any one of the heirs the right of pre-emption
with respect to any inherited property assigned to a co-heir and sold
by the latter to third parties. Pablo sold one of the parcels to his
co-defendant Catalina Padolina, without plaintiffs’ having been
informed of the sales. Plaintiffs prayed in their complaint that the
two deeds of sale be annulled and that the lands be conveyed to them
under the same conditions as those stipulated in said deeds.

Defendants Rabe and Padolina moved for dismissal on two grounds: (1)
that the complaint stated no cause of action because plaintiffs could
not exercise the right of pre-emption until Pablo had given them – and
he admittedly had not – written notice of the sales as required by
Article 1623 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the right of
legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by
the vendor, as the case may be; and (2) that if there was any cause of
action at all, the same was barred by the statute of limitations, since
plaintiffs did not exercise their right of pre-emption within thirty
days from December 1960, when they learned of the sales, as required by
the same Article 1623. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, but the court,
finding it well taken, dismissed the complaint on November 28, 1962.
Copy of the order of dismissal was served by mail on plaintiff
Revillosa on December 6, 1962. On June 26, 1963 plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by defendants on the
ground that the same was filed out of time. On that ground the court
denied the motion on August 24, 1963.

It is from this last order that plaintiffs have appealed.

The issue is whether the service of a copy of the order of dismissal
upon one of the plaintiffs, Agapito Revillosa, instead of upon their
attorney of record, was sufficient for the purpose of computing the
thirty-day period within which plaintiffs could appeal or move to
reconsider.

Section 2, Rule 13, Revised Rules of Court, formerly Section 2, Rule 27, provides:

“Every order required by its terms to be served,
every pleading subsequent to the complaint, every written motion other
than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice,
appearance, demand, offer or judgment or similar papers shall be filed
with the court, and served upon the parties affected thereby. If any of
such parties has appeared by an attorney or attorneys, service upon him
shall be made upon his attorneys or one of them, unless service upon
the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one attorney appears
for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper
served upon him by the opposite side.”

The complaint here was filed by appellants’ counsel, “Ortañes de
Guia, Buenavista, Marinduque,” while the opposition to the motion to
dismiss was by “Leonardo, De Guia & Duran by Ortañes de Guia,” with
the address “Ground Floor, San Luis Terraces, 640 San Luis, Ermita,
Manila.”

The rule, as aforestated, is that where a party appears by attorney
in an action or proceeding in a court of record, all notices thereafter
required to be given therein must be given to the attorney and not to
the client, and a notice given to the client and not to his attorney is
not a notice in law (Santiago v. Court of Appeals, L-12920, February
28, 1959; Mata v. Legarda, L-18941, January 31, 1963; Tolentino v.
Ongsiako, L-17938, April 30, 1963). The exception is when the court
orders otherwise (Tanpinco v. Lozada, L-17335, January 31, 1962).

In dismissing the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the lower court said:

“It would be read in the letter of the defendants
dated October 5, 1962, that aside from sending a copy of said letter to
Atty. Ortañez de Guia, Buenavista, Marinduque, a request was made to
the Clerk of Court that a notification be sent also to the plaintiffs,
which the Court remembered very well that this Court instructed the
Clerk of Court to send notice of said hearing also to the plaintiffs to
consider the said Motion to Dismiss. In fact during the hearing of said
Motion to Dismiss, the Court inquired from the Clerk of Court if the
plaintiffs were notified and the Clerk of Court informed the Court that
one of the plaintiffs, Agapito Revillosa was present and that was in
compliance with the notification of the Clerk of Court. It would be
noted that by the time that the said motion was to be heard on November
28, 1962, the whereabouts of Atty. de Guia could not be ascertained by
anybody much less by any person in authority in Marinduque or Manila.
Efforts have been exerted by the authorities of those two places,
Marinduque and Manila, and Atty. de Guia could still not be found in
any place and nobody could tell where his office nor his residence was.
In this case, we believe that the notification to the plaintiffs was in
order, that is why the order to notify them was given to the Clerk of
Court. The notification to the plaintiffs being in order and the said
plaintiffs having received the order of Dismissal of this Court on
December 6, 1962, and they having filed their Motion for
Reconsideration only on July 26, 1963 we believe that the said Motion
for Reconsideration was filed too late.”

It is therefore clear that it was by order of the trial court that
the notice of hearing of the motion to dismiss was served on
plaintiffs. From then on service upon them of any subsequent pleading
or order was presumably valid service. In making such order the court
took into account certain circumstances. Defendants had requested that
plaintiffs be the ones furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing.
The court was aware that the whereabouts of appellants’ counsel could
not be ascertained. It took judicial notice of the facts: (1) that in
another civil case pending before it (Modesta Sotejo v. Enrique
Salvacion, Civil Case No. 1213) it had, upon motion of the defendant
therein, ordered as early as August 29, 1962 that all motions,
pleadings and papers be served on the plaintiff therein because her
counsel Attorney Ortañes de Guia (the same lawyer representing
appellants) could not be located, “so that she can either contact her
lawyer, Atty. de Guia, or retain the services of a counsel if she
wishes to do so;” and (2) that in connection with the promulgation of
judgment rendered in a criminal case (Criminal Case No. 1971), it had
issued on October 8, 1962 an order for the arrest of one of the
accused, the same Attorney Ortañes de Guia, but the order of arrest was
returned unserved by the Manila Police Department because De Guia could
not be found at his given address and his whereabouts were unknown. The
court was obviously justified in stating, in the order appealed from
that “by the time that the said motion was to be heard on November 28,
1962, the whereabouts of Atty. de Guia could not be ascertained by
anybody much less by any person in authority in Marinduque or Manila.”

Plaintiffs accepted the notice of the hearing of the motion to
dismiss. One of them was in fact present at such hearing, although
their counsel failed to appear. That their counsel really could not be
located is further shown by the circumstance that by the time they
filed their motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal they
were already represented by a different lawyer.

Service on the plaintiffs-appellants being valid, they had thirty
days from December 6, 1962 within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. They did not file it until August 24, 1963. The denial
was therefore correct.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., no part.