THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ROMUALDO RODRIGO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

The Solicitor General appeals from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Masbate affirming the order of the Justice of the Peace
Court of Pio V. Corpuz, which dismissed the following amended
complaint:

“Undersigned Special Counsel, under oath accuses ROMUALDO RODRIGO of the crime of THEFT OF LARGE CATTLE, committed as follows:

“That on or about March 8, 1960, and months previous at Tubod, Pio
V. Corpuz, Masbate, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused deliberately did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and criminally kept in his possession one male
horse which is specifically described under Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle No. 4685981, legally belonging to FELIX MUERTIGUE, said
accused knowing as he does that the aforementioned horse was stolen
from the ranch of said Felix Muertigue at Casabangan, Pio V. Corpuz,
Masbate, and deliberately failed as he did fail to deliver the same to
the authorities or to its owner. The value of the aforecited horse is
no less than ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P150.00), all to the damage and
prejudice of said owner of the aforementioned amount.”

The
only question raised is whether or not the lower court erred in ruling
that the foregoing complaint is defective because the element of
“intent to gain” is not alleged.

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the defendant; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed (Section 5, Rule 110,
Revised Rules of Court). The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the
statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment (Section 8, Id.).

The complaint in question designates the offense charged as “theft
of large cattle.” This is the crime defined in Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, in connection with Article 308 thereof.

“Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.—Theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter’s consent.

“Theft is likewise committed by:

“1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;

“2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage
caused by him; and

“3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where
trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and, without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather
fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.”

“Art. 310. Qualified theft.—The crime of theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article, * * * if the
property stolen is * * * large cattle.”

Under the first paragraph of Article 308 the essential
elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent
of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or
intimidation against person or force upon things (U.S. v. De Vera, 43
Phil. 1000). But under paragraph 2, subparagraph (1),the elements are
(1) the finding of lost property; and (2) the failure of the finder to
deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner. In this kind
of theft intent of gain is inferred from the deliberate failure to
deliver the lost property to the proper person, the finder knowing that
the property does not belong to him.

Appellee contends that since the complaint refers to a stolen
horse it does not fall under said particular paragraph, “stolen
property” not being the same as “lost property.” The argument is
without merit. The word “lost” is generic in nature, and embraces loss
by stealing or by any act of a person other than the owner, as well as
by the act of the owner himself or through some casual occurrence. If
anything,the finder who fails deliberately to return the thing lost may
be considered more blameworthy if the loss was by stealing than through
some other means.

We therefore find that the complaint filed against
defendant-appellee satisfies the requirements of Rule 110, sections 5
and 8, in charging the offense of theft of large cattle defined in
Article 310, in relation to Article 308, paragraph 2, subparagraph 1,
of the Revised Penal Code.

The order appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.