CATALINA VDA. DE ROLDAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARIANO ROLDAN, FRANCISCO CAPISTRANO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

From the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, sustaining the complaint for forcible entry filed by
Catalina Vda. de Roldan, the defendants Mariano Roldan, et al., through
their counsel, filed and perfected their appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur (Civ. Case No. 4633). Thereafter, in
connection therewith, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance caused
the Chief of Police of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, to serve upon the
defendants the notices of the appealed case, and in the return of such
service, it appeared that defendants Mariano Roldan, Pedro Roldan, and
Francisco Capistrano duly received their copies of the notice on
September 5, 1959, while defendant Manuel Roldan was notified thereof
on September 28, 1959.

As defendants failed to file the necessary answer, the court, at the
instance of plaintiff, entered a default-order and the latter
introduced evidence in the absence of said defendants. On December 12,
1959, the court, finding the plaintiff to be the owner of the property
described in the complaint ordered defendants, who were in possession
of the land, to vacate the same and deliver possession thereof to the
plaintiff; to pay her the sum of P350.00, the value of the produce of
the land which she failed to receive, and the sum of P900.00 as
attorney’s fees and other incidental expenses.

A writ of execution was thereafter issued on January 18, 1960. The
same, however, was returned unsatisfied with the notation of the
Provincial Sheriff that he was told by defendants that “they will
vacate the land only over their dead bodies.” Said defendants were also
found to be without any real or personal property with which to satisfy
the money judgment. Later, however, or On October 27, 1960, plaintiff
was placed in possession of the property in virtue of an alias writ of
execution. The following day, defendants, allegedly armed with bolos,
re-entered the premises and exercised acts of possession. Consequently,
plaintiff filed a motion to declare them in contempt of court. By order
of November 16, 1960, said defendants were required to appear in court
and explain why they should not be dealt with for contempt.

On December 3, 1960, defendants filed a “special appearance” for the
purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court to render the
decision of December 12, 1959, and to quash the service of notice of
appeal upon them. It was their contention that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their person in view of the fact that the
said notices of appeal were served on them and not on their counsel who
had filed and perfected the appeal from the Justice of the Peace Court
to the Court of First Instance. The mode of service of said notices,
through the Chief of Police of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, was also
impugned as violative of the provisions of Section 7, Rule 40 of the
old Rules of Court.

This motion having been denied, defendants appealed to us, claiming,
mainly, that the lower court erred (1) in holding that the service of
the notice of appeal upon the defendants themselves, through the Chief
of Police, was valid; (2) in not quashing all the proceedings taken in
the case; and (3) in not setting aside the decision for having awarded
excessive damages.

Section 7, Rule 40 of the old Rules of Court , pertinent to this case, provides:

“SEC. 7. Reproduction of complaint on appeal.—Upon the docketing of the cause under appeal, the complaint filed in
the justice of the peace or municipal court shall be considered
reproduced in the Court of First Instance and it shall be the duty of
the clerk of court to notify the parties of that fact by registered mail,
and the period for making an answer shall begin with the date of the
receipt of such notice by the defendant.” (Underlining supplied).

Construing the foregoing provision, this Court, citing another case,^[1]
ruled that the service of the notice of appeal on defendant personally
is in order and regular. The reason therefor was given, thus:

“But assuming, for the sake of argument, that said
attorneys were, from the time they perfected defendant’s appeal, the
defendant’s lawyers, Section 7 of Rule 40, which governs appeals from
justice of the peace courts to Courts of First Instance, expressly
provides that notice of the pendency of the appeal be given to the
parties. This provision, being express and specific, can not be
interpreted to mean that the notice can be given to the lawyer alone.
The reason for this provision for notification of parties, and not of
the lawyers, lies in the fact that in an appeal from an inferior court,
only the complaint in the justice of the peace court is deemed
reproduced, and the proceeding immediately following the filing of the
complaint is the summoning of the defendant. Instead, however, of being
summoned, he is only personally notified because he is already within
the court’s jurisdiction, the notice taking the place of the summons.”

Defendants-appellants lay much emphasis on the fact that the
aforequoted provision requires the notice to be sent by registered
mail, and in this instance, they were served such notices through the
Chief of Police. While this may be true, it was admitted by defendants
in their memorandum of December 14, 1960, filed in the lower court,
that they actually received such notices through a policeman. There
being no damage or injury caused to said defendants by this mode of
service, the same may be considered, in connection with this
proceeding, to be in substantial compliance with the Rules. With the
foregoing conclusion, it follows that the proceedings had and taken in
the lower court were regular and valid.

The matter of the reasonableness of the damages and attorney’s fees
awarded by the lower court can no longer be entertained in this
proceeding. The same could have been the proper subject of an appeal
from the decision of December 12, 1959, which has now become final and
executory.

Wherefore, and for the reasons above stated, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

^[1] Valenzuela vs. Balayo, G.R. No. L-18748, March 30, 1963, citing Ortiz v. Manila, G.R. No. L-5147, June 2, 1953.