ERNESTO CERCADO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

This is a Petition for Review^[1]
of the Decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission dismissing
petitioner’s claim for compensation against respondent company.

The factual antecedents follow: petitioner started working as a driver of respondent bus company on
February 23, 1961. According to
petitioner, he used to work seven days a week at P16.00 a day. According to the employer, he was working on
commission basis on an average of three days a week at P12.00 per day.

During his term of employment, petitioner began to suffer the
effects of asthma and he received medical attention from Dr. Juan Barretto, a
physician in the employ of respondent bus company.

Petitioner stopped working on February 24, 1973 and on April 11,
1973, he filed with Regional Office No. 1 (Dagupan City), Department of Labor,
a “Notice of Injury or Sickness and Claim for Compensation” due to
bronchial asthma allegedly incurred in the course of his employment as a driver
of respondent. That claim was
controverted as non-compensable by respondent on the ground that “the
alleged ‘bronchial asthma’, if true, is due to allergy, and not ‘to prolonged
and/or overtime work and other unknown factors’.” On March 26, 1974,
petitioner, assisted by counsel, Atty. Arsenio Cabanting, executed a
“Quitclaim with Motion to Dismiss” subscribed and sworn to before the
Chief of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit, Dagupan City, Atty. Pedro L.
Fernandez, reading as follows:

“I, ERNESTO CERCADO, to this Honorable Commission respectfully
states that:

1.      
That I received complete com­pensation from respondent the De
Dios Transportation Company, Inc., as separation pay and full settlement of my
claim;

2.      
That I no longer have any claim or cause of action whether for
unpaid wages, overtime, workmen’s compensation and others arising from my
previous employment with said company.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Commission to dismiss the above-entitled case with prejudice.

Dagupan City, Philippines, March 26, 1974.

(SGD.)
ERNESTO CERCADO

Claimant

ASSISTED BY COUNSEL:

(SGD.) ATTY. ARSENIO CABANTING

WITNESS

(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 26th day of March, 1974.

(SGD.)
ILLEGIBLE

Administering
Officer”.^[2]

On the same date of March 26, 1974, petitioner also executed a Special
Power of Attorney authorizing his counsel to receive the money or check in
settlement of his claim against respondent and to sign the necessary papers for
the release and discharge of the latter from any further liability.^[3]

It appears that, on March 28, 1974, petitioner’s counsel Atty.
Arsenio Cabanting, received the sum of P800.00 from respondent in settlement of
petitioner’s claim against the latter^[4]. On April 19, 1974, the “Quitclaim with
Motion to Dismiss” was filed with the Regional Office.

On May 6, 1974, petitioner executed an Affidavit alleging that
the “Quitclaim with Motion to Dismiss” was signed by him upon the
advice of his counsel who, however, did not translate nor explain the contents
to him; that he did not appear before the Administering Officer before whom the
document was subscribed; and that he did not receive any amount from res­pondent
in settlement of his claim. At the
hearing of the “Quitclaim with Motion to Dismiss” on July 11, 1974,
peti­tioner, through another counsel, Atty. Bernardo Aquino, moved to withdraw
said Motion.

In an Order dated August 19, 1974, Hearing Officer Adriano H.
Pasaoa dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner had already received
full settlement of his claim.^[5]
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of said Order having been denied, the
records of the case were elevated to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for
review. On September 9, 1975, the
Commission rendered a Decision affirming the Order of dismissal.

In this Petition, it is prayed that the Commission’s Decision be
set aside as the “Quitclaim with Motion to Dismiss”, on which it is
based, is contrary to Sections 7 and 29 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Were this an ordinary civil action, the admission by petitioner
of satisfaction of his claim against respondent would be sufficient ground for
the dismissal of the case. The rule is,
however, different in workmen’s compensation cases for the law protects the
workingman, his family and his de­pendents by providing safeguards with respect
to agreements of this kind.

Sections 7 and 29 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, quoted
hereunder, lay down clear and unmistakable expressions of public policy:

“Sec. 7. Contract
prohibited. – Any contract, regulation or device of any sort intended to exempt
the employer from all or part of the liability created by this Act shall be
null and void”.

“Sec. 29. Agreement
on compen­sation. – In case the employer and the injured laborer or the
dependents en­titled to compensation arrive at an agreement concerning the
compensation provided for by this Act, such agree­ment in order to be valid,
shall pro­vide, at least, the same amount of compensation as that prescribed by
this Act and must be approved by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, or
any of his authorized representative; Provided, however, That the employer
shall be exempt from all liability under this Act as soon as the compensation
has been paid in accordance with this section, saving the provisions of section
six of this Act. (As amended by Section
9 of Act No. 3812 and by Section 17 of Republic Act No. 772)”

Under the last cited section, two requisites must be fulfilled
for any agreement concerning compensation to be valid, namely, the amount
agreed upon must be at least equal to that provided by the Act, and the
agreement must be approved by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner or his
authorized representative. As held in
National Mirror Factory vs. Vda. de Anure, 27 SCRA 719 (March 28, 1969):

“xxxx These limitations imposed by law on the right of the
parties to settle amicably should be viewed in the light of the avowed policy
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of securing the employee and his dependent
from becoming objects of charity. The
law frowns upon any agreement, scheme or device which seeks to exempt the
employer from any liability under the Act either partially or totally and
condemns such schemes as nullities.”

Guided by the foregoing criteria, the question to resolve is
whether or not the amount of P800.00 received by petitioner in full settlement
of his claim against respondent is more or less equal to that provided for by
the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

In his “Notice of Injury or Sickness and Claim for
Compensation”, petitioner claimed that the illness incurred by him in the
course of his employment, that is, bronchial asthma, caused him disability for
labor. We uphold this view. Petitioner became afflicted with bronchial
asthma sometime in January, 1969 in the course of his employment as driver of
respondent bus company. Due to his need
for earning a live­lihood, however, he continued working until February 24,
1973 when the progress of his ailment was such that he could no longer cope
with the physical demands of his work and had to leave his employment. Thus, there had been an impairment of his
earning capacity, which is what is being compensated.

Respondent’s position that asthma, being what it termed an
“allergic disease” is not compensable, is without merit. Thus, in Pillsbury Mindanao Flour Milling
Co. vs. Murillo,^[6]
we upheld the award of disability compensation for claimant’s ailment brought
about by repeated attacks of bronchial asthma, which caused his separation from
work. And in Hortizuela vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission,^[7]
we reinstated the award of the referee of disability compen­sation for
bronchial asthma, as a result of which claimant obtained optional retirement,
thereby recognizing her physical incapacity to render further efficient
service. Indeed, the life and limb of
passengers would be seriously endangered should an asthmatic driver of a
passenger bus suffer an attack of his illness on the road and lose control of
the bus.

Under the circumstances, petitioner is entitled to the maximum
disability compensation of P6,000.00 under Section 14 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.^[8]
In addition, he is entitled to such services and supplies as the nature of his
disability and process of recovery may require under Section 13 of the same
Act.^[9]
Inasmuch as under the Quitclaim deed petitioner received only the amount of
P800.00 in full settlement of his claim against respondent, that deed must be
declared a nullity under sections 7 and 29 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act as
it has the effect of releasing respondent from its liability for the unpaid
balance of the compensation due petitioner. However, the sum of P800.00 which petitioner’s first counsel, Atty.
Cabanting, received from respondent should be deducted from the amount of P6,000.00
to which petitioner is entitled under the Act. Atty. Cabanting should refund said amount to peti­tioner.

In its Comment to this Petition, respondent insinuates that said
Petition has not been seasonably filed. The records show that the Petition for Review was filed with this Court
only on February 4, 1976 or twenty-seven (27) days late, as his last day within
which to perfect an appeal was January 8, 1976, considering his Motion for
Extension of ten (10) days from December 29, 1975 within which to do so, and
which we granted in a Resolution dated January 16, 1976.

Be that as it may, in the interest of substantial justice and
equity, particularly considering that we have declared the Quitclaim deed a
nullity, and bearing in mind that the Rules of Court are suppletory to the
Workmen’s Compensation Com­mission Rules (see Rule 28), we are treating this as
a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, which can be filed
within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the order or proceeding to be
set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such order was entered, or
such proceeding was taken; in which case, this Petition shall have been filed
well within said period.

We also note that the Workmen’s Compensation Commission has not
been impleaded herein as a party res­pondent. In the spirit of Act No. 3428, however, which seeks to promote the
expeditious disposal of workmen’s compensation cases, said Commission must be
deemed impleaded, at the same time that we hereby fix the compensation to which
petitioner is entitled without remanding the case for hearing on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Workmen’s Com­pensation
Commission dismissing petitioner’s claim for compensation is hereby set aside
and respondent is hereby ordered: 1) to
pay petitioner (a) Five Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P5,200.00) as disability
benefits; (b) expenses, if any, incurred for medical and hospital services in
connection with his illness, duly supported by receipts; and (c) attorney’s
fees of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) for Atty. Bernardo Aquino; 2) to provide
petitioner continuous Medical and hospital services and supplies as the nature
of the ailment may require should the illness still subsist; and 3) to pay the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission Sixty One Pesos (P61.00) as administrative
fees.

Attorney Arsenio Cabanting shall refund the amount of P800.00 to
petitioner, if he has not done so.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Treated as a Special Civil Action in the Resolution of August 13, 1976.

^[2]
p. 47, WCC Records.

^[3]
p. 46, WCC Records.

^[4]
p. 59, WCC Records.

^[5]
pp. 91-93, WCC Records.

^[6]
L-32300, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 306.

^[7]
L-43211, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 306.

^[8]
Bello vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 80 SCRA 153 (1977).

^[9]
Ibid.