G.R. No. L-43006. February 28, 1979
BIBIANA CAOILI, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS) AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.
GUERRERO, J.:
Petition to review[1]
the decision of the defunct Workmen’s Compensation Commission dated January 14,
1976, affirming the Order of the Acting Referee in RO4-WC Case No. 151447-318
entitled “Bibiana Caoili v. Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public
Schools)” dismissing petitioner’s claim on the ground that “the claim
is anchored on a service-connected illness which has not been proved, to show
its credibility” and “the record is bereft of any medical proof to
support the claim.”
Petitioner-claimant was formerly employed as classÂroom teacher
of the Bureau of Public Schools (now Bureau of Elementary Education). On April 15, 1974, she filed a permanent
total disability benefit claim against the Republic of the Philippines under
the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, with Regional
Office No. 4, Department (now Ministry) of Labor. She alleged that during her employment, she contracted the
ailments of “hypertension; rheumatoid arthritis; chronic bronchial asthma;
and diabetes mellitus;” that she was found afflicted with these disabling
ailments as far back as 1958 which necessitated her going on sick leaves of
absence several times in 1958, 1964, 1968 to 1970; that despite medical
attendance, her ailments became worse; that in 1970, her physician declared her
totally, and permanently disabled for work; and that she was forced to retire
on December 19, 1970 at the age of 63.[2]
On May 21, 1974, respondent Republic of the PhiÂlippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a controversion of said claim on the
ground that the alleged illnesses of petitioner were not caused or aggravated
by the nature of her employment.
On October 14, 1975, after the case was heard, Acting Referee
Eduardo R. Isip issued an Order dismissÂing the claim for lack of merit as
petitioner retired from the Government service on December 19, 1970 at the age
of 63 and, therefore, there was no longer any employer-employee relationship at
the time petitioner filed her claim for compensation and that the alleged
ailments were not necessarily disabling and service-connected nor an
occupational disease within the meaning of the compensatory provisions of the
Workmen’s CompenÂsation Act, as amended.
On January 6, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal from the Order of the Acting Referee. Said motion was denied and the case was elevated to respondent
Commission which, on January 14, 1976 dismissed petitioner’s claim for lack of
merit, contending that the claim is anchored on a service-connected illness
which has not been proved and that the record is bereft of any medical proof to
support the claim.[3]
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was filed by the
claimant with this Court but the same was denied by Us in the Resolution of
March 22, 1976. A motion for
reconsideration was thereupon filed which We granted in the Resolution of
August 23, 1976, treating the petition for review as a special civil action.
We find for the petitioner.
The order of dismissal by the respondent Commission constitutes
reversible error for We find no factual nor legal basis therefor under our
established jurisprudence in workmen’s compensation cases. Since admittedly, petitioner’s illness
supervened in the course of or during her employment with respondent Republic
and upon which fact alone there arises the rebuttable presumption that said
illness arose out of or was aggravated by said employment and consequently
compensable without need of further proof. The burden to overcome such presumption is shifted to the door of the
employer which he must do so by substantial evidence. In the instant case, the respondent Republic has not even
attempted to do so.
Factually, petitioner then employed as a classroom teacher of the
Bureau of Public Schools contracted and/or aggravated by the nature of her
employment the ailments of “hypertension, rheumatoid arthritis, chronic
bronchial asthma and diabetes mellitus” (Items 4 & 12, Notice of
Injury or Sickness and Claim for Compensation, WC Form No. 1), which ailments
resulted in her disability for labor from October 12, 1970 up to the time of
the filing of the claim (Items 14 & 15, Ibid). She retired from the service on December 19, 1970 at the age of
63 years old.
The claim having been denied by Acting Referee Eduardo R. Isip in
his Order dated October 14, 1975 and the case elevated to the respondent
Commission, the latter rendered a decision on January 14, 1976 ruling thus –
“It appears in the notice and claim filed on July 3, 1971,
that Andres D. Cruz was employed by the respondent as a Telegraph Operator
receiving a daily wage of P8.66. On
March 5, 1962, he stopped working due to his alleged gradual lost of sight,
diabetes, stated in Item No. 12 of the notice and claim.
The respondent controverted the claim by denying its liability
under the law.
The claim is anchored on a service-connected illness which has not
been proved, to show its credibility. The record is bereft of any medical proof to support the claim. Therefore, this Commission, finds no reason
to reverse the findings of the Unit a quo, dismissing the claim
for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the order on appeal, should be, as it is hereby,
AFFIRMED, and the case dismissed for lack of merit.” (Underscoring
supplied).
Clearly and palpably, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission was based on a finding of fact which pertained to another case,
RO4-WCU Case No. 127595, Andres D. Cruz, claimant vs. Republic of the
Philippines (Philippine National Railways), respondent, filed with the
Workmen’s Compensation Unit Regional Office No. 4, Manila which for some reason
or another was found in the records of the claim of petitioner Bibiana Caoili
under docket No. RO4-WC Case No. 151447Â-348.
In basing its decision on the facts of another claim, the
respondent Commission has committed a very serious and grave error of injustice
to the herein petitioner Bibiana Caoili. We rule that the decision of the respondent Commission is an absolute
and complete nullity.
We cannot accept respondent Republic’s contention that the
decision of the Workmen’s Compensation CommisÂsion dated January 14, 1976
refers to petitioner’s claim on the ground that the caption of the said
decision mentions “Bibiana Caoili” as the claimant and the ReÂpublic
of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools) as respondent; that the case
number is stated as “RO4-WC Case No. 151447-318” which corresponds to
the case number of Bibiana Caoili’s claim for compensation; that the decision
states that the Order under review is dated October 14, 1975 and penned by
Acting Referee Eduardo R. Isip which unquestionably refers to petitioner’s
claim; and that the mention of the claim of Andres Cruz in the decision is
purely an innocuous mistake, due most likely to the great volume of cases then
handled by the WCC which had to be finished before the deadline. These allegations cannot cover-up the gross
inefficiency and infidelity clearly committed by those in charge of the records
which We must condemn and censure. However idenÂtical the name and number in the caption, the date of the
order under review and the name of the referee concerned, the factual basis of
the dismissal was not only erroneous but they related to another claim filed by
some other person against another respondent employer, that of Andres D. Cruz,
a telegraph operator employed by the Philippine National Railways.
The order of the acting referee which was sustained by the
respondent Commission has no legal basis to stand on for although the
employer-employee relationship between the respondent Republic and the
petitioner had ceased to exist, the rights that have already arisen are not
thereby necessarily extinguished.[4]
Further, it is not necessary that employer-employee relationship exist at the
time of the award. If the validity of a
judgment or order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission were made to depend
on the existence of an employer-employee relationship at the time the award or
judgment is rendered, then the employer could with impunity avoid all its
obligations under the Act by the simple expedient of dismissing its employees
as soon as indications of their injury or illness arise.[5]
While it is true that retirement from the service results in the severance of
employer-employee relationship which relationship is the jurisdictional
foundation of a claim for compensation benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, nevertheless, as long as the illness or injury for which
compensation is claimed arose out of or in the course of the employment, the
retired employee is still entitled to compensation benefits under the provisions
of Act 3428. The enjoyment by
government employees covered by GSIS of retirement benefits under the GSIS Law
(C.A. 186, as amended), concurrently with benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act is expressly provided for in Section 3 of said Act 3428.[6]
In a host of cases, We have ruled that when an employee is forced
to ask for retirement ahead of scheÂdule not because of old age but principally
because of his weakened bodily condition due to illness contracted in the
course of his employment, he shall be given, aside from his retirement
benefits, compensation for his inability to work during the remaining days
before his scheduled reÂtirement.[7]
Considering that one compelled to retire from emÂployment due to
disability is entitled to disability benefits,[8]
and considering further that the maximum amount of disability compensation
benefits should be extended to the worker where his illness results in the loss
of his earning capacity, it follows that herein petitioner who was compelled to
retire at the age of 63 years due to her disability, should be entitled to the
full compensation benefits.[9]
WHEREFORE, We hereby reverse the decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission under review and order the respondent Republic (Bureau
of Elementary Education):
1. To pay petitioner claimant
a.
The sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS as disability
compensation;
b.
The reimbursement of medical and/or hospital expenses incurred
duly supported by receipts;
2. To pay petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Quirino B. Maglente, Jr.,
the sum of SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS for attorney’s fees;
3. To provide petitioner-claimant with such medical, surgical, and
hospital services as well as necessary appliances as required by the nature of
her ailment; and
4. To pay the sum of SIXTY-ONE (P61.00) PESOS as administrative
fee.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
[1]
Treated as special civil action in Court Resolution dated August 20, 1976.
[2]
See Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 66; Memorandum for Respondents, p. 73,
Records of Case.
[3]
See Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 74, Records of Case.
[4]
Manila Electric Co. v. WCC, No. 31591, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 669, 674.
[5]
Batangas Transportation Co. v. Perez and WCC, No L-19522, August 31,
1964, 11 SCRA 793, 800.
[6]
Sudario, Jr. v. Republic, No. L-44088, October 6, 1977, 79 SCRA 338,
343.
[7]
Dimaano v. WCC, et al., L-43553, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 507, 511;
Galang v. WCC, et al., No. L-41893, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 454, 458;
Hernandez v. WCC, et al., No. L-20202, May 21, 1965, 14 SCRA 219, 222;
Hortizuela v. WCC, et al., No. L-43211, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA307,
311-312; Soriano v. WCC, et al., No. L-42824, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA
307, 311-312; Yap v. WCC, et al., No. L-44849, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA
307, 311-312; Roma v. WCC, et al., No. L-43675, October 28, 1977, 80
SCRA 171, 175. (citing Hernandez v.
WCC, supra); Sudario, Jr. v. Republic, No. L-44088, October 6,
1977, 79 SCRA 338, 343.
[8]
Galang v. WCC & San Miguel Corporation, supra.
[9]
Caparas v. WCC and Seven-Up Bottling Company of the Philippines, No.
L-42450, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 222, 225; Jacob v. WCC, et al., No.
L-43302, August 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 576, 580; PROS v. WCC, et al., No.
L-43348, September 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 92, 95-96.