PEDRO Z. YKALINA, PETITIONER, VS. ANANIAS ORICIO, RESPONDENT.

The
1951 polls of the municipality of Valladolid, Occidental Negros,
resulted in the election of Manuel Z. Ykalina as mayor, and of Antipas
Junio as vice-mayor. Among the councilors-elect, Pedro Z. Ykalina
obtained the highest place, and Ananias Oricio the fourth. All assumed
office the proper time.

On July 18, 1953, Antipas Junio
wrote the Provincial Board a letter of resignation, which was duly
accepted by that body on July 24, 1953.

Then on August 8,
1953, the Acting Executive Secretary suspended Mayor Ykalina by reason
of certain administrative charges, and in view thereof the Acting
Provincial Governor of Occidental Negros addressed to said mayor a
communication of the following tenor:

“This
is to inform you that a telegram dated August 8, 1953, has been
received in this Office from Malacañan signed by Executive Secretary
Marciano Roque, in which this Office has been requested to ‘please
advise Mayor Ykalina he has today been suspended in connection
administrative charges against him now being investigated by provincial
fiscal.’

“You are, therefore, hereby ordered to turn over
the office of the mayor of that municipality to vice-mayor, Ananias
Oricio, as soon as he is ready to take over.

Mayor Ykalina of course yielded the office to Ananias Oricio.

A few days later, Pedro Z. Ykalina asserted his right to substitute the
mayor in view of the resignation of the vice-mayor Junio, and started
here this quo warranto proceeding to contest respondent
Oricio’s possession of the office. He alleged that under section 2195
of the Revised Administrative Code, when the mayor of a town is
suspended his duties are discharged by the vice-mayor, but if there be no vice-mayor,
by the councilor who at the last general election received the highest
number of votes. He alleged further in his petition that the Provincial
Governor, without consultation with, nor consent of the Provincial
Board had invalidly designated said respondent to act as mayor of
Valladolid.

In his defense, the respondent answered that the
Governor’s letter merely informed Mayor Ykalina of his suspension by
superior decree, and of his obligation to cease in the exercise of his
powers which shall be assumed by Oricio, who had, before that time, i.
e., on July 28, 1953, qualified for the office of vice-mayor in
pursuance of an appointment issued by the President of the Philippines
on July 25, 1953.  The respondent went on to explain there
was no need of any designation by the provincial governor, inasmuch as
under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code he ipso facto succeeded to the mayorship upon the incumbent’s suspension.

By way of replication, the petitioner assailed the validity of Oricio’s
appointment as vice-mayor, contending that it was made by Executive
Secretary Marciano Roque, and not by President Quirino himself.

Undoubtedly, under section 21(b)
of the Revised Election Code, when the office of vice-mayor became
vacant the President could appoint thereto a suitable person” etc. The
appointment marked Exhibit 6 in favor of Ananias Oricio reads as
follows:

“OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Manila, July 25, 1953

Sir:

Pursuant to the provisions of section 21(b)
of Republic Act No. 180, you are hereby appointed Vice-Mayor of the
municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, vice Antipas Junio.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the
duties of the office, furnishing the Commissioner of Civil Service with
a copy of your oath.

	Very respectfully,
	By order of the President:
	(Sgd.)		MARCIANO ROQUE
		Acting Executive Secretary

Mr. ANANIAS ORICIO

Through the Honorable

The Provincial Governor

Bacolod, Negros Occidental.”

Impugning the legality of this appointment, the petitioner maintains
that as the power to appoint is intrinsically an executive act
involving the exercise of discretion which may not be validly delegated
by the President to the Executive Secretary, the above appointment made
by the latter in behalf of the President is null and void. The premises
of the argument are not without juridical foundation. However, it must
be observed that the writing Exhibit 6 is signed by the Acting
Executive Secretary “by order of the President.” Such signature means
that the President himself had selected the appointee and had
instructed Secretary Roque to extend the formal written appointment.
That Presidential order may be contained in a written memorandum, or
may be merely oral. In the light of principles of the law of public
officers that order as officially evidenced by the written
communication Exhibit 6 amounted to a valid appointment.

“While
the appointment of an officer is usually evidenced by a Commission, as
a general rule it is not essential to the validity of an appointment
that a commission issue, and an appointment may be made by an oral
announcement of his determination by the appointing power.” (67 C.J.S. Officers, p. 189.)

The Chief Executive
is vested by law with the power to appoint many officials. Probably in
the appointment of those of lesser category the Executive has found it
more expedient to follow the practice herein disclosed. We are shown no
constitutional or legal objection to it.

For that matter,
the document Exhibit 6 does not materially differ from another in the
same words of appointment, but with a rubber stamp of His Excellency’s
autograph, as a signature, affixed thereto by the Executive Secretary
upon orders of the President. Note particularly that Exhibit 6 does not
say “By authority of the President”, a phrase which might imply^[1] that the Executive Secretary had been authorized by the President to select, and did select the appointee.

But President Quirino, petitioner insists, could not have chosen this
particular appointee, because on July 25, 1953, he underwent a second
stomach operation at Johns Hopkins Hospital in the United States. The
trouble with the argument is its assumption that the directive to
appoint Oricio was communicated by the President precisely on July 25,
1953. Such directive could have been made days before,
considering that vice-mayor Junio’s resignation had been submitted one
week earlier. And it must be presumed that Secretary Roque committed no
usurpation of authority nor any disloyalty to the Chief Executive.
Anyway, if His Excellency has not actually ordered the appointment, it
should be easy for petitioner to secure an official statement to that
effect.

Petitioner’s last contention is that under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code an appointive vice-mayor has no right to assume the mayorship inasmuch as the section evidently refers to an elective
vice-mayor. That section provides that “upon the occasion of the
absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the mayor, his
duties shall be discharged by the vice-mayor, or if there be no
vice-mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election received
the highest number of votes.”

The provision makes no distinction between appointive and elective vice-mayors. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Where the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Indeed,
if an appointive mayor may be head of the local government, as is the
case in many instances, there is no reason to prevent an appointive
vice-mayor from acting as mayor temporarily.

This petition will be dismissed with costs. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] The words are advisedly italicized.