AMPANG (MORO), AMSIA (MORA) AND LUMPITAN (MORO), PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. GUINOO TRANSPORTATION CO. AND VICENTE GUINOO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On March 21, 1948, Moros Lambayong and Amsia were paid passengers
in bus No. 24, bearing TPU plate No. 7629, and belonging to the Guinoo
Transportation Company, on its return trip from Digos to Davao City.
When said bus came to kilometer 44, it capsized on the road, as a result
of which Lambayong died and Amsia suffered physical injuries Amsia,
Ampang and Lumpitan instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Davao, to recover from the Guinoo Transportation Company and
its manager, Vicente Guinoo, P2,000.00 as damages for the death of
Lambayong and P1,000.00 as damages suffered by Amsia for the physical
injuries. After hearing, the court dismissed the complaint on the
following grounds: “Sin embargo, del contenido de la declaracion jurada
suscrita por Amsia Puna y Lumpitan Dumingay se infiere claramente, que
el accidente que causo la muerte de Lambayong, las lessiones causadas en
la persona de Amsia, y la imposibilidad de los pasajeros de llegar a su
destino, se debio’ a un caso forfuito que estaba fuera del alcance de
los demandados y del chofer Quirino Piezas.” The plaintiffs have
appealed.

It appears that the case was submitted for decision practically
on the pleadings and the meager stipulation of facts entered into by
the parties in open court, without any attempt on the part of the
plaintiffs to show by proper evidence that the accident in question was
due to any fault of the defendants’ driver, and not to a fortuitous
event. Upon the other hand, the records show that, as a result of the
accident, a criminal case was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Sta. Cruz against the driver, Quirino Piezas, but said case was
dismissed upon the joint affidavit of Amsia and Lumpitan. This
affidavit was presented in evidence and the lower court based its
decision mainly thereon. In said affidavit Amsia and Lumpitan declared
as follows:

“That as the HABACCO bus No. 39 was overtaking the QUITRANCO bus
we felt that the HABACCO bus struck the QUITRANCO bus somewhere on its
left side, thus suddenly pushing the said QUITRANCO bus toward the canal
on the right side of the road, and the driver of the QUITRANCO bus
swerved the truck to the left in order to prevent the truck from falling
into the canal, and striking a tree standing on the side of the road,
and the HABACCO bus which was running very fast proceeded on its way.

“Then when the driver of the truck of the QUITRANCO suddenly
swerved the truck to the left in order to prevent it from falling to the
canal and striking a tree on the side of the road, the truck skidded,
thereby turning the truck upside down and as a result of which we
suffered injuries including Lamayong Mantuching who later died because
of the injuries she received.”

It is obvious from these statements that the accident could not be
attributed in any manner to any fault or omission of the defendants’
driver. Of course, it is now pretended by counsel for the appellants
that “After investigation made by the PC officers and policemen in
charge of the case, the negligence imputed to the driver of the HABACCO
truck No. 39 was found not true, because no sign or mark of any
collision was found on said two trucks and the driver of the Habacco
truck and the passengers of said two trucks denied that any such
collision has ever taken place.” However, this allegation cannot be
given any weight, there being nothing in the record to sustain it. Upon
the other hand, the affidavit of Amsia and Lumpitan was introduced at
the hearing without any objection from counsel for appellants.

It is urged for the appellants that the appellees are liable
under their contract as transport safely passengers Lambayong and Amsia
to their destination, regardless of any fault or negligence that cause
the accident, reliance being placed on the case of Lasam vs. Smith, 45
Phil. 657. This authority, however, comes to the aid of the appellees,
because the carrier is thereunder excused from liability if the accident
is due to a fortuitous event, and this was the ruling in the appealed
decision. This Court, in interpreting “fortuitous event”, stated that
“As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary
circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his
employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito.” From the
facts of the case at bar it is clear that the defendants’ bus which
carried Lambayong and Amsia capsized after being bumped on the left side
by Habacco bus No. 39, which caused the defendants’ driver to swerve
his bus to the left so as to prevent it from falling into the canal and
striking a tree, a maneuver which led the bus to skid and capsize.
This, in our opinion, resulted from the extraordinary circumstance of
being resulted from the extraordinary circumstance of being struck by
the Habacco bus, independent of the will of, and unforseen by the
defendants’ driver, in the absence of any showing to the contrary.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, and it is so
ordered without costs.

Feria, Bengzon, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista
Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.