ERNESTO ESCALER, JOSE ESCALER, JR., FEDERICO ESCALER, ALICIA E. GANA, ELISA E. PUNO, AND WIVINIA E. TABORA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. TOMAS P. PANGANIBAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY A…

Escaler versus Panganiban

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition filed with the Supreme Court by Ernesto Escaler, Jose Escaler, Jr., Federico Escaler, Alicia Escaler Gana, Elisa Escaler Puno, and Wivinia Escaler Tabora against Judge Tomas Panganiban, in his official capacity as presiding judge of a branch of the Court of Agrarian Relations. The petitioners ask the Court to stop the respondent judge from proceeding with a case for redemption and annulment of a deed of sale, on the ground that he acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when he deferred resolution of their motions to dismiss until after trial on the merits and required them to file an answer. The case matters because it draws a bright line between a mere error of judgment, which is not correctible by prohibition, and a true lack of or excess of jurisdiction, which is.

Procedural History

On February 20, 1964, Severo Lising, the private respondent, filed a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations, 5th Regional District, Branch II, against the herein petitioners, seeking to redeem a landholding of thirteen balitas upon payment of 17,500 pesos, or in the alternative to annul the deed of sale. The petition was later superseded by an amended petition. The petitioners, as respondents below, filed a motion to dismiss the original petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action, and after the amended petition was filed, a supplemental motion to dismiss alleging that the Court of Agrarian Relations had no jurisdiction over the second cause of action.

On July 11, 1964, the respondent judge issued an order deferring resolution of the motions to dismiss until the trial on the merits, on the ground that the grounds pleaded, especially those touching on jurisdiction, did not appear to be indubitable, and ordered the petitioners to file their answer within ten days from notice. The record does not show whether the petitioners complied. On September 4, 1964, they filed the present petition for prohibition in the Supreme Court, claiming that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in deferring resolution of their motions and in requiring them to answer.

Facts

Severo Lising was a tenant or claimant over a landholding of thirteen balitas, part of a larger lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34482-R. The whole lot had been sold, and Lising sought to redeem his portion by paying a proportionate share of the actual selling price, which he fixed at 17,500 pesos, invoking Section 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. In the alternative, he asked that the deed of sale be declared null and void and annulled.

The Escaler petitioners, as respondents in the agrarian case, moved to dismiss the original petition for failure to state a cause of action. After an amended petition was filed, they filed a supplemental motion to dismiss, this time asserting that the Court of Agrarian Relations had no jurisdiction over the second cause of action, which sought annulment of the deed of sale.

Rather than rule outright on the motions, the respondent judge deferred their resolution until trial on the merits, explaining that the grounds relied upon, particularly those on jurisdiction, did not appear to be indubitable, and directed the petitioners to answer. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court on prohibition, insisting that the deferral and the order to answer amounted to acting without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in deferring resolution of the motions to dismiss until trial on the merits.
• Whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in requiring the petitioners to file their answer to the amended petition.
• Whether or not the remedy of prohibition lies against an order that merely defers action on a motion to dismiss.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, as cited in the order complained of, provides:

Section 3. The court may defer action on a motion to dismiss submitted to it for resolution if in its opinion the ground relied upon therein is not indubitable.

This provision is the very authority the respondent judge invoked, and it is the pivot on which the Court's ruling turns: deferral is expressly allowed where the ground is not indubitable.

Section 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is invoked by the private respondent in his amended petition as the basis for redemption of his landholding at a proportionate price. It bears on the case because it is the substantive claim that the agrarian court was asked to try, and the deferral allowed that claim to proceed to trial.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that no real question of jurisdiction was involved. The order complained of neither granted nor denied the motions to dismiss; it merely deferred them. At most, the respondent judge may have committed an error of judgment in believing that the grounds relied upon were not indubitable, but he certainly did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction. The Rules of Court plainly authorize a judge to defer action on a motion to dismiss if in his opinion the ground relied upon is not indubitable.

On the second issue, the Court acknowledged that the petitioners would be compelled to file their answer and go to trial, but held that the orderly procedure established for the disposal of judicial cases should be followed, there being no clear showing that doing so would cause unnecessary and substantial prejudice to a litigant. The facts, as disclosed, did not seem to demand a protracted and cumbersome trial.

On the third issue, the Court held that prohibition does not lie, because the respondent judge neither acted without nor in excess of jurisdiction. Prohibition is a remedy against a tribunal acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, not against a mere error of judgment within jurisdiction.

Doctrine

A judge who defers action on a motion to dismiss because the ground relied upon is not indubitable acts within the authority expressly granted by Section 3 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Such deferral, even if erroneous, is at most an error of judgment, not a lack or excess of jurisdiction, and is therefore not correctible by the extraordinary writ of prohibition. The orderly procedure for the disposal of cases should be followed absent a clear showing of unnecessary and substantial prejudice to a litigant. A bar candidate should state the rule this way: prohibition lies only where the tribunal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction; where the court merely exercises a discretion expressly conferred by the Rules, the remedy is appeal, not prohibition.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition and dissolved the preliminary injunction previously issued, with costs. The petitioners lost; the respondent judge was allowed to proceed with the case.

Remember This

The single line to memorize: a deferral of a motion to dismiss on a ground not indubitable is authorized by Section 3 of Rule 16 and is at most an error of judgment, never a jurisdictional defect. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between an error of judgment and a lack or excess of jurisdiction, and to test when prohibition, rather than appeal, is the proper remedy.