G.R. No. L-23457. December 16, 1968

ERNESTO ESCALER, JOSE ESCALER, JR., FEDERICO ESCALER, ALICIA E. GANA, ELISA E. PUNO, AND WIVINIA E. TABORA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. TOMAS P. PANGANIBAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY A…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 16, 1968 DIZON, J.:
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DIZON, J.:


On February 20, 1964
Severo Lising, hereinafter
referred to as private
respondent, filed a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations, 5th Regional
District, Branch II (Case No. 26P-64) against herein petitioners.  This petition was sub­sequently superseded by
an amended petition praying for judg­ment as
follows:

“1. Ordering the respondents, under the first
cause of action, to allow
the
petitioner
to redeem his landholding of thirteen (13) balitas, upon pay­ment to them of the sum of P17,500.00, which is based proportionately on the actual
selling price of the whole lot No. 3863 described in the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 34482-R, or at such reasonable
price and consideration as the Court may de­cide, pursuant to
Section 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code
;

“2. In the remote possibility that this is not
feasible, to hold and declare, under the second cause of action that the deed
of sale of the lot subject matter of this litigation, is null and void, inopera
tive and of no legal force and effect, and/or to annul the same, for
the reasons and in view of the consideration mentioned in the second cause of
action
;

“3. To pay the petitioner the amount of P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of
P1,000.00 and

“4. To award such other
remedies as the court may find just and equitable in the pre­mises.”

Petitioners, as respondents in the case mentioned above, filed a
motion to dismiss the original petition upon the ground that it failed to state
a sufficient cause of action, to which the private respondent filed his written
opposition.  After the filing of the
amended petition they filed a supplemental motion to dismiss alleging that the
Court of Agrarian Relations did not have jurisdiction over the second cause of
action set forth therein.

On July 11, 1964, the respondent judge issued an order deferring
resolution of the motions to dismiss “until the trial on the merits in as
much as the grounds pleaded there­in, especially those appertaining to the
jurisdiction of this court, do not appear to be indubitable (Section 3, Rule
16, Rules of Court)”, and ordered herein petitioners to file their answer
to the amended petition within ten days from notice of the order.  The record of this case does not show whether
peti­tioners have done so.  On September
4, 1964, however, they filed the present petition for prohibition claiming
that, in deferring resolution on their motions to dismiss until trial on the
merits and requiring them to submit their answer to the amended petition, the
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.

Upon the facts set forth above, this court finds no real question
of jurisdiction involved.  In the first
place, it is obvious from the order complained of that the respondent judge
neither granted nor denied the motions to dismiss.  In the second place, in deferring action
thereon, His Honor might, at most, have committed an error of judgment – in
believing that the grounds relied upon were not indubitable – but certainly did
not act without or in excess of his jurisdiction.  In the third place, the Rules of Court plainly
authorize the respondent judge to defer action on a motion to dismiss submitted to him for resolution if in his
opinion the ground relied upon therein is not indubitable.

True, by reason of the order complained of, petitioners will be
compelled to file their answer and go to trial, but we are of the opinion that
the orderly procedure established for the disposal of judicial cases should be
followed, there being no clear showing in this case that to do so would cause
unnecessary and substantial prejudice to one of the litigants.  The facts of the case, as disclosed in the
petition under consideration, do not seem to demand a protracted and cumbersome
trial.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is denied and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued heretofore is hereby dissolved, with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.