THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT VS. MIGUEL LASALA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Miguel Lasala was accused of the crime of serious slander by deed with less
serious physical injuries and damages committed, according to the amended
information dated December 10, 1956, as follows:

“That on or about the 11th day of September, 1956, in the municipality and
province of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court the said accused with the deliberate intent to expose to public ridicule,
cast dishonor and public contempt on one Wenceslao Andanar incumbent municipal
mayor of Sapao, Surigao, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously in a public place use personal violence by attacking, assaulting and
using fistic blows on said Wenceslao Andanar thereby exposing the latter to
public ridicule, contempt and dishonor and inflicting injuries in the different
parts of his body whieh required 14 days medical treatment and incapacitated him
from the performance of his customary labors for 12 days, thereby exposing the
said Wenceslao Andanar to public contempt, dishonor and special humiliation,
purposely committed in the cockpit where there were many people present.

“That on the same date, place and on the same occasion, the herein accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault
the said Wenceslao Andanar with, fistic blows, causing bruises and contusions in
the different parts of his body which required 14 days medical treatment and
incapacitated him from the performance of his customary labors for 12 days.

“That by reason of all these acts alleged and described in the preceding
paragraphs the offended party suffered mental anguish, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation, physical and mental torture and social humiliation
causing him great damage and prejudice in the total sum of P30,000 as actual,
exemplary, and moral damages.”

Before his arraignment, the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that
the act he has committed, if any, is not the complex crime of serious slander by
deed defined in Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code and of less serious
physical injuries but the single offense defined in paragraph 2 of Article 265
for the reason that said act has happened in the same place, on the same
occasion, and had been impelled by the same intent. So he prayed that the
information be quashed or amended by eliminating the charge of serious slander
by deed. Notwithstanding the opposition interposed thereto by the prosecution,
the trial court sustained the motion granting the fiscal 5 days within which to
amend the information charging therein the proper offense in line with its
suggestion. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, the prosecution
instituted the present appeal.

The grounds on which the lower court predicated its order requiring the
prosecution to amend the information by setting forth therein only the single
offense of less serious physical injuries as prescribed in paragraph 2 of
Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, are as follows:

“The accused in this case filed a motion to quash the information, dated
February 8, 1957, on the ground that two crimes have been charged in the
information which constitute, according to the accused, only one single crime,
and that the offense allegedly committed by said accused is the one denned and
penalized under the second paragraph of Article 265, of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution objected to said motion contending that the crime committed is a
complex crime of slander by deed with less serious physical injuries defined and
penalized under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

“The Court, after considering the matter and hearing the arguments on both
sides, holds and declares that this is the crime specifically defined and
penalized under the second paragraph of Art. 265 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Court is of the opinion that the crime committed is less serious physical
injuries with the manifest intent to insult and offend the complaining witness
and tile same acts cannot constitute the complex crime of slander by deed with
less serious physical injuries, because such complex crime only exists in cases
where the Code has no specific provision penalizing the same with definite
specific penalty.”

Article 265, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code provides:

“Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted with the
manifest intent to insult or offend the injured person, or under circumstances
adding ignominy to the offense, in addition to the penalty of arresto mayor, a
fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.”

An analysis of the provisions of the article above-quoted reveals that
whenever an act has been committed which inflicts upon a person less serious
physical injuries with the manifest intent to insult or offend him or under
circumstances adding ignominy to the offense, the offender should be prosecuted
under that article and, if convicted, should be sentenced to the penalty therein
prescribed. This specific provision should be considered as an exception to the
rule contained in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code relative to complex
crimes. Of course, we cannot deny that Article 359 considers as slander by deed
any act “which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person”,
and if said act results in the infliction of physical injuries it may also be
covered by any of the articles comprised in Chapter Two, Title Eight, of the
Revised Penal Code, relative to physical injuries, but if such eventuality
happens the act cannot come under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which considers as complex crime a single act that constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies for the simple reason that in this particular case that
act is specifically covered by paragraph 2 of Article 265 already
abovementioned. In this respect, we agree with the following comment of the
lower court: “The Court is of the opinion that the crime committed is less
serious physical injuries with the manifest intent to insult and offend the
complaining witness and the same acts cannot constitute the complex crime of
slander by deed with less serious physical injuries, because such complex crime
only exists in cases where the Code has no specific provision penalizing the
same with definite specific penalty.”

The acts alleged in the information as constituting the crime of slander by
deed with the infliction of physical injuries on the body of the offended party
fit well into Article 265, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, for it is
there alleged that the assault upon said offended party was committed in the
cockpit where at the time there were many people present. In other words, it may
be said that the act was committed with the manifest intent to insult or offend
the offended party, or under circumstances adding ignominy to the offense, it
appearing that said offended party was then the incumbent municipal mayor of the
place. The lower court, therefore, was justified in ordering the amendment of
the information.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.