IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, SIAO TICK CHONG, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

Appeal taken by the Republic of the Philippines
from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by the
Honorable Agustin P. Montesa, in Civil Case No.
47737, reconsidering its decision of March
14, 1963 and providing as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the petitioner possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino
citizen under the existing laws, for which his petition is hereby granted.  The certificate of naturalization, however,
shall not issue until after the expiration of the period of two years from and
after the date of the promulgation of this decision and only after hearing at
which he shall establish the final conditions required for Philippine
citizenship.”

It appears that appellee, a chinese citizen, filed a petition
for naturalization in the abovementioned court on August 8, 1961.  The
same was subsequently amended so as to include a statement of the different
places in which appellee had resided before the
filing of his application.

According to the evidence, appellee was
born on December 27, 1918
in Quemoy, China.  Having come to the Philippines
in 1936 he was allowed thereafter to stay as a permanent resident as the son of
a merchant then engaged in selling second hand goods.  Since his arrival he had resided in the
following addresses and for the period stated correspondingly as follows:

“For 2 months after arrival at Espeleta,
Manila

From 1936 to 1950, at Iligan
City

From 1950 to 1951, at Quiniones
St., Manila

From 1951 to 1955, at 360 T. Pinpin, Manila

From 1955 to July 20, 1959,
at 648, T. Pinpin, Manila

From July 20, 1959
to the present at 630 T. Pinpin, Manila (p. 97, t.s.n.).”

The evidence further shows that appellee
was employed for the first time in 1936 as a salesman at a monthly salary of
P30.00, increased to P120.00 a month in 1941; that during the japanese occupation he engaged himself in gardening and
poultry raising; that after liberation he engaged himself in the business of
buying and selling rice, corn, etc.; that when his father left the Philippines
in 1939 he gave him the sum of P5,000.00 which he invested together with his
savings and thus became a partner in the Kim San Company organized in Iligan City to engage in general merchandising; that his
original investment in said Company was P16,000.00; that he received from said
Company, as its representative in Manila, a monthly salary of P300.00; that in
addition thereto he received dividends whenever the Company realized profits;
that in the years 1959 and 1960 he did not pay any income tax because he was
exempt therefrom; that his income for 1961 amounted
to P15,000.00; that his present capital investment in Kim San Company was
P45,000.00; that on June 6, 1948 he married Lo Eh Biao,
a chinese woman born in Amoy, China on September 17,
1929 and who had come to the Philippines as a quota immigrant on August 8,
1947, with whom he had six children living with him at 630 T. Pinpin, Manila; that his children are enrolled as students
in Crusaders’ Academy, Letran College; that he
himself was at the time he testified studying at the Loyal Hearts Institute
where he finished his elementary education; that before coming to the
Philippines he had studied in China, and that in 1937 he had studied in a chinese school in Iligan; that
since his arrival in the Philippines he had gone abroad twice on vacation.

Appellee filed his declaration of
intention with the office of the Solicitor General on June 23, 1960. 
He also presented as evidence clearances of the City Fiscal, the Court
of First Instance and the Municipal Court of Manila, the Bureau of Prisons, the
Deportation Board, the Anti-Dummy Board, the Bureau of Immigration, the
Municipal Court of Iligan City, the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte, the office of the City
Fiscal and the Police Department of Iligan City,
together with a medical certificate showing that he was not suffering from any
incurable contagious disease.

Appellee’s character witnesses were Flaviano R. Pacheco and Abelardo
J. Basilio, residents of No. 52, 7th Guillermo
Avenue, Quezon City,
and 17 Regalado St.,
Parañaque, Rizal,
respectively.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the following
grounds:

I

“THAT PETITIONER IS NOT SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO BECOME A
FILIPINO CITIZEN; AND

II

THAT THE WITNESSES TO THE PETITION HAVE NOT PROVED THAT PETITIONER
HAS CONDUCTED HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER DURING THE ENTIRE
PERIOD OF HIS RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES OR THAT PETITIONER HAS ALL THE
QUALIFICATIONS NECESSARY TO BECOME A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND IS NOT IN
ANY WAY DISQUALIFIED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED NATURALIZATION
LAW.” (p. 13. rec. on appeal).

After appellee had filed a reply, the
Court heard the case and on March 14,
1963 rendered a decision denying appellee’s
petition holding that he is “not qualified to become a Filipino
citizen”.  However, within the reglementary period, appellee
filed a motion for reconsideration and for the reopening of the case to enable
him to present evidence regarding his sincerity to become a citizen of the Philippines,
and to further qualify his character witnesses. 
Inspite of the Government’s opposition, the
trial court reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and after the
reception of additional evidence, issued the order appealed from.  Not satisfied with said order, the State
interposed the present appeal, claiming that the trial court committed the
following errors:

“I

PETITIONER IS NOT SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO BECOME A FILIPINO
CITIZEN.

II

THE WITNESSES TO THE PETITION ARE NOT IN A
POSITION TO VOUCH FOR PETITIONER’S GOOD REPUTATION AND IRREPROACHABLE CONDUCT.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
NATURALIZATION.”

After a careful study of the record, We have come to the conclusion
that the order appealed from must be reversed on the strength of the second
assignment of error which puts in issue the capacity of appellee’s
character witnesses “to vouch for petitioner’s good reputation and
irreproachable conduct”.

Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires that the
petition for naturalization must be signed by the applicant and be supported by
the affidavit of at least two credible persons stating that they are
citizens of the Philippines and personally know petitioner to be a resident of
the Philippines for a period of time required by law, and that he is a person
of good repute and morally irreproachable; that in their opinion petitioner has
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of
the Philippines.

We have held in connection with the above legal provision that a
“credible person” is not merely an individual without a previous
conviction of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record;
who has not perjured in the past or whose affidavit or testimony is not
incredible (Mo Yuen Tsi vs. Republic, G. R. L-17137,
June 29, 1962) but must be a person with a good standing in the community,
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, whose word may be taken on its face value
as a good warranty of the integrity and trustworthiness of petitioner.

In as much as the matter of presenting at least “two
credible persons” as witnesses is a legal requirement for the sufficiency
of petitioner’s case, it is clear that it is incumbent upon him to establish
affirmatively that his character witnesses are “credible persons” in
the sense above indicated.  We find that
in this connection petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

Moreover, it is not clear from the record that petitioner’s
character witnesses – Flaviano Pacheco and Abelardo Basilio – were in a
position to vouch for his qualifications.

Pacheco testified that he came to know petitioner for the first
time in Iligan City when he went there in 1946 as
salesman of the Tide Water Associated Oil Company; that he met him the second
time in September 1947 in the offices of the William Lines; that from 1949 to
the time he ceased to be the assistant manager of the William Lines nine years
later, he used to see petitioner regularly every two days at his residence in
T. Pinpin St., Manila.

To be observed in connection with Pacheco’s testimony is the fact
that he had disclosed no reason why for a period of several years he saw
petitioner regularly every two days. 
Similarly, Pacheco’s testimony that from 1949 to nine years later (1958)
appellee’s residence was located at T. Pinpin St., Manila, does not tally with petitioner’s
allegation in his petition that he resided in Iligan
City from 1936 to 1950 (p. 7, record on appeal).

With respect to witness Basilio, the
record shows that he did not know anything about appellee’s
reputation in Iligan
City because he did not meet him
there, most of his meetings with him having taken place in the City of Manila.  He also testified that whenever he visited appellee, he went direct to the latter’s apartment and had
never talked with any of appellee’s neighbors regarding
his reputation.  He also said that he had
seen appellee from three to five times on board a
ship of the William Lines plying between Cebu and
Manila during the period from 1949 to 1953 where he was a purser; that for
sometime appellee had resided in Cebu.  Appellee’s
residence in Cebu is not
mentioned in his amended petition for naturalization as one of his former
residences.

To qualify as a good character witness within the meaning of the
law, and for testimony given as such to be sufficient to support the petition
for naturalization, one must not be a mere acquaintance of the petitioner but
must possess such intimate knowledge of him as to be competent to vouch for his
qualifications and his lack of disqualifications (Cuaki Tan Si vs. Republic,
G.R. No. L-18006, October 31, 1962;
Go vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-18068, October 30, 1962) because he is the insurer
of petitioner’s character and his testimony is to be heavily relied upon by the
courts.  Considering that, as shown by
the foregoing, the character witnesses of appellee do
not satisfy the standard required, the order appealed from must be, as it is
hereby, reversed, with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.