G.R. No. L-25024. March 30, 1970
TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR., MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER, MRS. ANGELITA C. SANTIAGO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA…
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato
dismissing, on a motion to dismiss,
its Civil Case No. 2012 – for certiorari, injunction and damages
– on the ground that the complaint therein states no cause of action, and from
the subsequent order of the court a quo denying the motion for
the reconsideration of the said order of dismissal.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was
commenced in the court below, appellant
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the
public school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato
City. As the school year
1964-1965 was then about to end, the “Committee On The Rating Of Students
For Honor” was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for
the purpose of selecting the “honor students” of its graduating
class. With the school Principal, Mrs.
Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas,
Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee deliberated
and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat
and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and
third honors, respectively. The
school’s graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three
days before that date, the “third placer” Teodoro
Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel,
sought the invalidation of the “ranking of honor students” thus made,
by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the
above-named committee members along with the District Supervisor and the
Academic Supervisor of the place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that
plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a
sixth grader at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May 21st, 1965
with the honor rank of third place, which is disputed; that the teachers of the school had been made respondents
as they compose the “Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor”
whose grave abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the
other defendants were included as Principal, District Supervisor and Academic
Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
had been a consistent honor pupil from
Grade I to Grade V of the Sero Elementary
School, while Patricia Liñgat (second placer in the
disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner
before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr.
had been prejudiced, while his closest rival
had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro
Medina, was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in English in
Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that
the committee referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the
same was composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the
Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau
of Public Schools which provides
that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all
teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and circumstantial matters,
which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of discretion and
irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia
Liñgat from 80% to 85%, and some teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75%
in Grade VI, which prove, that there was already an intention to pull him to a much lower rank at the end of the
school year; that several district
examinations outside of teachers’ daily units and other than periodical tests
were given, ratings in which were heavily considered in the determination of
periodical ratings, whereas according to the Academic Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of schools of the
place such district examinations were not advisable; that there was a unanimous
agreement and understanding among the respondent teachers to insult and
prejudice the second and third honors
by rating Socorro Medina with a
perfect score, which is very
unnatural; that the words “first place” in petitioner’s certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced
with the words “second place”, which is an instance of the unjust and discriminating abuses committed
by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor pupils they made;
that petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the
District Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials
“passed the buck to each
other” to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher
authorities will be too late, there is no
other speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances; and, that petitioner
and his parents suffered mental and moral damages in the amount of
P10,000.00. They prayed the court, among
others, to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and,
during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and
formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was
scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that
year 1965. The injunction prayed for
was denied by the lower court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said court
reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then already set on the
following day, May 21, 1965, and the
restraining of the same would be
shocking to the school authorities, parents, and the community who had eagerly
looked forward to the coming of that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of
the Sero Elementary School for the school year
1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested list of honor students.
Having been required by
the above-mentioned order to answer
the petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved for the dismissal of the
case instead. Under date of May 24,
1965, they filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds
(1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even
assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had
already become academic. This was
opposed by petitioner.
In an order dated June 4,
1965, the motion to
dismiss of respondents was granted, the court reasoning thus:
“The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being
improper and for being academic. In
order to resolve the motion to dismiss, the Court has carefully examined the
petition to determine the sufficiency of the alleged cause of action constituting
the special civil action of certiorari.
“The pertinent portions of the petition alleging ‘grave abuse
of discretion’ are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These
allegations may be substantially summarized as follows: Paragraph 3 alleges that
since grades one to six, the students closely contending for class honors were
Socorro Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican and
Patricia Liñgat.
“Socorro Medina
obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once second honor (grade IV), and twice third place (grades II
and III).
“Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained
first place once (grade IV); four times second place (grades I, II, III and V)
and once third place (grade VI).
“Dolores Dalican obtained twice
first place (grades II, III); once third place (grade I).
“Patricia Liñgat once third place
(grade V); and once second place (grade VI).
“That as now ranked in the graduation, Patricia Liñgat is given second place while Teodoro
Santiago, Jr., is given the third place only.
This is the ranking now disputed
by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
“Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the
summer of 1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas who became
her English teacher in the sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas
unjustly favored Socorro against her rivals.
“Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the
committee on honor students are all grade six teachers while the Service Manual
For Teachers provides that the committee shall be composed of the teachers from
the fifth and sixth grades.
“Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial
evidence showing the change of ratings of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower rank.
“Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations
upon which ratings were partly based were not advisable.
“Paragraph 8 alleges
that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect pupil which is unnatural.
“Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of
the petitioner the word ‘First
Place’ was erased and changed to ‘Second
Place.
“Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to
the school authorities but they only ‘passed the buck to each other’.
“SECOND PARAGRAPH
VIOLATED
“Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
‘Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of, its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying
the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.’
‘The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto.’
“It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order complained of,
together with all pleadings and documents which are relevant thereto, as
required by the second paragraph of the aforequoted
rule. This violation renders the
petition extremely indefinite and uncertain.
There is no written formal judgment or order of respondents that is
submitted for revision or correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the petition.
“ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES NEGLECTED
“All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner
personally appealed to the school authorities who only ‘passed the buck to each
other’. This allegation does not show
that petitioner formally availed of and
exhausted the administrative remedies of the Department of Education. The petition implies that this is the ‘first formal complaint of
petitioner against his teachers. The
administrative agencies of the Department of Education could have
investigated the grievances of the petitioner with dispatch and give effective
remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
“NO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
“Allegations relating to the alleged ‘grave abuse of
discretion’ on the part of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or
irregularities rather than to real grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of
jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari.
“In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so
holds, that the petition states no cause of action and should be, as it is
hereby dismissed.”
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner
moved for the reconsideration thereof, but the same proved to be futile, hence, this appeal.
Appellant
here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition states no cause
of action on the grounds – discussed by the court a quo in the appealed order above-quoted – (1) that the
petition does not comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because
it has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order
subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative remedies were not first
exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the teachers who constituted the committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees
maintain that the court below did not err, in dismissing the case on said
grounds. Further, they, argue in favor of the questioned order of
dismissal upon the additional ground that the “committee on the ratings of
students for honor” whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not
the “tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions” against which an action for certiorari may lie
under Section 1 of Rule 65.
The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really the
said committee of teachers does not fall within the category of the tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion
of the issues raised by appellant may no longer be necessary. To resolve this problem the following tests
may be employed:
“In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil
action instituted against ‘any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions.’ (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by
virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of
something in the nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action of certiorari
may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist:
(1) that there must be a specific
controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board
or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and
obligations.
‘Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who
in general appear or are brought before the tribunal by notice or process, and
upon whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered. It implies impartiality, disinterestedness,
a weighing of adverse claims, and is inconsistent with discretion on the one
hand – for the tribunal must decide according to law and the rights of the
parties – or with dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must exercise its own judgment under the
law, and not act under a mandate from another power. x x x The character of its action in a given case must decide
whether that action is judicial, ministerial, or legislative, or whether it
be simply that of a public agent of the county or State, as in its varied
jurisdictions it may by turns be each.’ (In Re Saline County Subscription, 100
Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)
‘It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is
to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with
that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.’ (State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of St. Louis County,
et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom
the controversy is brought must
have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the
controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
‘The phrase “judicial power” is not capable of a precise
definition which would be applicable to all cases. The term has been variously defined as the
authority to determine the rights of persons or property by arbitrating
between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party
thereto; the authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is and its construction so
far as
it is written law; the authority or power vested in the
judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some court, officer, or
persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the
propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication; the power
belonging to or emanating from a judge as such; the power conferred upon
a public officer, involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of questions of
right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons or property, as
distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out the mandates of
judicial power or of the law; the power exercised by courts in hearing and
determining cases before them, or some matter incidental thereto, and of which
they have jurisdiction; the power of a court to decide and pronounce a
judgment; the power which adjudicates upon and protects the rights and
interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and applies the
law. “Judicial power”
implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and determine
but not everyone who may hear
and determine has judicial power. The term “judicial power” does not
necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties.’ (34 C.J. 1183-1184)
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the
judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive
department.
‘x x x the distinction between
legislative or ministerial functions and judicial functions is difficult to
point out. What is a judicial function does not depend solely upon the mental
operation by which it is performed or the importance of the act. In solving this question, due regard must be
had to the organic law of the state and the division of power of
government. In the discharge of executive and legislative
duties, the exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is
necessary, and matters of the greatest weight and importance are dealt
with. It is not enough to make a
function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought, and
judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within that subdivision
of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least, which does
not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the matter, in respect to which it is exercised, belongs to either of
the two last-named departments of government, it is not judicial. As to
what is judicial and what is not seems to be better indicated by the nature of
a thing, than its definition.’
(Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co., Appt. v. Town
of Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N.S.), pp. 321, 328- 329.) [Underscoring supplied][1]
“‘WHAT ARE
JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is
difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi
judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard
thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari. It is clear, however, that it
is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or
body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a
judicial or quasi-judicial function.
It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and
technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to
courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially
in making their decision, whatever may be their public character. x x x.’
“In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs.
Dunn (86 Minn., 301, 304), the
following statements were made:
‘The precise line of demarkation between
what are judicial and, what are administrative or ministerial functions is
often difficult to determine. The
exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial
duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may
be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter
in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.’”[2]
It is evident, upon the
foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for
honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor
quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the
decisions cited, it will be gleaned that before a tribunal, board, or officer
may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary, that there be a
law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board
or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and
thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees,[3] however, there is nothing on record about
any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such
function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are
therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been
apprised by appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of
Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly
violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee’s
duties.
At any rate, the
situation brought before Us in this case, tho
seemingly one of first impression, is not without substantial parallel. In the case of Felipe vs. Leuterio,
etc., et al.,[4] the issue presented for determination was
whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board
of judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared that the judiciary
has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of that contest and,
for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests
and similar competitions. It was
reasoned out thus:
“For more than
thirty years oratorical tilts
have been held periodically by schools and colleges in this islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have taken part in them
either as contestants in their school days (In the College of Law, U. P. annual
oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor
in 1914 and to Justice Labrador in 1916), or as members of the board of judges
afterwards. They know some (few)
verdicts did not reflect the audience’s preference and that errors have
sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial
intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board’s decision is final and unappealable.
“Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments
of the Word apply the highest tenets of sportsmanship: finality of the referee’s verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to join the
competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary.
“No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants,
because their’s was merely the privilege to compete
for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until
they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or
referees or judges.
“Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from
the United States. We found in American jurisprudence no
litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges.
“Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent
during a long period affords some reason for doubting the existence of the
right sought to be enforced, especially
where occasion for its assertion
must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being loath
to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the generally accepted
views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p.
1012.)
“We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter,
the respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance
are courts of general jurisdiction.
“The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that
Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part
of one judge, at most. Error and wrong
do not mean the same thing. ‘Wrong’ as used in the aforesaid legal
principle is the deprivation or
violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to
the prize unless and until he or she is
declared winner by the board of referees or judges.
“Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in
law there are instances of ‘damnum absque injuria‘. This is
one of them. If fraud or malice
had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed
against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured
her. Not against the other judges.”
But even were We to
assume for the moment, as the court below apparently did, that judicial
intervention might be sought in cases of this nature, still, We are inclined to
sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of
appellant to comply with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court’s holding that
appellant’s failure to accompany
his petition with a copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto “is fatal to his cause” is
supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by precedents as
well. In the case of Alajar
et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,[5] where it was claimed by therein petitioners
that the respondent court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in estimating
certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans
instead of cans, allegedly in complete disregard of the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation
Proceedings No. 84, and of this Court in G.R.
No. L-6191,[6] and in ordering thereafter the division of
the said rice harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants, this
Court denied the petition for certiorari on the ground, among others, of
failure on the part of said petitioners to attach to their petition copies of
the decisions allegedly violated.
Speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this Court held:
“The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not even sufficient
in form and substance to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari
prayed for. It charges that the Court of
Industrial Relations abused its discretion in disregarding the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G. R. No. L-6191; yet it
does not attach to the petition the decisions allegedly violated by the Court
below and point out which particular
portion or portions thereof have been disregarded by the respondent
Court.”
The same principle was
applied in the more recent case of NAWASA vs. Municipality of Libmanan, et al.,[7] wherein
this Court dismissed (by Resolution) the petition for certiorari and mandamus
filed by the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur,
and the municipality of Libmanan. In the following language, this Court
emphasized the importance of
complying with the said requirement of Rule 65:
“While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint
filed by the respondent municipality with the respondent court for recovery of
property with damages (Civil Case No. L-161), no copy thereof is attached to the petition.
“Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision
rendered by the respondent court on December
10, 1965, but no copy thereof is attached to the petition.
“Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of
default entered by the respondent court and of the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner in the case above-mentioned, but no copy of the order of
default is attached to the
petition.
“Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was
filed for the purpose of enjoining the respondent court from executing the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the importance of the missing
pleadings is obvious.
“Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an order commanding the
respondent court to approve either the original or the amended record on
appeal filed by petitioner, but no copy of either is attached to its petition.
“In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is
dismissed.”
It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the programmer of the
graduation exercises held by the Sero Elementary
School in the morning of the very day of that graduation exercises, implying that he could not
have attached then a copy thereof (to show the decision of the committee of
teachers in the ranking of students complained
of) to his petition. The stubborn
fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such decision of the said
committee of teachers much
earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him, even before the
filing of his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had
personally appealed the said committee’s decision with various higher
authorities of the above-named school, who merely passed the buck to each
other. Moreover, appellant mentions in
his petition various other documents or papers as the Service Manual for
Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the
constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his
Grade I certificate – which appellant never bothered to attach to his petition.
There could be no doubt then that he miserably failed to comply with the
requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned.
With this conclusion, it
is no longer necessary to pass upon the
other two errors assigned by appellant.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Ruperto vs. Torres, et al., L-8785, February 25,
1957, (Unreported).
[2]
Municipal Council of Lemery vs. Provincial
Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 268.
[3]
See pp. 5-6, Brief for Appellees.
[4]
91 Phil. 482 (May 30, 1952).
[5]
G.R. Nos. L-8174 and L-8280-86, October
8, 1955, 97 Phil. 675.
[6]
Republic of the Philippines
vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461.
[7]
L-27197, May 31, 1967, 20
SCRA 337.