BURGUNDY ASSETS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROGELIO SERAFICA, AND GREGG GREGONIA, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION) AND BURGUNDY ASSETS DEV’T C…
LIBREA-LEAGOGO, J.:
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, complainants’ appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of Labor Arbiter Vivian H. Magsino-Gonzalez, dated October 21, 2013 is VACATED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered:
1.Declaring respondent Burgundy Asset Development Corporation guilty of Unfair Labor Practice;
2.Finding Manolo J. Cabahug, Dionito V. Babor, Danilo G. Fuentes, Romeo D. Pestanas, Mario M. Fortunoba, Edwin M. Galeon and Rizaldy A. Tigbayan to have been illegally and constructively dismissed by respondent Burgundy Asset Development Corporation;
3.Ordering respondent Burgundy Asset Development Corporation to reinstate complainants Manolo J. Cabahug, Dionito V. Babor, Danilo G. Fuentes, Romeo D. Pestanas, Mario M. Fortunoba, Edwin M. Galeon and Rizaldy A. Tigbayan without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, and to pay the aforesaid complainants’ full backwages from the time of their dismissal on February 23, 2013 up to the (sic) their actual reinstatement as herein discussed;
4.Ordering respondent Burgundy Asset Development Corporation to pay each of the complainants Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos as moral damages and Ten Thousand (P5,000.00) (sic) as exemplary damages; plus attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total judgment award, the computation of which is hereto attached forming part of the records.
SO ORDERED.“[4]
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Private respondents filed a Comment[5] dated 23 September 2014. Petitioners filed their Manifestation and Compliance with Motion for Leave to Admit Reply, etc.[6] dated 13 October 2014. Thus, the fourth paragraph of the Resolution[7] dated 01 September 2014 is reiterated, and the Petition is submitted for decision.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
A Complaint[8] dated 25 March 2013 was filed by Burgundy Asset Dev’t Corp. Employees Union-NUBCW (“union,” for brevity), represented by its Vice President Manolo Jarligo Cabahug, Danilo Gutierrez Fuentes, Romeo Delfino Pestañas, Mario Milla Fortunoba, Edwin Macalos Galeon and Rizaldy Angeles Tigbayan against respondents Burgundy Asset Development Corp. (“Burgundy,” for brevity), Rogelio Serafica (“Serafica,” for brevity) and/or Gregg Gregonia (“Gregonia,” for brevity) for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal-constructive, damages, attorney’s fees, and illegal dismissal of union officers.
In their Position Paper[9] dated 29 May 2013, it was alleged by complainants, inter alia, that: they started to work for respondents in 1997, and continuously up to their summary dismissal on 23 February 2013; aside from their uninterrupted years of service for almost seventeen (17) years, their work positions as mason and carpenters are no doubt necessary, desirable and directly related to the main business of respondent, which is a realty developer and builder of high rise buildings/condominiums; on 10 October 2012, in order to improve the terms and conditions of employment including wages and other wage-related benefits, the employees, including complainants, started to organize the Burgundy Asset Development Corporation Employees Labor Union (“BADCELU,” for brevity) directly affiliated to the National Union of Building and Construction Workers (“NUBCW,” for brevity) for the purpose of collective bargaining; BADCELU is one of the local chapters of NUBCW having Charter Certificate No. 23 issued by the NUBCW President and General Secretary; on 15 October 2012, a petition for certification election was filed before the Makati Pasay District Field Office praying for the immediate conduct of a certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Burgundy; they were assigned at the Burgundy Corporate Tower in Makati City, Burgundy McKinley Place in Parañaque City and Burgundy Transpacific Place in Taft Avenue, Manila as building maintenance, electrician, painter and mason up to 2012; when respondents noticed that all of them were the leaders of the newly organized union, respondents did not waste time and immediately transferred them from McKinley Place/Transpacific Place to Burgundy Forbes Tower in Manila in the early part of January 2013 without any valid reason; Burgundy Forbes Tower was considered as an abandoned building and only security guards lived therein; hence, it was act of wild insanity to transfer them from the productive and profitable place of Burgundy in Makati City, Parañaque City and Taft Avenue in Manila to the lifeless Burgundy Forbes Tower; almost two (2) weeks after, they were placed on suspension for a maximum period of thirty (30) days from 24 January 2013 to 23 February 2013, allegedly for suspension of work; the anti-union sentiment of respondents is glaring, from the intentional non-payment of salaries and wages since the union was organized, to transferring them from their profitable workplace to an abandoned building, to their suspension of thirty (30) days, and termination afterwards; they have been in the service for seventeen (17) years with respondents as regular employees; their positions as masons, carpenters, electricians and painters were directly related to the business or trade of the employer; as regular employees, they are entitled to security of tenure and due process; their dismissal is limited to just and authorized cause as provided for by law and after compliance with substantive and procedural due process; the burden of proof is on the employer to establish that the dismissal was for cause; their suspension from work that led to their termination was due to the respondents’ anti-union sentiment; respondents’ suppression of their right to self-organization is a legal maneuver crafted by the former to bust the union and stop the furtherance of union activities, in violation of Article 248 (e) of the Labor Code and the Constitution; respondents are guilty of unfair labor practice; being illegally dismissed, they are entitled to reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and with full backwages from the time of their illegal dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement; all of the illegal and improvident acts of respondents are part of their malevolent design to interfere with and curtail their constitutional rights to self-organization and collective bargaining, entitling them to exemplary and moral damages; and since respondents dismissed them illegally, they engaged the services of lawyers to protect their rights, entitling them to 10% attorney’s fees.
Respondents failed to submit their Position Paper.[10]
On 21 October 2013, Labor Arbiter Vivian H. Magsino-Gonzalez rendered a Decision,[11] the dispositive portion of which reads:
“IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the instant illegal dismissal/unfair labor practice complaint with money claims is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.“[12]
Complainants filed a Memorandum of Appeal[13] dated 14 November 2013.
The NLRC (Fourth Division) rendered the assailed Decision[14] dated 25 April 2014, which granted the complainants’ appeal and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, the decretal portion of which was earlier quoted.[15]
Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration[16] dated 16 May 2014. The NLRC (Fourth Division) issued the assailed Resolution[17] dated 16 June 2014 denying respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
RULING
Petitioners raise the following grounds for allowance of their Petition, viz:
- THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION-FOURTH DIVISION COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER (sic) (THEN RESPONDENTS) FOR GRANTING THE APPEAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT (sic) (THEN COMPLAINANT) (sic) WHICH ON ITS FACE HAD COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON FORUM SHOPPING;
- THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION-FOURTH DIVISION COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER VIVIAN MAGSINO-GONZALES (sic) WHICH EARLIER DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE WITH MONEY CLAIMS (; AND)
- THE INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS THE ONLY ADEQUATE, PLAIN AND SPEEDY REMEDY AVAILABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES(.)[18]
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that: there is no doubt that private respondents were project employees, and in no circumstance considered as regular employees; being project employees, they cannot enjoy the rights and privileges accorded a bona fide regular employee; their status as project employees can be gleaned from their respective contracts; the Labor Arbiter was correct in dismissing the complaint in the absence of any proof of existence of employer-employee relationship; this was supported by an Order dated 21 December 2012 issued by Atty. Ma. Simonette Calabocal-Macalalad, Mediator-Arbiter, NCR-DOLE, Manila which explicitly states that, “the petitioning union failed to present even a single evidence to show that they are indeed employees of Burgundy Asset Development Corporation xxx”; the evidence failed to prove by substantial evidence the cause of action for unfair labor practice and illegal/constructive dismissal, damages and attorney’s fees; public respondent shifted the issue from the absence of employer-employee relationship and shifted the burden of showing by substantial evidence that the dismissal of complainants is not illegal; instead of sanctioning the contumacy and habitual penchant of the complainants of filing several actions before the Office of the Labor Arbiter and trifling with the legal procedures for filing similar actions which lead to confusion and uncertainty, public respondent kept a blind eye and disposed the appeal in total reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, which is bereft of any cogent reason; in the case filed before Labor Arbiter Thomas Que docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 11-171012-12, complainants therein, Tito Catamco, Christopher dela Rosa, Dionito Babor, Dionisio Ybarrita, Tito Canares, Edwin Galeon, Romeo Pestanas, Mario Fortunoba, Ramon Fajardo and Gino Acyatan, complained of non/underpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay, reinstatement, damages and attorney’s fees, while in the case before Labor Arbiter Veneranda Guerrero docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 10-15913-12 complainants therein, Zaldy Agustin, Norberto Renon, Rizaldy Tigbayan, Manolo Cabahug, Richard Sario, Danilo Fuentes and Apolinario Gutierrez, averred non-payment of salary/wages, underpayment of ECOLA, and regularization with damages; when these matters were brought to the attention of public respondent, the latter ignored the same and instead, postured against the supposed non-presentation of evidence via position paper before the Labor Arbiter; petitioners never claimed denial of due process; it is unfortunate that during the appeal, public respondent reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint due to the absence of employer-employee relationship, by imposing judicial notice of the decisions on the other cases where petitioners failed to present evidence that the complainants in those cases were project employees; there was no constructive dismissal in the instant case when private respondents were transferred to Burgundy Forbes Park Tower in España, Manila because the requisites laid down by law were complied with; private respondents were notified of their transfer in a letter of communication by Project Engineer Reynaldo Valdez (“Engr. Valdez,” for brevity) to the HR Officer Cherry Yambao (“Yambao,” for brevity) dated 10 January 2013 with the subject Temporary Transfer; private respondents did not report for work as directed and refused to report and sign their temporary transfer; a letter-notice was sent to the Office of DOLE-NCR Regional Director Raymund Agravante of the low volume of production which necessitated the temporary suspension of work operations which shall commence on 23 February 2013 and shall not last for more than six months, together with the names of the affected employees; after the temporary suspension of work, private respondents were called back to work through a letter by HR Officer Yambao dated 18 September 2013, with an instruction for them to coordinate with Engr. Valdez, Engr. Francis Mamaril or with the HR Department; despite the return to work orders, private respondents, particularly Dionito Babor, refused and filed the instant case; thus, from the foregoing, it is very clear that there was no dismissal as petitioners were able to comply with the legal requirements of temporary stoppage or suspension of work; there was notice to the employees concerned of at least thirty days, notice was sent to the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR having territorial jurisdiction over the place of work and there was substantial ground for the temporary suspension; as it is an exercise of management prerogative, as long as the legal procedures and requirements laid down by law is complied with, there is no business for employees to interfere; the fact that the temporary suspension ended with a return to work order issued to private respondents and as the latter actually worked after the temporary suspension negated constructive dismissal; unfair labor practice cannot be sustained because there was no certified labor union to speak of; the matter of certification/representation issue insofar as the alleged labor union of private respondents is still pending appeal with the Office of the Secretary of Labor; private respondents, being project employees, cannot belong to the bargaining unit intended to be represented; to do so would disenfranchise the bona fide rank-and-file employees; to rule at this stage on the presence of unfair labor practice allegedly committed by petitioners is premature considering the pendency of the appeal on the certification and representation issue; there is no factual nor legal basis for the award of damages and attorney’s fees; there was no bad faith nor malicious intent on the part of petitioners in ordering the transfer of private respondents to Burgundy Forbes Park Tower; absent malice and bad faith, the exercise of management prerogative cannot be interfered with; the manner of informing private respondents and the DOLE-NCR of the suspension of work operations would negate bad faith, hence, moral and exemplary damages cannot be awarded; and private respondents should not be awarded attorney’s fees for their propensity in filing similar suits and trifling with the legal processes.
Private respondents riposte, inter alia, that: petitioners merely made a rehash of the arguments which were already discussed at length, and exhaustively and conclusively passed upon in the assailed Decision; public respondent did not, in any way, commit grave abuse of discretion when the present case was resolved in favor of private respondents; generally, the findings of fact made by the NLRC, as a specialized agency with expertise on matters within its respective field, are accorded much respect and even finality, when supported by ample evidence; despite being informed of their memorandum of appeal filed with public respondent, petitioners did absolutely nothing to controvert or rebut all the allegations made against them by private respondents; from the start of this case at the arbitration level and NLRC level, only private respondents tirelessly and unconditionally pursued the case; and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is not warranted.
The Petition is bereft of merit.
(I)n a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court or quasi-judicial body with jurisdiction over a case, petitioner carries the burden of proving that the court or quasi-judicial body committed not merely a reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order.[19] Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered “grave,” the discretionary authority must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence.[20] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[21]
Petitioners posit that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the appeal of private respondents, which on its face, committed a violation of the rule on forum shopping.
We are not persuaded.
(F)orum shopping is the institution of two or more actions involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would come out with a favorable disposition. An indicium of the presence of, or the test for determining whether a litigant violated the rule against, forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.[22] The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions.[23]
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.[24]
Here, the instant Petition stemmed from NLRC NCR Case No. 03-04638-13 which involves a complaint for illegal dismissal of union officers tantamount to unfair labor practice, and prayed for their immediate reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, full backwages, damages and attorney’s fees.[25] The second case docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 11-17102-12 dealt with the issues of whether the complainants therein are regular employees; the illegal dismissal of complainant Dela Rosa; and their entitlement to money claims.[26] The third case docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 10-15913-12 dealt with the issues on whether the complainants therein were all regular employees; and whether they are entitled to ECOLA differential and unpaid wages, damages, and attorney’s fees.[27]
Thus, while private respondents in the instant case were included as complainants in the second and third cases, the causes of action in the three cases are not identical. Thus, there is no forum shopping.
It must be emphasized that the complainants (which include herein private respondents) were ruled upon as regular employees of petitioner Burgundy, in the decisions[28] rendered in NLRC NCR Case No. 11-17102-12 and NLRC NCR Case No. 10-15913-12 which have already acquired finality because, as found by public respondent, herein petitioners (respondents therein) did not appeal the same.[29] (It is) the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive to the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.[30] Thus, public respondent correctly pointed out that Labor Arbiter Vivian H. Magsino-Gonzales, in her Decision dated 21 October 2013, should have taken notice of the judgments rendered three months earlier in NLRC NCR Case No. 11-17102-12 and NLRC NCR Case No. 10-15913-12 which categorically ruled that complainants therein (which include herein private respondents) are in fact regular employees of respondent Burgundy (herein petitioner Burgundy) given the latter’s failure to adduce evidence that they are legitimate project employees.[31]
Petitioners claim that there was no illegal or constructive dismissal to speak of when private respondents were ordered transferred to Burgundy Forbes Park Tower because there was compliance with the requirements provided by law in the exercise of management prerogative.
We are not swayed.
It bears stressing that despite being given one last chance to submit their position paper,[32] petitioners failed to file the same.[33] It was only after the assailed Decision was rendered by public respondent that petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, where they raised for the first time the issue of forum shopping, denied the allegation of constructive dismissal, and argued that public respondent erred in finding that petitioners committed unfair labor practice.
In this regard, public respondent aptly ruled that by petitioners’ failure to answer and specifically deny the material allegations in the complaint due to their failure to file their position paper, they are deemed to have admitted such material averments.[34] Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of the NLRC, material averments in the complaint are deemed admitted when not specifically denied.[35]
(While) (l)abor tribunals, such as the NLRC, are not precluded from receiving evidence submitted on appeal as technical rules are not binding in cases submitted before them, xxx any delay in the submission of evidence should be adequately explained and should adequately prove the allegations sought to be proven.[36] Petitioners claim that because of a supervening circumstance involving the unfortunate shooting incident at its former main office, it lost track of all the cases pending before the labor arbiter.[37] We find the said explanation insufficient as petitioners also inadequately proved their allegations.
Petitioners aver that there is a pending appeal on the certification and representation issue. However, as found by public respondent in its assailed Decision, “xxx (t)he Petition was eventually decided in complainants’ favor based on Annex ‘C’ (Id., p. 93) to their November 29, 2013 Memorandum of Appeal (Id., pp. 68-78) showing the Minutes of the Certification Election among the rank-and file employees conducted on November 11, 2013 under Case No. NCR-MP-CE-001-016-10-13 xxx.”[38]
As stated in private respondents’ Position Paper, they were assigned at the Burgundy Corporate Tower in Makati City, Burgundy McKinley Place in Parañaque City, and Burgundy Transpacific Place in Taft Avenue, Manila as building maintenance, electrician, painter and mason since 1997 up to the last quarter of 2012; when petitioners noticed that all of them were leaders of the newly organized union, they did not waste time and immediately transferred them to Burgundy Forbes Tower in Manila in the early days of January 2013, without any valid reason, other than the exercise of prerogative;[39] Burgundy Forbes Tower in Espana, Manila was considered an abandoned building and only security guards lived therein, whereas the Burgundy Places in Makati City, Parañaque City and Taft Avenue, where they were previously assigned, were productive places; and almost two weeks thereafter, they were placed on suspension for a maximum period of 30 days, from 24 January 2013 to 23 February 2013, allegedly due to suspension of work in that particular place; and petitioners’ anti-union sentiment is glaring.[40]
A perusal of the Memorandum[41] dated 10 January 2013 of Project Manager Engr. Valdez of the Burgundy Group of Companies, addressed to HR Officer Yambao, would show that certain workers (including private respondents) would be temporarily transferred to the Burgundy Forbes Project, effective 14 January 2013, without stating any reason for the transfer. Neither do the transfer forms[42] state any reason for the transfer. There was no other document presented by petitioners to sufficiently explain the necessity of transferring private respondents to an abandoned project, from their previous assignments which were humming with construction activity.[43] Thus, as aptly found by public respondent, “(t)he unjustified transfer practically stripped complainants of their functions xxx, thus reducing them to doing nothing and, therefore, being constructively dismissed. The hallmarks of constructive dismissal are present – reduction of employees’ functions xxx and cessation of work xxx. By the same stroke, respondents isolated complainants from the rest of their co-workers, thus interfered with and restrained their right to self-organization.”[44] Constructive dismissal is a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. In constructive dismissal cases, the employer is concededly, charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action were for valid and legitimate grounds.[45] This, petitioners failed to do.
Moreover, a few weeks after effecting the said transfer, petitioner Burgundy sent a letter[46] dated 24 January 2013 to the Director of DOLE-Makati Office alleging that it tried to preserve its existence by trying to lessen the cost of operations and even suspended work operations, but the company continues to lose its revenues in a very drastic manner, considering its high cost of operations coupled with low sales of productivity; as such, it decided to conduct an assessment of its operations in general which resulted to the assessment of a necessity of temporary suspension of work operations. However, a reading of the list[47] of employees who are temporarily laid off, that was attached to said letter, indicates that there were only eight (8) employees enumerated therein, seven (7) of whom are herein private respondents, who are officers of the union.
(The Supreme Court) has always considered the management’s prerogative to transfer its employees in pursuit of its legitimate interests. But this prerogative should be exercised without grave abuse of discretion and with due regard to the basic elements of justice and fair play, such that if there is a showing that the transfer was unnecessary or inconvenient and prejudicial to the employee, it cannot be upheld.[48] In the instant case, petitioners’ alleged exercise of management prerogative was for the purpose of interfering with and restraining their right to self-organization, as correctly pointed out by public respondent.[49]
Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, taken together, reasonably support an inference that, indeed, such were all orchestrated to restrict private respondents’ free exercise of their right to self-organization.[50] When there is doubt between the evidence submitted by the employer and that submitted by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee. This is consistent with the rule that an employer’s cause could only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s evidence.[51]
Petitioners question the award of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees in favor of private respondents. However, this issue was raised here for the first time, as petitioners did not assail the same when it sought reconsideration of the public respondent’s Decision. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the xxx appropriate quasi-judicial administrative body, need not be considered by the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal xxx because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[52]
Considering the foregoing disquisition, We find that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion in rendering/issuing the assailed Decision and Resolution. With respect to other matters raised by petitioners, We find no necessity to pass upon the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Diamante, and Sadang, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-23
[2] Id. at 25-38
[3] Id. at 46-50
[4] Id. at 37-38
[5] Id. at 176-185
[6] Id. at 187-191
[7] Id. at 174-175
[8] Id. at 56-57
[9] Id. at 60-72
[10] Id. at 172
[11] Id. at 76-79
[12] Id. at 79
[13] Id. at 80-91
[14] Id. at 25-38
[15] Supra note 4
[16] Id. at 39-44
[17] Id. at 46-50
[18] Id. at 8
[19] Zuellig Freight and Cargo Systems v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 157900, 22 July 2013
[20] Martin K. Ayungo v. Beamko Shipmanagement Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 203161, 26 February 2014
[21] Eric Godfrey Stanley Livesey v. Binswanger Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 177493, 19 March 2014
[22] Cf. Michelle Lana Brown-Araneta, etc. v. Juan Ignacio Araneta, G.R. No. 190814, 09 October 2013
[23] Id.
[24] Cf. Heirs of Marcelo Sotto, etc., et al. v. Matilde S. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, 17 February 2014
[25] Rollo, p. 61
[26] Id. at 138
[27] Id. at 146
[28] Id. at 135-148
[29] Id. at 29
[30] Cf. Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corporation v. Ting Guan Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 182153, 07 April 2014
[31] Rollo, p. 33
[32] Id. at 170
[33] Id. at 172
[34] Id. at 33
[35] Cf. A’ Prime Security Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division), et al., G.R. No. 107320, 19 January 2000
[36] Misamis Oriental II Electric Service Cooperative (MORESCO II) v. Virgilio M. Cagalawan, G.R. No. 175170, 05 September 2012
[37] Rollo, p. 12
[38] Id. at 30
[39] Id. at 63
[40] Id. at 64
[41] Id. at 101
[42] Id. at 103-106
[43] Id. at 31
[44] Id. at 34
[45] Diamond Taxi, et al., v. Felipe Llamas, Jr., G.R. No. 190724, 12 March 2014
[46] Rollo, pp. 107-108
[47] Id. at 108
[48] Misamis Oriental II Electric Service Cooperative (MORESCO II) v. Virgilio M. Cagalawan, supra
[49] Rollo, p. 34
[50] T & H Shopfitters Corporation/Gin Queen Corporation, et al. v. T & H Shopfitters Corporation/Gin Queen Workers Union, et al., G.R. No. 191714, 26 February 2014
[51] Misamis Oriental II Electric Service Cooperative (MORESCO II) v. Virgilio M. Cagalawan, supra
[52] Ma. Consolacion M. Nahas, etc. v. Juanita L. Olarte, G.R. No. 169247, 02 June 2014