GIL SAN DIEGO AND RUFINA SAN DIEGO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Presented before us in this petition for mandamus is the peculiar case
of party-defendants insisting on, and prevailing party-plaintiffs resisting, the
execution of a final and executory decision. 

To understand this peculiarity, we will state briefly the facts leading to
the controversy.

After trial in Civil Case No. 770 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
on complaint of Jose, Maria, and Urbano, all surnamed “de la Cruz”, to recover a
parcel of land and damages from Gil San Diego and Rufina San Diego, the Court
(Hon. Jesus Y. Perez, presiding) rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court hereby renders judgment as follows:

“(a) Declaring the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, null and void;

“(b) Ordering the defendants and third-party plaintiffs to vacate the Land in
question upon payment to them by the plaintiffs and third-party defendants,
within thirty (30) days after this decision has become final, of the sum of
THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,500.00);

“(c) Dismissing the counterclaim of the third-party defendants; and

“(d) No pronouncement as to costs.”

The court found that the disputed portion of a parcel of land belonged to the
plaintiffs through hereditary succession; that the defendants built a house on
the land in good faith, having acquired the land from Catalina Anastacio, mother
of the plaintiffs, by purchase for P1,000.00. During the proceedings, the
defendants filed a third-party complaint against said vendor. The vendor (mother
of plaintiffs) subsequently died; hence, herein respondents, who were the
plaintiffs, became at the same time third-party defendants in substitution of
their deceased mother. The court voided the sale on the ground that the vendor
had no right to the land, but upheld the defense of defendants as builders in
good faith.

On appeal by the plaintiffs and third-party defendants, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the lower court’s decision, and the same, thereafter,
became final and executory. Over two years later, the defendants and third-party
plaintiffs, who were in possession of the parcel of land in litigation, moved to
execute paragraph (b) of the aforequoted dispositive portion of the decision in
order to collect the sum of P3,500.00 and thereafter to vacate the premises. The
motion was denied by the court (Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding), and a
motion for reconsideration was likewise of no avail. Hence, the instant petition
for mandamus was filed to compel the respondent Judge to issue the writ
applied for.

Petitioners’ argument is that the pertinent part of the dispositive portion
of the decision ordains, first, that they vacate the land, and second, that the
plaintiff pay P3,500.00 within 30 days after this decision becomes final,

“with the connecting preposition ‘upon’ unmistakably denoting that the second
(payment of indemnity) is a condition precedent to the first (vacation of the
premises).” (Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 5)

They hold the view that the respondents should pay them first before they
vacate, and not vice-versa; and that they are entitled now to insist on
the payment through a writ of execution.

Respondents, upon the other hand, contend:

(1) That petitioners have no right to the writ of execution, because as
absolute owners of the land, the respondents have the right, under Article 448
to exercise the option to either pay the value of improvements or demand
reasonable rent if respondents do not choose to appropriate the building;

(2) That in fact respondents have elected to demand payment of rentals on
land actually occupied by petitioner’s building at TEN PESOS a month, and made a
demand therefor immediately after the finality of the Court of Appeals decision,
because the amount of P3,500.00 is exorbitant, so that the land owners chose to
allow petitioners to remain on the land;

(3) That respondents have long suggested to petitioners that a commissioner
be appointed to assess the present fair market value of the building, taking
depreciation into account; and

(4) That the denial of the motion for execution is justified because it is
premature and has no legal basis.

We find the petition meritorious. The judgment affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, and now final, explicitly ordains the payment by the respondents de la
Cruz of the amount of P3,500.00 “within 30 days after this decision becomes
final” to petitioners San Diego. If it also orders petitioners to vacate only
upon such payment, it did so in recognition of the right of retention granted to
possessors in good faith by Article 546 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
This provision is expressly made applicable to builders in good faith (Article
448). The right of retention thus granted is merely a security for the
enforcement of the possessor’s right to indemnity for the improvements made by
him. As a result, the possessor in good faith, in retaining the land and its
improvements pending reimbursement of his useful expenditure, is not bound to
pay any rental during the period of retention; otherwise, the value of his
security would be impaired (cf. Tufexis vs. Chunaco (C. A.) 36 Off. Gaz.
2455).

Normally, of course, the landowner has the option to either appropriate the
improvement or to sell the land to the possessor. This option is no longer open
to the respondent landowners because the decision in the former suit limits them
to the first alternative by requiring the petitioners to vacate the land (and
surrender the improvements) upon payment of P3,500.00. Evidently, the Courts of
First Instance and of Appeals opined that the respondents’ suit to recover the
property was an exercise of their right to choose to appropriate the
improvements and pay the indemnity fixed by law. The respondents acquiesced in
this view, since they did not ask for a modification of the judgment and allowed
it to become final. Consequently, they can no longer insist on selecting another
alternative; nor can they be heard now to urge that the value of the indemnity,
set at P3,500.00, is exorbitant, for the same reason that the judgment fixing
that amount is no longer subject to alteration.

The judgment ordering payment to petitioners of P3,500.00, by way of
indemnity, having become final, and the 30 days for its payment having elapsed,
the court of first instance has the ministerial duty to order its execution
(Zulueta vs. Paredes, 62 Phil. 5; Buenaventura vs. Garcia, 78 Phil. 759; Amor
vs. Jugo, 17 Phil. 703; Viquiera vs. Baraña, 78 Phil. 456). That duty is
compilable by mandamus; and the execution is leviable on any property
of respondents de la Cruz, including the land now in question and its
improvements.

Wherefore, the writ prayed for is granted, and the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan is ordered to issue the writ of execution in favor of petitioners. Costs
against respondents de la Cruz.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes,
Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.