ROSARIO GREY VDA. DE ALBAR AND JOSE M. GREY, PETITIONERS, VS. JOSEFA FABIE DE CARANDANG AND THE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.

Appeal taken by Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar and Jose M. Grey from the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28196-R—an original action for certiorari
filed by respondent Josefa Fabie de Carandang.

In her will the deceased Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey bequeathed the naked
ownership of a parcel of land situated at Ongpin St., Manila, and of the
building and other improvements existing thereon, to petitioners, and the
usufruct thereof to respondent for life. Because the improvements were destroyed
during the battle for the liberation of the City of Manila, the Philippine War
Damage Commission paid petitioners a certain sum of money as war damage. It was
respondent, however, who paid the real estate taxes due on the land for the
years 1945 to 1954.

On October 2, 1952, petitioners commenced Civil Case No. 17674 in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to limit respondent’s usufruct to the legal interest
on the value of the land. After due trial the court rendered judgment as
follows:

“En virtud de todo lo cual, el Juzgado promulga decision a favor de la
demandada usufructuaria, declarando:

(a) Que su usufructo vitalicio continua sobre la finca en Ongpin con derecho
exclusivo de percibir durante su vida la totalidad de sus rentas, sin que los
demandantes tengan derecho de inmiscuirse en la administracion de dicha
finca;

(b) Con derecho de percibir el 6% de la cantidad de P8,574.00 percibidos como
indemnizacion de guerra desde Enero 11, 1950;

(c) Al reembolso de la suma de P1,989.27 pagados o abonados por la demandada
como pagos de amillaramiento desde la fecha de la Contestacion, Octubre 22,
1953;

(d) Mas la suma de P2,000.00 como daños y perjuicios en forma de honorarios
de abogado y gastos de litigio;

(e) Con las costas a cargo de los demandantes.”

Deciding the appeal taken by petitioners, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment as follows:

“Wherefore, we hereby affirm the decision appealed from in so far as it holds
that appellee’s right of life usufruct subsist and is in full force and effect
upon the Ongpin lot and the building now existing thereon, and that she is
entitled to receive from appellants 6% of the amount the latter actually
received from the Philippine War Damage Commission, and we hereby reverse said
decision, declaring that reimbursement to appellee of the sum of P1,989.27 paid
by her for real estate taxes is deferred until the termination of the usufruct,
and that she is not entitled to any amount for attorney’s fees.”

On appeal taken by petitioners We, in turn, rendered judgment affirming that
of the Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioners should not be
made to reimburse the real estate taxes paid by respondent for the years 1945 to
1954. Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, We further
modified the appealed judgment by eliminating therefrom the portion requiring
them to give security for the payment of legal interest on the amount of the war
damage.

The record of the case having been remanded to the court of origin for
execution, respondent filed a motion praying that the court issue an order for
the “payment of the sum of P1,963.20 as the legal interests from January 11,
1950 to January 11, 1960, which are already due to the defendant usufructuary
from the plaintiffs, naked owners, as legal interest on the war damage payments
received by the later covering said ten years period and that plaintiffs be
ordered to pay defendant usufructuary the amount of P196.32 every year,
representing the legal interest per annum payable on or before January 15, 1961,
and every year thereafter during the existence of the usufruct.”

Petitioners opposed the motion alleging that because respondent failed to pay
the real estate taxes on the property for the years 1954 to 1959, the property
was declared delinquent and sold at public auction to Mrs. Pilar T. Bautista;
that respondent failed to repurchase the property despite the fact that she was
under obligation to do so in order to maintain her usufruct thereon; that on
June 8, 1959, petitioners repurchased the same for P715.05 and paid all the back
taxes due thereon up to 1957, bringing the total amount of real estate taxes
paid by them to P3,495.00; that, consequently, respondent’s usufruct over the
property was extinguished and they are entitled to reimbursement for the amount
of real estate taxes paid by them. On these grounds they prayed for the denial
of respondent’s motion, or for the suspension of the issuance of the writ of
execution until the question of the termination of respondent’s usufruct has
been finally settled.

On July 2, 1960, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the following
order:

“On motion of the defendant and it appearing that the decision of this Court
dated August 10, 1953, as modified by the decisions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. No. 11917-R and of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-13361, had already
become final and executory, let a writ be issued for the execution of the said
decision.

“In collecting and satisfying the sums adjudged in the judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs, [defendant] the Sheriff of Manila is hereby ordered to withhold
the sum of P3,495.90 which the plaintiffs claim to be reimbursable to them for
real estate taxes paid on the property for the years 1954, 1955, 1957 and 1959,
as well as the sum spent in repurchasing the property from the buyer at public
auction, Mrs. Pilar T. Bautista, The disposition of the said sum should be
threshed out by the parties in a separate incident either in this action or in
an independent litigation”.

On July 23, 1960 respondent filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
above order upon the ground that it imposes a condition on the execution of the
judgment rendered in the case—which, as modified by the appellate courts, had
already become executory. The court, however, denied the motion in its order of
August 25 of the same year, which, in part, said:

“The Court recognizes the fact that the decision had already become final and
executory and has ordered the issuance of the proper writ for the enforcement of
the said decision, in the first paragraph of the questioned order. The second
paragraph of the same order was deemed necessary in view of the apparent
conflict between the parties as to how to execute the decision, particularly
with regard to the liability for real estate taxes on the property in question.
The difference of their views on this matter is very evident in the pleadings
they have filed in connection with the issuance of the writ of execution. In
view of this divergence of opinion between the parties, the Court considered it
wise to withhold the disputed sum, the same to be disposed of in such manner
that the parties may thresh out between themselves in a separate incident or in
an independent action. There is no intention to modify or impose any condition
on the enforcement of the judgment; rather the Court merely desires that the
said judgment be enforced and executed in the correct and proper
manner.”

A petition for certiorari was thereafter filed by respondent Josefa Fabie de
Carandang with the Court of Appeals to annul the orders of July 2, 1960 and
August 25, 1960, on the ground that the same were not in conformity with our
decision in G.R. No. L-13361, as modified by our resolution of February 10,
1960.

Respondents’ answer, after admitting some of the averments made in the
petition for certiorari and denying the others, alleged as affirmative defenses,
inter alia, that appeal in due time was the proper remedy against the orders
complained of; that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the petition
because the writ sought was not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and
lastly, that the respondent judge, in issuing the aforesaid orders, did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion.

Upon the issues thus submitted, the Court of Appeals rendered the appealed
decision annuling the orders of July 2 and August 25, 1960 mentioned heretofore,
and ordering the respondent judge to issue a writ of execution in accordance
with our decision of December 29, 1959, as modified by our resolution of
February 10, 1960. Hence the present appeal.

Petitioners reiterate now their contention that the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed by herein respondent, Josefa
Fabie Vda. de Carandang (CA-G.R. No. 28196), because the writ sought therein was
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. We find this contention to be
meritorious.

It is not disputed that the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and all other auxiliary writs
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction (Section 30, Republic Act 296, commonly
known as Judiciary Act of 1948). Settled likewise is the view that anyone of the
writs aforesaid is in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
within the meaning of the law, if said court has jurisdiction to review, by
appeal or writ of error, the final decision that might be rendered in the
principal case by the court against which the writ is sought.

In Breslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co. et al., 84 Phil., 618; 47 Off. Gaz.
1170, the main question raised by certiorari, was whether or not the Court of
First Instance of Manila erred in denying admission of an amended complaint
filed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4609 and, accordingly, in dismissing
the case. The Court of Appeals forwarded the case to us in the belief that the
writ sought by petitioners therein was not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
The reason given in support of this view was that if petitioners in the case had
sought a review of the orders complained of, by appeal or writ of error, the
review would have fallen under our exclusive appellate a question of law. In
deciding whether or not the case was correctly forwarded to Us, however, we said
that the reason relied upon had no bearing on the question of whether or not the
writ of certiorari sought by the therein petitioners was in aid of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, because the determining factor for the
solution of that question was whether said court had appellate jurisdiction to
review the final decision of the Court of First Instance on the merits of
petitioners’ action. In the present case, it is undisputed that the review of
the final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 17674 instituted by herein petitioners against respondent Josefa Fabie
de Carandang was within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. In
fact, it was actually appealed to said court (CA-G.R. No. 11917-R) and its
decision was subsequently appealed to us (G.R. No. L-13361).

While from the above circumstances it might appear that—conformably with our
decision in the Breslin case—the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the
petition for certiorari filed by respondent Josefa Fabie de Carandang against
herein petitioners and the Court of First Instance of Manila, because the writ
sought was in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, we find it to be otherwise in
view of one important fact that makes the aforesaid decision inapplicable to the
present case.

Before Breslin and others filed their petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, there had been no trial and decision on the merits in the principal
case—which was for the recovery of a sum of money—because the trial court not
only refused to admit their amended complaint but also dismissed the case on the
ground that the plaintiffs had no cause of action against the defendant.
Consequently, it was still reasonable and logical to say that the writ of
certiorari sought in their petition was in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals because, upon trial on the merits, the final decision that
would have been rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila would have
been appealable to the Court of Appeals considering the amount involved.

In the present case such situation does not obtain. The main case (Civil Case
No. 17674 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) had already been finally
decided, first by the Court of First Instance of Manila, then by the Court of
Appeals and lastly, by Us; our decision had become executory, for which reason
the record of the case was remanded below for purposes of execution; there was
absolutely nothing left of the substance of the action to be resolved. Such
being the case, there can be no reason to say that the Court of Appeals still
had jurisdiction to review the final orders and decision of the Court of First
Instance in said case, by appeal or writ of error. That jurisdiction had already
been exercised and exhausted with the rendition of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 11917. Upon the other hand, assuming that the orders
complained of are appealable, they could only be appealed to Us because the
appeal would have necessarily involved nothing more than a question of law,
namely, whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction to
issue the orders complained of.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction to entertain Carandang’s petition for certiorari, and, as a result,
the appealed decision is set aside. But, in view of the fact that we have the
original jurisdiction to entertain said petition, we shall proceed to decide it
on the merits as if it had been originally filed with Us, in order to save time
and avoid unnecessary expenses for the parties—following the practice adopted in
the Breslin case.

The question to be resolved is whether the orders of July 2 and August
25,1960 issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila modify our decision in
G.R. No. L-13361 (106 Phil. 855) as modified by our resolution of February 10,
1960. The answer must be in the negative.

It is, of course, the law in this jurisdiction that a decision, once
executory, is beyond amendment, the prevailing party being entitled to its
execution as a matter of right; that the writ of execution to be issued must
conform with the decision (Buenaventura vs. Garcia, 78 Phil. p. 759); but it is
likewise settled that a stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized
if necessary to accomplish the aims of justice, as for instance, where there has
been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution
inequitable (Chua Lee vs. Mapa, 51 Phil. 624; Li Kim Tho vs. Sanchez, 82 Phil.
776).

As stated heretofore, when petitioners opposed respondent Carandang’s motion
for execution, they alleged that because the latter did not pay the real estate
taxes on the property over which she had usufructuary rights, for the years 1954
to 1959, the property was declared delinquent and sold at public auction; that
because Carandang failed to repurchase it, petitioners made the purchase for the
sum of P715.05, and paid all the back taxes up to 1957 as well as those for the
year 1959, having paid the total sum of P3,495.00 as real estate taxes; for
which amount they claimed reimbursement from respondent Carandang.

Upon the above facts—if proven—it would seem that petitioners had at least a
prima facie case against the aforesaid respondent. It was in this connection
precisely that the order of July 2, 1960 provided that “the Sheriff of Manila is
hereby ordered to withhold the sum of P3,495.98 * * *, as well as the sum spent
in repurchasing the property * * *”, providing further that “the disposition of
said sum should be threshed out by the parties in a separate incident either in
this action or in an independent litigation”. This order, in our opinion, does
not amount to a modification of our final decision in the principal case, nor to
the imposition of a condition upon its enforcement. It amounts to a mere stay of
execution and is authorized by our decisions in the Chua Lee and Li Kim Tho
cases (supra).

In view of the foregoing, the writ prayed for in the petition for certiorari
filed by Josefa Fabie de Carandang against Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar, Jose M.
Grey, and the Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez (CA-G.R. No. 28196-R) is denied. With
costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.
B. L., Barrera, Paredes, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.