JOSEFA AGUSTINES, ENCARNACION AGUSTINES, JOSE AGUSTINES, LOURDES, ESTELA AGUSTINES, AND ABELARDO AGUSTINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, SEVE…

A nine-hectare land in Marilao, Bulacan, is the subject of a three-cornered
dispute between Severo Valenzuela on one side and the relatives of his deceased
wife Generosa Agustines on the other, with the Archbishop of Manila as
intervenor.

The main facts are unquestioned:

In August, 1934, Generosa Agustines died leaving a will which was
subsequently submitted for probate in the court of first instance of Bulacan in
special proceedings No. 4944. Having no children, she named her surviving
husband Severo Valenzuela the universal heir, but she specified some bequests.
There was opposition to the approval of the will; however, after some
negotiations, the sister (Josefa) and the nephews and nieces of the decedent
(the other petitioners in this special civil action) executed on February 8,
1935, an extrajudicial partition with the respondent Severo Valenzuela,
expressing conformity with the probate of the testament and dividing the
properties of the deceased. They promised specifically to respect the wishes of
the testatrix, one of which was this:

“Sexto – Encargo a mi marido que, después de que haya percibido todos los
bienes recayentes en mi herencia done * * * a la

*        *        *        *        *        *        *

Iglesia Católica de Polo otra porcion que no exceda de nueve hectareas, a
discrecion también de mi marido, del mismo terreno palayero e inculto, en el
sitio de Quiririt, para que su producto se invierta en misas en sufragio de mi
alma.”

Giving effect to the above direction, the extrajudicial partition stipulated
that, “Quinta base. Que el solicitante de este expediente Sr. Severo Valenzuela,
instituido heredero universal en el testamento obrante en autos y marcado como
Exhibit “A,” por su parte renuncia a favor de los opositores, todo derecho que
tenga o pudiera tener en la parcela de terreno, descrito y deslindado en el
inventario de los bienes propios de la finada y designado con el numero cuatro
(4) de dicho inventario, con excepción de, y después de descontar aquella
porción de nueve (9) hectáreas, cuyo producto, la finada ha destinado, para
misas en sufragio de su alma, a discreción de su esposo, Sr. Severo Valenzuela,
por disposición testamentaria y otros tres hectareas más, de esta misma parcela
de terreno que se adjudican y serán para el Sr. Severo Valenzuela.
Entendiéndose, que en la segregación de estos 12 hectáreas, 9 de los cuales cuyo
producto se destina en sufragio del alma de la finada y los otros tres hectáreas
que perteneceran al Sr. Severo Valenzuela deben colindarse con, estar muy
contiguos, a la pesquera designada y descrita en el inventario de los bienes
propios de la finada, e indicadas con el número tres (3).”

Other items of the estate were apportioned among the signers of the deed of
partition, which, submitted for approval, was confirmed by the probate court on
October 31, 1936, in an order directing the administrator to deliver the
respective shares to the heirs or legatees after paying the corresponding
inheritance taxes. No appeal was ever taken from such order.

Years passed. Severo Valenzuela failed to transmit the lot or part thereof to
the parish church of Polo or to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.
Wherefore, in May, 1944, the Agustines connections, petitioners herein, filed a
complaint against Severo Valenzuela (civil case No. 153) seeking the return to
them of that nine-hectare lot in Quiririt, alleging his breach of trust, plus
renunciation on the part of the church of Polo that had reportedly neglected to
demand compliance with the beneficial legacy.

Advised of this move, the surviving husband Severo Valenzuela hastened to
submit in September, 1944, in the testamentary proceeding No. 4944, a motion in
which he represented that under the will he had discretion to determine the area
of land to be conveyed to the Polo church and that, exercising such discretion,
he elected to assign that tract actually cultivated by the tenant named Benito
Salazar in Quiririt (admittedly one hectare more or less). He asked that this
assignment be declared full compliance with the testamentary directions. The
other parties to the testamentary proceeding were not given notice of this
petition. It was approved on December 2, 1944.

After the liberation and after they had become aware of Valenzuela’s act that
tended to frustrate their civil action No. 158, the petitioners herein submitted
motions for reconsideration, the main theme of which was that the said last
order amended the decree of distribution of October 31, 1936, which had become
final long ago. All was to no avail. Hence they started this special civil
action to annul the order of December 2, 1944, on the concrete proposition that
the court had no jurisdiction to issue it, the order of October 31, 1936, having
become final and executory eight years before. They contend, first, that under
the will, and in accordance with the partition approved by the court in 1936,
the Polo church was entitled to nine hectares in the Quiririt farm of Generosa.
They argue next that when that Church repudiated the nine-hectare lot, it again
became a part of the whole Quiririt property which, under the partition, had
been adjudicated to them.

On the other hand, Severo Valenzuela’s position is that the whole
nine-hectare realty was awarded to him, subject to his obligation to donate to
the Polo church such portion thereof as he may designate in his
discretion.

The intervenor, the Archbishop of Manila, representing the Polo church,
shares the petitioner’s opinion that a nine-hectare lot had been granted to said
church. He maintains, however, that no voluntary renunciation of the legacy ever
took place.

The questions at issue are these:

“(a) What was the share of the church of Polo under the will and the
extrajudicial partition?

“(b) If it was a nine-hectare piece, is the order of December 2, 1944 in
Special Proceeding No. 4944 valid?

“(c) If invalid, is certiorari the proper remedy?

1. It will be recalled that the will of Generosa Agustines contained a
   provision directing her husband to donate a portion of her Quiririt farm not
   exceeding nine hectares to the Polo church.

   It will also be recalled that the extrajudicial partition, containing the
   promise of all parties to respect all her testamentary directions, provided that
   all the land in Quiririt belonging to Generosa would be adjudicated to the
   herein petitioners excepting “con excepción de, y después de descontar aquella
   porción de nueve (9) hectáres, cuyo producto, la finada ha destinado, para misas
   en sufragio de su alma, a discreción de su esposo, Sr. Severo Valenzuela, por
   disposición testamentaria y otros tres hectareas mas, de esta misma parcela de
   terreno que se adjudican y serán para el Sr. Severo Valenzuela. Entendiéndose,
   que en la segregación de estos 12 hectáreas, 9 de los cuales cuyo producto se
   destina en sufragio del alma de la finada y los otros tres hectáreas que
   pertenecerán al Sr. Severo Valenzuela deben colindarse con, estar muy contiguos,
   a la pesquera designada y descrita en el inventario de los bienes propios de la
   finada, e indicadas con el número tres (3)”

   After examining and analyzing the circumstances of this litigation, we reach
   the conclusion that, as contended by petitioners and the intervenor, the
   extrajudicial partition definitely allotted a nine-hectare parcel to the Polo
   church. Supposing, that under the will Valenzuela’s discretion included the
   determination of the area to be transferred — and not merely the selection of
   the site where the nine-hectare portion is to be segregated — still it seems
   clear that in the partition he elected or agreed that a nine-hectare portion
   shall be conveyed to the Polo church for masses.

   While it is true, as pointed out by Valenzuela’s counsel, that in the
   paragraph here inabove quoted from the extra-judicial partition the phrase “a
   discreción de su esposo” appears, still it must be admitted that it could not
   have implied a future choice by such husband, because immediately thereafter the
   document speaks of nine hectares, “cuyo producto se destina en sufragio
   del alma de la finada” without any discretionary reservations. It is obvious
   that “a discreción de su esposo” meant “segun discreción que hoy ejercita su
   esposo”. It might also have referred to the particular location of the parcel to
   be separated.

   It is markworthy that, in addition to the nine-hectare portion, the
   deed mentions another parcel of three hectares exclusively given to Valenzuela.
   If the parties had not contemplated a nine-hectare donation to the Polo church,
   but empowered Valenzuela to fix the area subsequently, they would have assigned
   to him 12 hectares, with the provision that he will separate therefrom such
   portion as he may desire to convey to the parish of Polo. They did not say so.
   Instead they clearly stipulated that nine hectares were destined for “misas” (to
   the Church), and that three hectares would be reserved for him.

   It is quite probable that if Generosa’s kin had known, in the course of
   bargaining, that Valenzuela would not deliver all the nine hectares to the Polo
   church but would retain eight hectares thereof, they would not have ceded to him
   an additional lot of three hectares.

   Proof positive that he had no choice as to the number of hectares is the fact
   that for eight years he never exercised it, keeping for himself in breach of
   trust the fruits of all the land. He might have ideas repugnant to the
   religious beliefs of his wife in regard to the celebration of masses for the
   dead. But as a man of honor, as the surviving partner, he had no excuse to set
   his own notions against those of his departed spouse, especially on a subject
   that concerned the disposition of her own properties. The will of the testatrix
   is law¹. And his action in fixing
   one hectare, when his wife bequeathed a portion not exceeding nine
   hectares is surely such abuse of discretion (if he had any) that will not
   easily commend itself to judicial approbation.

   To make ourselves clear, we must state at the risk of repetition that
   although under the provisions of the will Severo Valenzuela might have elected
   to transfer to the Polo church a portion less than nine hectares, however, in
   the deed of partition he agreed — exercising his discretion — to assign nine
   hectares for masses (to the Polo church). It must be emphasized that in the
   distribution of the decedent’s assets, we must face the deed of partition which
   bears the courtfs fiat. The last will becomes secondary in value. Important to
   bear this distinction in mind, because both in Valenzuela’s motion and in the
   courtfs order approving the assignment of one hectare, only the will was quoted,
   and not the extrajudicial partition. Valenzuela’s motion invoking the will
   exclusively induced the court into error.

   A third reason to hold that the document of partition deeded nine hectares to
   the Polo church is the fact that the court and the parties considered it a final
   settlement of all the rights of all concerned, the court approving it in toto
   and ordering the administrator to deliver to the beneficiaries their respective
   portions or legacies. The court’s order even wrote finis to the
   expediente. And the parties, including Severo Valenzuela regarded it as
   final for eight years, until he found it necessary, for his own interests, to
   make another move indirectly amending the final settlement of October, 1936. Now
   then, if that partition avowedly settled the estate and accomplished its
   distribution, the implication is unavoidable that it left nothing to future
   judicial action or determination. Consequently it did not contemplate any
   subsequent fixing by Valenzuela, and approval by the court, of the portion to be
   transmitted to the Church of Polo. The parties deemed it final — because the
   rights of all beneficiaries were therein defined with certainty. Therefore, the
   attempt by the surviving husband to modify it eight years thereafter was
   completely beyond the pale of the law.

   This should be the logical place to discuss the effects of the nondelivery of
   the landed legacy for so many years. But in the interest of orderly procedure
   that matter should be left open to debate and decision in Civil Case No. 158 of
   the court of first instance of Bulacan.

2. Having found in the preceding exposition that under the partition the Polo
   church (or the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila) was entitled to a
   nine-hectare lot, the conclusion becomes inevitable that the order of December
   2, 1944, attempted to modify the final order of October, 1936. Which of course
   may not be done in this jurisdiction.

3. And certiorari may be interposed and granted under the circumstances, the
   order of December 2, 1944, being an absolute nullity.^[2]

Wherefore, the order of the Bulacan court of December 2, 1944 is declared
null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

Petition granted with
costs against respondent Severo Valenzuela.

Moran, C. J., Parás, Pablo,
Hilado, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 216.

^[2] Director of Lands vs.
Santamaria and Javellana, 44 Phil. 594; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil.
339.