THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LORENZO PADERNA Y GAMBOA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The appellant Lorenzo Paderna y Gamboa was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for unlawful possession of four packs of
untaxed imported cigarettes known locally as “blue seal” cigarettes.  The information, filed on August 8, 1966 and denominated
“for violation of Rep. Act No. 4097,” charged.

“That on July 25, 1966, in the evening, in La Carlota City,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines … the
above-named accused, without justifiable cause or reason intentionally,
feloniously, criminally and illegally had in his possession four (4) packages
of UNTAXED BLUE SEALS CIGARETTES the specific tax of which in the amount of
P4,224 has not been paid, in violation of law.”

After trial, the court found Paderna “guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Republic Act 4097” and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200 and suffer
imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day.

He then appealed to the Court of Appeals where he moved to quash
the information on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
try the case.  He contended that Republic
Act 4097, which punished the unlawful possession of untaxed articles with a
“fine of not less than ten times the amount of the specific tax due on the
articles found but not less than two hundred pesos nor more than five thousand
pesos and . . . imprisonment of from four months and one day to four years and
two months,” had been amended by Republic Act 4713, effective on June 18,
1966, and that the penalty for the same offense was reduced to a “fine of
not less than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred pesos and imprisonment of
not less than five days nor more than thirty days, if the appraised value . . .
of the article does not exceed five hundred pesos.” The result is that the
case was now cognizable only by the city court of La Carlota City, this,
according to the appellant, for the reason that criminal statutes should be
given retroactive effect in so far as they favor the accused.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General contended that the CFI
of Negros Occidental, having validly acquired
jurisdiction under Republic Act 4097, could not thereafter be divested of it.

In its resolution of December
20, 1967 the Court of Appeals certified the case to us, because in
issue is the jurisdiction of a court.

In our view both the appellant and the Solicitor Gen­eral are in
error.

1.  To begin with, what the
appellant should have filed is a motion to dismiss this case,
not a motion to quash the information.  The rule that objection to the jurisdiction
of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and is not waived by a
failure to file a motion to quash,^[1]
does not mean that a motion to quash based on that ground may be filed at any
stage of the action.  Under the rules of
criminal pro­cedure, a motion to quash an information may be filed only before
the defendant anters his plea.^[2]
Nevertheless, we will brush aside this technicality, and treat the appellant’s
motion as one to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

2.  Republic Act 4097, which
took effect on June 19, 1964,
and Republic Act 4713, which took effect on June 18, 1966, are both amendatory statutes relating to
section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code.  It is not the principal purpose of Republic
Act 4713 to reduce the penalty earlier provided by Republic Act 4097, for while
the reduction in penalty nay be the result of its enactment in this particular
case it is so only incidentally.  Rather,
the purpose of Republic Act 4713 is to draw a distinction between unlawful
possession of untaxed imported articles and unlawful possession of untaxed locally
manufactured articles.  A graduated scale
of penalties is provided for the former even Fs the same penalty (introduced by
Republic Act 4097) is maintained with respect to the latter.  Thus, section 174 of the Tax Code, as amended
by Republic Act 4713, now reads:

“SEC. 174.  Unlawful
possession or removal of articles subject to specific tax without payment of
tax.  – Any person who owns and/or is
found in possession of imported articles subject to specific tax, the tax on
which had not been paid in accordance with law or any person who owns and/or is
found in possession of imported tax exempt articles other than those to whom
they are legally issued shall be punished by:

“1.  A fine of not less
than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred pesos and imprisonment of not less
than five days nor more than thirty days, if the appraised value, to be
determined in the manner prescribed in the Tariff and Customs Code, including
duties and taxes, of the article does not exceed five hundred pesos.

“2.  A fine of not less
than six hundred pesos nor more than five thousand pesos and imprisonment of
not less than six months and one day nor more than four years, if the appraised
value, to be determined in the manner prescribed in the Tariff and Customs
Code, including duties and taxes, of the article exceeds five hundred pesos but
does not exceed fifty thousand pesos.

“3.  A fine of not less
than five thousand pesos nor More than eight thousand pesos and imprisonment of
not less than four years and one day for more than eight years, if the
appraised value to be determined in the manner prescribed in the Tariff and
Customs Code, including duties and taxes, of the article is more than fifty
thousand pesos but does not exceed one hundred fifty thousand pesos.

“4.  A fine of not less
than eight thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos and imprisonment of
not less than eight years and one day nor more than twelve years, if the
appraised value, to be determined in the manner prescribed in the Tariff and
Customs Code, including duties and taxes, of the article exceeds one hundred
fifty thousand pesos.

*                    *                       *                       *

“Any person who is found in possession of locally manufactured
articles subject to specific tax, the tax on which has not been paid in
accordance with law, or any person who is found in possession of such articles
which are exempt from specific tax other than those to whom the same is
lawfully issued shall be punished with a fine of not less than ten times the
amount of the specific tax due on the articles found but not less than two
hundred pesos nor more than five thousand pesos and imprisonment of from four
months and one day to four years and two months. . . .”

In this case the charge is for unlawful possession of untaxed
“blue seals cigarettes” of an appraised value of less than P500,
which makes the case fall under paragraph of section 174, but, as already
stated, this is a mere happenstance, and a general statement that the
latest amendment reduced the penalty for the offense is unwarranted.

3.  Nor is it correct to say
that since the amendment of section 174 of the Tax Code by Republic Act 4713,
as applied to the facts of this case, is favorable to the accused it should be
given retroactive effect in determining the ju­risdiction of the trial
court.  It is now a settled rule of law
that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action,^[3]
and that once acquired, jurisdiction is retained until the case is finally
terminated.  In this respect, the
Solicitor General is correct.  But the
Solicitor General nonetheless has overlooked the important and cogent fact that
both the commission of the offense and the filing of the information in this
case took place after the enactment of Republic Act 4713 on June 18, 1966.  Thus, the offense is alleged to have been
committed on July 25, 1966;
the information was filed by the city attorney on August 8, 1966. 
Consequently, jurisdiction over this case should be determined under the
provisions of Republic Act 4713.  Since the
penalty provided by this latter statute is a fine of not less than P50 nor more
than P200 and imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more than 30 days because the
value of the cigarettes does not exceed P500, this case falls within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the city court of La Carlota City.^[4]

Indeed, this case is in substance similar to People v.
Pegarum,^[5]
in which this Court made the following findings and pronouncements:

“Before the Revised Penal Code took effect,
the penalty provided by law for the offense alleged to have been committed by
the appellant was arresto mayor in its
medium degree to presidio correccional
in its minimum degree, or from two months and one day of arresto
mayor to two years and four months of presidio correccional. 
The penalty prescribed in the Revised Penal Code for the same offense is
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, or from two months and one day to six months of arresto
mayor.  This is the penalty
applicable in this case.  (Revised Penal
Code, article 22)

“It is, thus, clear that under the law in force at the time
the crime was committed, the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to try
the case; while under the law in force at the time the complaint or information
was filed, the case was originally cognizable by the justice of the peace.  The specific question thus raised is whether
the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be determined by the
law in force at the time of the commission of the crime, or by that in force at
the time of instituting the action.  ‘As
a general rule the jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of the facts
existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to
the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of
events, although they are of such a character as would have presented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance will not operate to oust
jurisdiction already attached.  (16 C.J.,
sec. 246, p. 181) In the instant case, jurisdiction was invoked for the first
time when the complaint was filed in the justice of the peace court on February 6, 1932.  That was after the Revised Penal Code took
effect.  By reason of the penalty which
might be imposed, jurisdiction to try the case was already vested in the
justice of the peace.  Hence, the Court
of First Instance acted beyond its jurisdiction in trying the case.”

4.  Jurisdiction over this
case therefore belongs exclusively to the city court of La Carlota, pursuant to
section 81 of its charter^[6]
in relation to section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948.  But what of the jurisdiction of the
newly-created circuit criminal courts? Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, which
took effect on September 8, 1967,
provides in part that circuit criminal courts shall have –

“limited jurisdiction, concurrent with
the regular court of first, instance, to try and decide the following criminal
cases falling under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the latter:

*                    *                       *

“c.  Violations of
sections 3601, 3602, and 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and sections
174, 175 and 345 of the National Internal Revenue Code.  (emphasis supplied)

The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent
not only on the type of cases but also on the penalties provided for those
cases.  Inasmuch as the case at bar falls
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the city court, it cannot,
even if it involves a violation of section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken
cognizance of by circuit criminal courts the jurisdiction of which is
concurrent with that of courts of first instance in criminal cases where the
latter’s jurisdiction is original and exclusive.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion is granted, and this case is
dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of another information for the same
offense in the city court of La Carlota City.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rule 117, see 10.

^[2] Id.
sec. 1.

^[3] E.g.:
 Aquizap v.
Basilio, L-21293, Dec. 29, 1967; Rilloraza v.
Arciaga, L-23848, Oct. 31, 1967; People v. Pegarum,
58 Phil. 715 (1933).

^[4]
Jud. Act of 1948, secs. 44(f) and 87(c); Esperat v. Avila, L-25922, June 30, 1967.

^[5]
Note 3, supra, at 716-17.

^[6]
Rep. Act 4585.