G.R. No. L-28415. January 29, 1968
ESTRELLO T. ONG, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEZON AND LUIS S. ETCUBAÑEZ, RESPONDENTS.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Contenders in the November
14, 1967 elections for Lieutenant-Governor in the sub-province
of Aurora, province
of Quezon,
were petitioner Estrello T. Ong
and respondent Luis S. Etcubañez.
On December 4, 1967,
respondent Etcubañez went to the Commission on
Elections (Comelec).
He there petitioned to suspend canvass of the election returns from
Precinct 5, municipality of Dipaculao, and Precincts 2, 7
and 15, municipality of Maria
Aurora, all of the sub-province
of Aurora. Sole ground therefor
is that alterations affecting the result of the election, were discovered to
have been fraudulently made on said election returns in the hands of the
provincial treasurer and Comelec. Etcubañez sued for
time to enable him to seek a judicial recount under Section 163 of the Revised
Election Code.
On the same day, December 4, 1967, acting upon the foregoing
petition, Comelec wired respondent board of
canvassers, ordering the latter to suspend the canvass of votes cast for
Lieutenant-Governor in the aforementioned precincts and to suspend the proclamation
of any winning candidate for the said office for a period of five days from
December 4, to give respondent Etcubañez time
“to go to court for [the] proper judicial remedy.”
On December 6, 1967,
respondent Etcubañez lodged a petition in court
praying for a recount or, in the alternative, correction of the election
returns heretofore adverted to, and for preliminary injunction.[1]
His petition reiterated the alleged alterations fraudulently made. He attached thereto copies of official
certifications of the municipal treasurers concerned and photocopies of the
returns on file with the Comelec.
On the same day, December
6, 1967, the court came out with an order directing judicial
recount and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stop respondent
board of canvassers from canvassing the returns in the questioned precincts and
from proclaiming the winning candidate for Lieutenant-Governor.
At about 8:30 p.m. of December 6, 1967, the ballot boxes
for the three precincts of Maria Aurora were delivered to the court for
purposes of recount. Deputy Clerk Andres
G. Cadiz, who took possession from the municipal treasurer thru the deputy
provincial sheriff, found them to have been tampered with, the bottoms thereof
having been destroyed and soldered bank.
On December 11, 1967,
candidate Ong asked the court to set aside said order
of judicial recount and to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction. Reason he gave was that the official
certifications by the municipal treasurers, attached to the petition for
recount, were not the authentic copies contemplated by Section 163 of the
Revised Election Code. He challenged the
court’s jurisdiction to go into a recount of votes.
After hearing, at which both parties orally argued, the court, on
the same day, December 11, 1967, made the finding that “the requisites
mentioned in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code” were not
“complied with, as it is not alleged in petitioner’s (herein respondent Etcubañez’] petition that another copy or other authentic
copies of the statements from the four (4) election precincts in question,
which allegedly give to petitioner [Etcubañez] a
different number of votes and the difference affects the results of the
election, have been submitted to respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers.”
The court thereupon set aside its December
6, 1967 order directing the recount of votes cast in the disputed
precincts and, consequently, dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.
Still on the same day, December
11, 1967, Comelec, upon petition of
candidate Etcubañez, wired another order directing
respondent board of canvassers to again suspend the canvass and proclamation
for forty-eight hours from receipt thereof, to enable Etcubañez
to elevate to this Court the question of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Aurora on the matter in dispute.
This wire was received by the board on December 12, 1967.
On December 13, 1967, instead of proceeding to this Court, Etcubañez petitioned Comelec for
an order directing: (a) the respondent board
of canvassers to immediately suspend canvass of votes in the four (4) precincts
in controversy and the proclamation of any winning candidate for
Lieutenant-Governor; (b) the municipal treasurers of Dipaculao
and Maria Aurora to immediately deliver to Comelec
the election returns from Precinct 5 of Dipaculao and
Precincts 2, 7 and 15 of Maria Aurora; (c) the municipal treasurer of Maria
Aurora to immediately deliver to Comelec the ballot
boxes from Precincts 2, 7 and 15 of Maria Aurora, whose bottoms were allegedly
destroyed and contents tampered; (d) the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon, as chairman of the provincial board of canvassers
of Quezon and the Provincial Treasurer of Quezon, to immediately deliver to Comelec
the allegedly falsified election returns from the four disputed precincts; (e)
a hearing before the Comelec on the question of which
returns are genuine and correct, summoning for the purpose all the members of
the boards of inspectors concerned, who should be required to testify; and (f)
thereafter, the provincial board of canvassers to use the municipal treasurers’
copies of the election returns from the four questioned precincts in the
canvass of votes for Lieutenant-Governor of the sub-province of Aurora, and
then, make the corresponding proclamation.
The votes for the two candidates appearing on the copies of the
provincial treasurer and the Comelec, both allegedly
falsified, as compared with the votes in the purportedly genuine copies of the
municipal treasurers, are as follows:
Precinct 5, Dipaculao
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Precinct 2, Maria Aurora
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Precinct 7, Maria Aurora
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Precinct 15, Maria Aurora
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It is averred that in falsifying the copies for the provincial
treasurer and the Comelec, words and figures were
erased and added by a different hand to produce the results reflected above.[2]
Etcubañez has, from the beginning,
consistently alleged that the vote difference in the discrepancies above shown
affects the true result of the election.
In his petition before the Comelec dated December 13, 1967, he specified that
as per the returns furnished him and the municipal treasurers of the
municipalities of Aurora
sub-province by the different boards of inspectors thereof, he (Etcubañez) received 8,554 votes while petitioner Ong garnered 8,424 votes, or a majority of 130 votes in
favor of Etcubañez.
If the falsifications charged are true, Etcubañez
illegally lost a total of 310 votes while Ong
illegally gained a total of 306 votes.
Thus, upon the provincial treasurer’s copies of the returns in the four
disputed precincts, Etcubañez would lose to Ong by 486 votes; whereas, if the municipal treasurer’s
copies were used for canvassing, Etcubañez would win
over Ong by 130 votes, as heretofore stated.
On December 13, 1967,
Comelec, entertaining Etcubañez‘
last named petition, promptly resolved as follows:
“1. To order, as it hereby orders the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Quezon at Lucena
City to suspend canvass of the votes cast in Precinct No. 5 of Dipaculao and Precincts Nos. 2, 7 and 15 of Maria Aurora,
and the proclamation of any candidate for Lieutenant-Governor, until further
orders of this Commission;
2.
To order, as it hereby orders, the Municipal
Treasurer of Dipaculao and the Municipal Treasurer of
Maria Aurora, sub-province of Aurora, Quezon
Province, to deliver under receipt of a representative of this Commission who
will be properly authorized and identified, the election returns from Precinct
No. 5 of Dipaculao and Precincts Nos,
2, 7 and 15 of Maria Aurora;
3.
To order, as it hereby orders, the Municipal
Treasurer of Maria Aurora to immediately deliver to this Commission under
proper PC escort the ballot boxes from Precincts Nos. 2, 7 and 15 of Maria
Aurora, for inspection and investigation by this Commission;
4.
To order, as it hereby orders, the Provincial
Fiscal of Quezon as chairman of the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Quezon or his duly authorized
representative and the Provincial Treasurer of Quezon
or his duly authorized representative to immediately deliver to the Commission
the election returns from Precinct No. 5 of Dipaculao
and Precincts Nos. 2, 7 and 15 of Maria Aurora, provincial treasurer’s copy;
5.
To set, as it hereby sets, this matter for
hearing on Wednesday, December 20, 1967 at 10:00 A.M. in the session hall of
this Commission located at Intramuros, Manila;
6.
The Commission FURTHER RESOLVED to direct the
Executive Officer to designate two (2) lawyers of the Commission to go to Dipaculao and Maria Aurora, respectively, to take delivery
from the respective municipal treasurers of said municipalities, the municipal
treasurer’s copies of the election returns aforementioned;
7.
The Commission FINALLY RESOLVED to direct the
Chairman of the Action Group to make proper representations with the. Chief PC
as regards the PC escort to be provided the Municipal Treasurer of Dipaculao and the Municipal Treasurer of Maria Aurora, both
of the sob-province of Aurora, Quezon,
aforementioned;
x x x.”
From the foregoing resolution of Comelec
sprang the present original petition, lodged in this Court on December 19, 1967, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.
At the December 20 Comelec hearing,
upon motion of Estrello T. Ong,
petitioner herein, the former suspended the proceedings until December 22, 1967
at 9:00 a.m., pending resolution by this Court of said petitioner’s prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 21, 1967,
this Court denied Ong’s prayer for preliminary
injunction, but issued a restraining order directing Comelec
to refrain from ordering respondent board of canvassers to canvass the votes
cast for Lieutenant-Governor in the disputed precincts and to refrain from
ordering the proclamation of the winning candidate for the said post. Hearings at the Comelec
have thus, in the meantime, continued.
On January 17, 1968, Comelec, after
taking evidence and upon finding: (a)
that the copies of the election returns for the municipal treasurers of Dipaculao and Maria Aurora from the four precincts in
dispute are authentic, whereas the copies for the provincial treasurer of the
returns from the said precincts were falsified; and (b) that the three ballot
boxes for Precincts 2, 7 and 15 of Maria Aurora examined by the Commission
appeared to be patently tampered, the bottom of each box having been opened and
closed by soldering, promulgated its resolution, the dispositive
part of which reads:
“Considering all the foregoing, the Commission finds, and RESOLVES
to declare, as it hereby declares, that the copies of the election returns for
the Provincial Treasurer of Precinct No. 5 of the municipality of Dipaculao and Precincts Nos. 2, 7 and 15 of the
municipality of Maria Aurora are falsified and that the copies of the election
a returns of the Municipal Treasurer of the four Precincts are the true and
correct copies of the returns.
The Commission RESOLVES FURTHER that no further action will be
taken in this case until after the Supreme Court has decided the petition[3]
filed by respondent Candidate Estrello T. Ong, for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, in view of
the preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court in said case already
mentioned earlier in this resolution.”
This case now stands submitted for decision.
The focal point is this:
In a case like the present, where copies of election returns were
alleged to have been tampered with and falsified after they have left the hands
of election inspectors, where should an aggrieved party seek his remedy, before
proclamation – the Comelec or the Court of First
Instance?
The time has come, we believe, when we should take a hard look at
the limits of the authority of a court of first instance to take jurisdiction
under the provisions of Sections 163 and 168 of the Revised Election Code vis-a-vis Comelec’s power over
election returns, A policy statement becomes necessary to avoid confusion.
There should be an expositor of the law for the guidance of all concerned.
1. The jurisprudence of this
Court thus far has established that the board of canvassers are to be guided by
election returns transmitted to it “which are in due form” and that
they must “be satisfied of the genuineness of the returns – namely, that
the papers presented to them are not forge and spurious” and “where
the returns are obviously manufactured, x x x the board will not be compelled to canvass them.”[4]
And, if the board for one reason or another makes a wrong decision, or takes no
immediate action whether to consider or shunt aside returns which appear to
have been falsified or to be spurious, the matter may be elevated forthwith to
the Comelec.
Because time, the fourth dimension, is of the essence; it cannot be
meaningless.
And, as we recently declared in Espino
vs. Zaldivar, L-22325, December 11, 1967, it is
“within the realm of Comelec’s concerns to
direct that only genuine returns be considered where x x
x dastardly attempts were made to subvert the
people’s choice by a resort to patently doctored returns.”[5]
And this, because of the constitutional mandate that Comelec
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections,[6]
and of insuring free, orderly and honest elections.[7]
2. Section 163 of the
Revised Election Code,[8]
upon the other hand, circumscribes the power of a court of first instance to
direct a recounting. It says:
“SEC. 163. When statements
of a precinct are contradictory. – In case it appears to the provincial board
of canvassers that another copy or other authentic copies of the statement from
an election precinct submitted to the board give to a candidate a different
number of votes and the difference affects the result of the election, the
Court of First Instance of the province, upon motion of the board or of any
candidate affected, may proceed to recount the votes cast in the precinct for
the sole purpose of determining which is the true statement or which is the
true result of the count of the votes cast in said precinct for the office in
question. Notice of such proceeding
shall be given to all candidates affected.”
We have said in Lawsin vs.
Escalona[9]
that a “judicial recount of votes under Section 163 – ‘is a special
authority conferred on the Court and must be
restrictively construed, so as not to extend to other cases that
may, more or less, bear some resemblance to the situation described in said
section (s).’” We there further pronounced:
“The special nature and limited scope of the summary judicial
recount provided by section 168 of the Election Code is admittedly aimed
at delaying as little as practicable the
proclamation of the winning candidate, without prejudice to a thorough
revision of the election results in proper cases by means of the corresponding election
protest, which is the normal process provided for the purpose. To multiply the grounds
for a recount of votes before a proclamation by the board of canvassers is
made has the effect of downgrading the election protest as a remedy, and to
prolong the periods during which the contested
positions will remain without an occupant,
thereby provoking suspicion, conjecture, and unrest.”[10]
Viewed in this light, the court’s delimited power in Section 163
of the Revised Election Code may only be invoked where “it appears to the
provincial board of canvassers that another copy or other authentic
copies of the statement from an election precinct submitted to the board give
to a candidate a different number of votes and the difference affects the
result of the election.” To be underscored is the concept of the term
“another copy or other authentic copies.” We pointed out in Espino vs. Zaldivar,
supra, that –
“Implicit in the statute just quoted [Section 163] is that
differences in the number of votes given a candidate should result from contradiction
in the different returns, as prepared and signed by the inspectors. We do not discern in the law a purpose to
throw the burden on courts where it is patent – as is the case here – that
tampering a the returns occurred after they have left the hands of the
election inspectors, just to pave the way for the proclamation of a candidate
in whose favor falsification was resorted to.”
3. Appropriately to be drawn
then is the line that divides the powers of the boards of canvassers and the Comelec, on the one hand, and the Court of First Instance,
on the other. We are unprepared to say
that the election law intended that where, in a given precinct, some of the
returns are authentic and others are falsified, both the Comelec
and the Court of First Instance will have concurrent jurisdiction – prior to
proclamation. Such procedure breeds
confusion. It detracts so much from the
powers granted the boards of canvassers and Comelec
to proceed with dispatch with the work of canvassing and proclamation.
Where before or during canvassing or before proclamation
representations are made that returns are falsified, it becomes the primary
duty, first of the board of canvassers, and then of the Comelec,
to ascertain this fact.
If finally the Comelec summarily finds
that there was falsification of the copies to be used for canvassing purposes,
then canvassing must be made upon the basis of authentic copies. Because a falsified return or spurious return
amounts to no return at all.
If, on the other hand, the discrepancy in the returns was the
result of honest mistakes of the board of inspectors, two courses of action are
open in the court of first instance: (1)
a petition for correction of returns with the consent of all the members of the
board of inspectors under Section 154 of the Revised Election Code;[11]
and (2) a petition by the said board or any candidate affected for summary
judicial recount under Sections 163 and 168 of the same code.
All the three remedies heretofore marked out are intended to be
speedy. Resort to the board of
canvassers and Comelec in cases of falsification
should give rise to expeditious proceedings.
Unanimity of the board of inspectors paves the way for immediate
correction by court order of any mistakes in the returns. So also is judicial recount – on application
of any candidate affected – summary in nature; Worth remembering at this point
is Cawa vs. Del Rosario,
L-16837-40, May 30, 1960,
where we ruled that a summary judicial recount is merely for the purpose of
counting the number of votes received by each candidate “as they
appear on the face of the ballots.”
After all, ballot appreciation is proper in an election contest after
proclamation.
4. The remedies thus
delineated are explicit. They serve as guidelines.
The right course to pursue given the fact of discrepancy -by reason of mistake
or otherwise – is there.
We concede that there could be some delay in proclamation where
the wrong step is taken. Mistakes are
bound to happen. Lack of the required
data compounded with pressure of time conceivably may induce an incorrect
move. But to be accentuated is the
cornerstone tenet in elections of public officers that the choice of the people
expressed at the polls should not be frustrated by wrongful acts which can be
remedied. And amongst these is
falsification of returns resorted to by the unscrupulous. It is correct to say
that these acts are punishable. It is
not as easy, however, to pinpoint guilt therefor. Emboldened, malefactors falsify returns in the
hope that the board of canvassers may take them for the genuine. A defeated candidate may grab proclamation,
take his seat, while he keeps the victim out by a long drawn expensive election
protest – if protest the latter can afford. It is because of all these that
remedies before proclamation, within the limits set out by the law, must have
to be exhausted. Important is that a canvass and proclamation be made on the
basis of authentic returns. The end to
be achieved more than compensates the effort, money, and time expended.
The remedies heretofore mentioned before proclamation, likewise
offer a practical solution. Each of them far outweighs, in beneficent effects,
a subsequent election protest as a mode of relief. First. Because they take away the inducement –
proclamation – to falsify the genuine returns.
Second. Prompt
confirmation of the expression of the people’s will – the overriding
consideration – is effected. Third. Between the short delay in proclamation and
the long delay in an election protest, the choice is clear. The first is preferred. It brings results more consonant with
fairness and reason.
5. The other argument
pressed upon us is that, by the series of steps which Etcubañez
had previously taken he is barred from filing his last petition before Comelec praying, amongst others, for a ruling on the
falsification of returns charge These steps, petitioner points out, are: first, Etcubañez
asked the Comelec to suspend canvass and proclamation
for Lieutenant-Governor to enable him to file a petition for judicial recount,
which Comelec did; second, Etcubañez
then filed his petition for judicial recount in the Court of First Instance of
the sub-province of Aurora, which was dismissed after hearing; and third, Etcubañez again asked Comelec to
suspend canvass and proclamation for a period of forty-eight hours so that he
can elevate the question of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Aurora to the Supreme Court, which Comelec
granted. But instead, respondent Etcubañez returned to Comelec and
procured Comelec’s order of December 13 now under
review.
The wrong proceedings taken by Etcubañez
in this case cannot constitute estoppel. Here, that is reduced to a technicality which
serves no purpose. Etcubañez
has not adopted inconsistent positions.
Right from the start, his assertion – which never changed – was that the
election returns to be canvassed from the four precincts concerned, were
fraudulently altered. No positive
assertion of facts has been made from which he retreats. No party was misled. No fraud was foisted on anyone. In truth, the crux of the matter is in his
honest misconception of the recourse furnished him by the law. Under the circumstances, no estoppel can attach. The authorities are clear on this
point. In broad terms, an act or
representation made through innocent mistake or misapprehension
or induced by fraud is not a ground for estoppel.[12]
More particularly, the assertion of a legal conclusion where the facts
are all stated does not operate to estop
the person making the assertion.[13]
And this, because, as we have already confirmed, the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law, about
the truth of which the other party is ignorant.[14]
We can derive, great profit from the statement that an “expression of
opinion as to what the law is does not make the law other than it is, nor does
it estop a party from relying on the law as it really
is.”[15]
And then, respondent’s moves in swift succession constitute proof
of diligence in the protection of his rights.
He cannot be accused of laches.
The overriding consideration, of course, is that, above and
beyond the narrow personal stakes of the opposing candidates, the rights of the
electorate, not to say the people, are involved. To these rights we pay full respect. It is thus that the view is here expressed
that before proclamation Comelec’s hands
should not be unduly shackled from deciding election matters the purpose of
which is to ascertain the will of the people.
Comelec should be given the opportunity in the
first instance to try within its capabilities to approximate the people’s will
and thereby forestall the imminent probability that a wrong man may discharge a
public trust. We should write off an
unreasonable bridle upon Comelec’s constitutionally
ordained obligation of exclusively enforcing and administering the election
laws and of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections, And this, if only to
help stem the tide of illegal election practices, commission of electoral
crimes, coercion of election officials, Abhorrence of the iniquity and
injustice resulting from a public office being occupied by a candidate
undeservingly proclaimed, is sufficient justification for our view that Comelec is not powerless to fashion the appropriate remedy
– prevent the use in canvass of falsified returns.
6. Finally, we are asked to
reexamine the doctrine laid down in the Espino
case, supra. No compelling reason
exists why we should break away therefrom. It is
argued that in pronouncing that Comelec has power to
direct rejection of patently doctored returns, we tend to less heavily on Comelec, which unlike a court of justice, does not observe
procedural safeguards other than the bare requirement of due process. But this merely emphasizes the fact that the
proceeding to determine which returns are genuine is summary; its purpose, to
expedite canvassing and proclamation. To
be stressed here is that really judicial recourse before proclamation may only
be had in the limited cases provided by law, i.e., petition for correction and
petition for recount.
Other drawbacks there are which deter us from giving the nod to
the view that courts should be made to decide before proclamation
whether returns are falsified or not.
Necessarily summary in nature, the proceeding does not partake of a
full-dress trial. Probability exists that the court’s finding in such summary
inquiry may, for lack of time, be wanting in the desirable earmarks of
contemplative wisdom. And, it may be
conducive to an arbitrary prejudgment of the factual issue of
falsification. For, the very same court
later on may be called upon to go over the question in a criminal case for
falsification or in an election contest.
What if it draws a different conclusion? An embarrassing conflict of
views by the same court, perhaps by the same judge, is not a remote
possibility.
And if all the procedural safeguards attendant in regular court
proceedings to determine falsification as a fact, are to be observed, undue
delay in proclamation is not far from a certainty. Proclamation cannot wait for so long. Elected officials, by law, should sit at
dates not far removed from election day.
And yet, there is a necessity, to strike down falsified returns before
they even begin to inflict damage.
True, the victim of a proclamation upon falsified returns may
still go to court in an election protest.
But adverted to elsewhere this opinion is the fact that election
protests take a long time to decide If the protestant turns out to be the
actual winner in the elections, irreparable injury shall have been done. A grave injustice is caused to the winner, a
great wrong to the people. Worth reading
once again is the language of this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Cesar
Bengzon, in Lagumbay
vs. Climaco, L-25444, January 31, 1966.
It reads:
“The well-known delay in the adjudication of election protests
often gave the successful contestant a mere pyrrhic victory,
i.e., a vindication when the term office is, about to expire, or has
expired. And so the notion has spread among
candidates for public office that the ‘important thing’ is the proclamation;
and to win it, they or their partisans have tolerated or abetted
the tampering or the ‘manufacture’ of
election returns just to get the proclamation,
and then let the victimized candidate to file the protest, and spend his money
to work for an empty triumph.
It is generally admitted that the
practice has prevailed in all previous
elections. Never was the point
pressed upon us in a more clear-cut manner.
And without, in any way, modifying our stand as outlined in the Nacionalista Party vs. Commission decision, we feel the
mores of the day require application – even extension – of the principle in the
Mitchell decision, which is realistic and commonsensical even, as it strikes a
blow at such pernicious ‘grab–the–proclamation–prolong–the–protest’
slogan of some candidates or parties.”[16]
Our view, therefore, is that, in confirmation of the Espino doctrine, Comelec
possesses full power to direct boards of canvassers, after investigation, to
use genuine election returns for canvassing purposes.
Upon the view we take of this case, the petition herein for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is, as it is hereby, denied;
and the restraining order heretofore issued herein is hereby lifted.
Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the Department of
Justice and another to the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon
for investigation of the alleged falsification of the returns herein involved
and the prosecution, if warranted, of the parties appearing to be liable therefor.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
Election Case 1, Court of First Instance of Aurora, entitled “Luis S. Etcubañez, Petitioner, vs. The Provincial Board of
Canvassers of the Province of Quezon and Estrello T. Ong,
Respondents.”
[2] See: Answer of respondent Luis S. Etcubañez, and particularly its Annexes B to I.
[3]
Refers to the present case.
[4] Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, 85
Phil. 149, 157, 158. See also: Lagumbay vs.
Climaco, L-25444, January 31, 1966.
[5] Citing
Cauton vs. Commission on Elections, 1967B Phild. 248, 255, where this Court pronounced that Comelec “has the duty to see to it that the action
returns to be used for canvassing must be genuine and authentic, not falsified
or tampered with” and “[w]here the election returns produced by the
provincial treasurer have been shown to have been tampered, and all the other
copies outside the ballot boxes have also been shown to have been tampered or
falsified, it is certainly within the power of the Commission Elections to
issue such order as would ascertain the existence of the genuine, authentic and
untampered election returns, x x
x.”
[6]
Section 2, Article X of the Constitution.
[7] Id.;
Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil.
288, 294.
[8]
To be read in conjunction with Section 168, Revised Election Code, referring to
canvass of election returns for municipal offices, which in part provides: “x x x. In case of
contradictions or discrepancies between the copies of the same statements, the
procedure provides in section one hundred and sixty-three of this Code shall be
followed.”
[9]
L-22540, July 31, 1964, citing
Parlade vs. Quicho,
L-16259, December 29, 1959;
emphasis supplied.
[10]
Emphasis supplied.
[11]
Section 154, Revised Election Code, reads:
“Alterations in the statement. – After the announcement of the result of the
election in the polling place, the board of inspectors shall not make any
alteration or amendment in any of its statements, unless it be so ordered by a
competent court.” Unanimity of the board of inspectors has long been
considered to be a requisite to correction under this provision. Estrada vs. Navarro, L-28340 &
L-28374, December 29, 1967,
and cases cited therein.
[12]
Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil. 566, 569; Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584; 19 Am. Jur., p. 656, citing cases.
[13]
Sturm vs. Boker, 150 U.S.
312, 336, 37 L. ed. 1093, 1102.
[14] Tañada vs. Cuenco, L40520,
February 28, 1957.
[15]
19 Am. Jur., pp. 660-661, at footnote
9, citing Aunt Jemima Mills Co. vs. Rigney
& Co., 247 F. 407,409, writ of certiorari
denied in 245 U.S. 672.
[16]
Emphasis supplied.