CORAZON P. NAVARETTE, SPOUSES MIMING RAMIREZ AND JANET N. RAMIREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES CHITO CALLANG AND MARLYN YAON, RESPONDENTS.

Navarette versus Callang

The Case

This is Navarette versus Callang, an ejectment case that began as a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the spouses Chito Callang and Marlyn Yaon against Corazon Navarette, later amended to include the spouses Miming and Janet Ramirez and two other defendants. The respondents claim the land as heirs of Felix Callang, who died intestate, and they say they allowed the petitioners to stay on it only by tolerance, on the promise that the petitioners would build a small hut and vacate whenever the owners needed the lot. The case matters because it settles a question examiners love: whether the demand to vacate in an unlawful detainer suit against a possessor by tolerance must be written, and whether the Regional Trial Court, on appeal from a first level court in a summary procedure case, may simply remand instead of deciding the case on the merits.

Procedural History

The complaint for ejectment was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and later amended to add more defendants. The Municipal Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to prove that a written demand to vacate had been served on the defendants, and that occupants by tolerance are not deforciant occupants unless there is a written demand. The plaintiffs appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, which reversed and set aside the Municipal Trial Court decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Regional Trial Court held that the allegations in the original complaint were sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of prior demand, and that the complaint before the Barangay Captain operated as a quasi-judicial demand. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied, so they came to the Supreme Court on a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

Facts

Felix Callang, the father of the respondent Chito Callang, died intestate leaving a parcel of land in Bonfal West, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. During his lifetime he had already disposed of some portions of the land. The petitioners, who are relatives, pleaded with the respondents to let them stay on the premises because they had no place to live. The respondents agreed, on the condition that the petitioners build only a small hut as shelter, and that when the respondents needed the lot, the petitioners would vacate and surrender possession. The petitioners agreed and stayed without paying any rentals.

When the respondents needed the lot, they verbally notified the petitioners to vacate, but the petitioners refused and instead categorically claimed ownership over the lot. The matter was brought before the Barangay Captain of Bonfal West for mediation and conciliation, which failed, and the Barangay Captain issued the corresponding certification.

The respondents then filed the complaint for ejectment, alleging that the petitioners' possession was by mere tolerance. The petitioners admitted being relatives of the late Felix Callang and of the plaintiff, but insisted that the complaint was premature because there was no demand made upon them, which they claimed is a jurisdictional requirement. The Municipal Trial Court agreed with them and dismissed the case, and the case then traveled up to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the jurisdictional requirement of a written demand to vacate in an unlawful detainer case was complied with by the respondents under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in remanding the case to the Municipal Trial Court for further proceedings instead of deciding the appealed case on the merits.
• Whether or not the respondents have a better right of possession over the subject lot.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving a written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen days in the case of land or five days in case of buildings.

This is the provision the petitioners invoke, and the Court construes it to hold that the written demand it requires applies only where the cause of action rests on a lease, not where the possessor holds merely by tolerance.

Section 18, paragraph 2 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.

This is the provision the Court uses to fault the Regional Trial Court for remanding the case instead of deciding it on the merits.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the requirement of a written demand applies only to unlawful detainer cases where the cause of action is based on the failure of the lessee to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease and to vacate the premises, as is clear from the wording of Section 2 of Rule 70. When the cause of action is against a possessor by tolerance, there is no requirement that the demand to vacate be in writing; it is sufficient that the complaint shows that a demand to vacate was made, and that demand may be verbal. The Court noted that in the earlier cases of Hautea and Jakihaca, an allegation in an original complaint for illegal detainer that in spite of demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused to restore the land was considered sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of previous demand. The Court also stressed that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and cannot be made to depend on the defenses pleaded by the defendant. It was therefore error for the Municipal Trial Court to dismiss the case when the complaint clearly alleged unlawful detainer based on possession by tolerance.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Regional Trial Court committed an error in remanding the case. Having found that the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court should have decided the appealed case on the merits, which is within its appellate power. The Court reminded that the Rule on Summary Procedure was designed to avoid procedural delays and to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. It also reiterated that the Court may resolve the dispute in a single proceeding instead of remanding the case to the lower court if, based on the records, pleadings and other evidence, the matter can readily be ruled upon.

On the third issue, the Court ruled in favor of the respondents. The only issue in an ejectment suit is possession de facto, or physical or material possession, and any determination of ownership is merely initial and not clothed with finality. Both parties acknowledged that the subject property belonged to Felix Callang, from whom the respondent Chito Callang inherited it by intestate succession, so there was sufficient evidence that the lot belonged to the respondents as owners. The petitioners, on the other hand, failed to prove by sufficient evidence their right of possession, and they themselves admitted that they had no contract of lease with the respondents and that their possession was merely tolerated. The Court reiterated that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant and illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave, and that when a person occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract binding them, such a person is bound by an implied promise that he will leave the land upon demand.

Doctrine

First, the written demand required by Section 2 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court applies only to unlawful detainer cases founded on a lease, where the cause of action is the lessee's failure to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease and to vacate. Where the cause of action is against a possessor by mere tolerance, no written demand is required; an oral demand suffices, and an allegation in the complaint that demands were made and refused is sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of previous demand.

Second, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, not by the defenses raised by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss.

Third, one whose stay on the land is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant and an illegal occupant the moment he is required to leave, and the period within which to file the ejectment action is reckoned from the date of the demand to vacate.

Fourth, on appeal from a first level court in an ejectment case, the Regional Trial Court must decide the case on the merits on the basis of the entire record, and a remand is improper where the records allow the dispute to be resolved in a single proceeding.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court with modification, and ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject lot.

Remember This

Memorize this line: against a possessor by tolerance, the demand to vacate need not be written, and an allegation of demand in the complaint suffices to vest the first level court with jurisdiction. Examiners use this case to test the written demand requirement under Section 2 of Rule 70, the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the appellate duty of the Regional Trial Court to decide ejectment appeals on the merits rather than remand.