CORAZON P. NAVARETTE, SPOUSES MIMING RAMIREZ AND JANET N. RAMIREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES CHITO CALLANG AND MARLYN YAON, RESPONDENTS.
CARANDANG, J.:
“WHEREFORE, this court finds the instant appeal meritorious and thereby REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the Decision of September 24, 2012 rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and accordingly remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings with reasonable dispatch.”
The motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in the Order dated June 28, 2013[2] , hence the present petition.
Antecedents:
A complaint for ejectment was filed by Spouses Chito Callang and Marlyn Yaon against Corazon Navarrete on June 6, 2003 which case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3673 before the Municipal Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.[3]
The said complaint alleged that Felix Callang who was the father of plaintiff Chito Callang died intestate leaving a parcel of land with an area of 887 sq.m located at Purok 5, Bonfal West, Bayombong Nueva Vizcaya; that during the lifetime of Felix, he already disposed of some portions of the land; that the defendant (petitioner herein) who is a relative, pleaded to plaintiffs (respondents herein) to allow her to stay in the premises because she had no place to live; that plaintiffs allowed defendant to stay in the premises provided she would build only a small hut to use as shelter and provided further that when plaintiffs would need the lot, she would vacate and surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs; that defendant agreed and stayed on the lot without paying any rentals; that when the plaintiffs needed the lot, they verbally notified defendant to vacate said lot, however, the latter refused and instead categorically claimed ownership over the lot forcing plaintiffs to bring the matter before the Barangay Captain of Bonfal West for mediation/conciliation; that mediation/conciliation failed prompting the Barangay Captain to issue the corresponding certification.[4]
The said complaint was amended on February 16, 2004 adding more defendants namely: Spouses Miming and Janet Ramirez and Ferdinand and Winnie Navarrete.[5]
Defendants admitted being relatives of the late Felix Callang and the plaintiff. However, they assert that plaintiffs had no locus standi to file the case against them because the lot in question had already been disposed of by Felix Callang even during his lifetime; that defendants are not even inside the lot of Felix as they have, for 27 years, occupying a three meter easement of the Colocol Creek to which the DENR and the NIA had jurisdiction; that the case was prematurely filed because it never passed the conciliation and mediation proceedings at the barangay level because Bonfal West has no jurisdiction over the subject lot as it is located within the Purok 7, Barangay Sta. Rosa, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya; that assuming arguendo that the parties had undergone mediation/conciliation in the Barangay, the complaint is still bound to fail because there was no demand made upon the defendants which is a jurisdictional requirement.[6]
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. The trial court ruled that plaintiffs failed to prove that a written demand to vacate was indeed served on the defendants on June 4, 2003 as alleged in their Position Paper, thus they have no cause of action against the defendants. The court raciocinated that demand must be alleged and proven in order to enable the land owner to eject a person unlawfully withholding his/her property and under the present rule, only written demand maybe made, either by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice by mail as provided under Section 7, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Although the trial court recognized defendants as occupants of the subject lot by tolerance, it ruled that they are not considered deforciant occupants of the property unless there is a written demand to vacate.[7]
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the MTC decision was reversed and set aside on April 15, 2013. The RTC considered the original complaint as sufficient and effective prior demand required under the Rules, citing the case of Hautea vs. Magallon[8] wherein the Supreme Court held that: “an allegation in an original complaint for illegal detainer that in spite of demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused to restore the land is considered sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of previous demand.” (Italics Ours)[9]
The RTC also took cognizance of the allegations in the Amended Complaint that appellees were verbally notified to vacate the premises but adamantly refused claiming ownership thereof; that the matter was brought to the Barangay Captain for Conciliation and mediation conducted three times as contained in the Certificate to File Action; that the complaint pursued before the Barangay Captain is considered as a quasi-judicial demand; that in the Position Papers of the parties, it show that there was an oral demand made upon appellees.[10]
Aggrieved by the RTC decision, defendants-appellees (herein petitioners) now come before this Court on Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
Issue/s:
The sole issue in contention in this present petition is whether of not the jurisdictional requirement of written demand to vacate in this unlawful detainer case was complied with by the respondents in accordance with Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
It is maintained by petitioners that the MTC dismissed the complaint not because of the deficiency in the allegations in the complaint but because the written demand to vacate was not proved to have been made against them. The dismissal was due to the deficiency of evidence and not because of the deficient pleading. There was no evidence to support the jurisdictional requirement on demand to vacate.[11] (Italics Ours)
Petitioners cited the case of Lourdes dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals and Melba Tante[12] where the Supreme Court ruled:
Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged with the first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that embraces an action for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property. Second, they must also assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of physical possession of the land or building.
The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one unlawfully withholds possession of the subject property after the expiration or termination of the right to possess. Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive; for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession. The essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold possession; (3) withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the right to possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received by the defendant.
Petitioners insist that if the original complaint, by itself, is deemed the written demand or notice to vacate, it would be proof res ipsa loquitor that at the time such original complaint was filed, no sufficient and effective prior demand to vacate was made as required by Section 2, Rule 70.
Is the contention of petitioners correct?
Our Ruling:
We affirm the RTC with modification.
The material allegations in the complaint stated thus:
“That the defendant who is a relative of herein plaintiffs, because they have no place to live, pleaded to herein plaintiffs to stay temporarily on the lot in question and because of their insistence, plaintiffs hid to their request, Provided, that they will only build a small hut on the lot to use as shelter and Provided, further that if plaintiffs are in need of the same, they vacate and surrender possession of said lot;
xxxx
That since the plaintiffs are now in need of said lot, after notifying the defendant verbally to vacate the premises, she refused and arrogantly categorically claimed ownership of the lot;”[13]
From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners’ possession of the subject property is by mere tolerance of the owner.
The concept of tolerance has been explained as:
“Acts merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy. They are acts of little disturbances which a person in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from the well. Although this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription.
There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Xxx”[14]
It is well-established in our jurisprudence that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant and illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave.[15] When a person occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission sans any contract binding them, such a person is bound by an implied promise that he will leave the land upon demand. His failure to vacate the land upon demand gives rise to the summary action for ejectment. The reckoning period within which to file the action should be from the date of demand to vacate.[16]
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court states:
“Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. – Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving a written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land of five (5) days in case of buildings.”
Petitioners argue that the the wordings of Section 2 of Rule 70 require that the demand to vacate be in writing, as enunciated in the cited case of Lourdes Dela Cruz[17]
The essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold possession; (3) withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the right to possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received by the defendant.[18]
We disagree with petitioners.
The requirement of a written demand applies only to unlawful detainer cases where the cause of action is based on the failure of the lessee to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease and to vacate the premises as clearly evident from the wordings of said Section 2, Rule 70. When the cause of action is one against a possessor by tolerance, there is no requirement that the demand to vacate be in written form. It is sufficient when it can be shown in the complaint that demand to vacate was made which maybe verbal.
Thus, in the case of Jakihaca vs. Aquino[19] , involving possession by tolerance, the Supreme Court ruled that demand maybe oral. Such oral demand maybe proved by sufficient evidence showing that there was indeed a demand made like testimonies from disinterested persons and unbiased witnesses.[20] In fact, the Supreme Court, both in the Hautea and Jakihaca cases ruled that:[21]
“An allegation in an original complaint for illegal detainer that inspite of demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused to restore the land, is considered sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of previous demand.”
In the said cases, the Supreme Court considered the allegation in complaints that plaintiffs verbally asked defendants to remove their houses but the latter refused as sufficient compliance with the requirement of previous demand. The allegations in the complaint of herein respondents also contain the same asseverations which would suffice to comply with the requirement of prior demand, thus, vesting the MTC with jurisdiction to try and hear the unlawful detainer case.
It is embedded in our jurisprudence that “jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein – a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the pleas or defenses pleaded by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss, for, if such be the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.”[22]
It was error on the part of the MTC to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction when the allegations in the complaint clearly show that the action was one for unlawful detainer based on possession by tolerance for which oral demand is sufficient compliance with the requirement of prior demand. The RTC, therefore, was correct in reversing the said MTC decision on appeal.
We note that the RTC ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings. In this wise, the RTC committed an error. Having found that the MTC had jurisdiction to try and hear the case, the RTC should have decided the appealed case on the merits which is within its appellate power to do so. It must be stressed here lest it be forgotten by the RTC that the Rule on Summary Procedure was designed to avoid procedural delays that plagued the administration of justice in order to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice which is mandated under the Constitution itself.
The appellate power of the RTC under Section 18, par. 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure states:
“The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as maybe submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.”
In possession of the entire records of the proceedings from the original court, the RTC has all the means to decide the appealed case based on those records elevated to it and can even require additional memoranda and/or briefs to be submitted by the parties. Hence, the remand is improper.
“It is an accepted precept of procedural law that the Court may resolve the dispute in a single proceeding, instead of remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings if, based on the records, pleadings and other evidence, the matter can readily be ruled upon.”[23]
A careful review of the present petition reveals that petitioners do not question the ownership of the herein respondents nor deny their occupation of the subject lot by tolerance. In fact, the sole bone of contention in this petition for review is the alleged lack of prior written notice which We have already disposed of accordingly.
To dispose of this case in its entirety, We must decide the core issue presented before the MTC in the ejectment case to wit:
Who between petitioners and respondents have a better right of possession?
We rule in favor of respondents.
A catena of cases decided by the Supreme Court, the rule in ejectment suits is that the only issue is possession de facto or physical or material possession.[24] “Thus, all that the court may do is to make the initial determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent any other evidence to resolve the latter. But such determination of ownership is not clothed with finality”[25]
In the case at bar, the parties both acknowledged that the subject property belonged to Felix Callang who was the father of herein respondent Chito Callang who inherited the same by virtue of an intestate succession. There is therefore sufficient evidence presented by respondents that the subject lot belonged to them as owners. On the other hand, petitioners failed to prove by sufficient evidence their right of possession over the subject lot. Moreover, petitioners themselves admitted in their petition that:
“It cannot be gainsaid that the petitioners had no contract of lease with the respondents, and so could not be considered as “lessee”under Section 2 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court who should receive the written demand to vacate, so much so that oral demand would already suffice since possession of the subject lot is merely tolerated or allowed for free. Because “lessees”under Sec. 2 of Rule 70 includes that of an implied lease which in turn, includes possession by way of tolerance.”[26]
In fine, petitioners do not deny that they are possessing the subject land by mere tolerance. We reiterate the following jurisprudence enunciated by the Supreme Court, to wit:
It is well-established in our jurisprudence that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant and illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave.[27] When a person occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission sans any contract binding them, such a person is bound by an implied promise that he will leave the land upon demand. His failure to vacate the land upon demand gives rise to the summary action for ejectment. The reckoning period within which to file the action should be from the date of demand to vacate.[28]
Petitioners therefore have no right to possess the subject lot and must immediately vacate the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the RTC dated April 15, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners are hereby ordered to VACATE the subject lot.
SO ORDERED.
Gonzales-Sison and Sorongon, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, at 26-29
[2] Ibid, at 89-90
[3] Ibid, at 36-37
[4] Ibid, at 36-37
[5] Ibid, at 39-41
[6] Ibid, at 43-45
[7] Ibid, at 66-71
[8] 12 SCRA 514
[9] Rollo, at 26-30
[10] ibid
[11] Petition, pp. 9-10
[12] GR No. 139442, December 6, 2006
[13] Rollo, at 36
[14] Explained by Toelntino and cited in the book “The law on ejectment and leases” by Judge Danilo A. Manalastas, 2004 ed. p. 63
[15] Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626
[16] Calubayan vs. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146
[17] supra
[18] ibid
[19] 181 SCRA 67
[20] Cited in the book Civil Procedure by Williard B. Reano, 2009 ed. p. 728
[21] supra
[22] Cardenas vs. Camus, 5 SCRA 639
[23] Bunao vs. Social Security System, 477 SCRA 564, cited in the case of Medline Management, Inc., et.al., vs. Roslinda, GR No. 168715, September 15, 2010
[24] Dizon vs. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 391; Diu vs. Ibajan, 322 SCRA 452; Somodio vs. CA, 235 SCRA 307
[25] Gachon vs. DE Vera 274 SCRA 540, cited in the book The Law on Ejectment and Leases by Judge Danilo Manalastas 2004 ed. p.p. 7-8
[26] Petition for review, p. 12, par. 2
[27] Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626
[28] Calubayan vs. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146