CAMPUA UY TINA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. DAVID P. AVILA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF COTABATO FIRST BRANCH; TAN CHING JI, AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERI…

Campua Uy Tina versus Avila

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Campua Uy Tina against Judge David P. Avila of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, First Branch, and against Tan Ching Ji, the plaintiff in the collection case below. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to annul a writ of execution issued to enforce a judgment rendered upon a compromise agreement. The case matters because it fixes the reckoning point for the five-year period of execution by motion: not the date the judgment became final in the sense that no appeal could be taken, but the date it became executory in the sense that it could already be enforced. It is a study in the interplay of the rules of execution and the civil law on obligations with a term.

Procedural History

In the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Tan Ching Ji sued Campua Uy Tina in a civil case for collection. The parties executed a compromise agreement, which the trial court submitted to and approved in its decision dated February 4, 1954. After the six-year period fixed in the agreement had expired, Tan Ching Ji filed a motion for execution on September 20, 1960. The trial court granted the motion, and the writ of execution issued on August 14, 1962. The defendant moved for reconsideration, announcing that he would file an ordinary action to enjoin enforcement, which he did. The trial court denied reconsideration and issued another writ on January 3, 1963. The defendant filed several motions to quash the writ or stay its enforcement, all denied in an order dated February 11, 1963. The defendant then filed this petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the writ of August 14, 1962 and all proceedings taken under it.

Facts

Under the compromise agreement approved by the trial court, the defendant obligated himself to pay the plaintiff 23,000 pesos, without interest, within a period of six years from the date of the agreement. It was also stipulated that certain properties attached as security would not be released until full payment, and that the defendant, during the six-year period, would hold and fully enjoy the fruits of those properties.

On September 20, 1960, after the six-year period had expired, the plaintiff filed a motion for execution. The motion was granted, and the writ issued on August 14, 1962. The defendant moved for reconsideration and then filed an ordinary action to enjoin enforcement. The trial court denied reconsideration on October 20, 1962 and issued another writ on January 3, 1963. The defendant's subsequent motions to quash or stay the writ were all denied on February 11, 1963.

The defendant then came to the Supreme Court on certiorari. He invoked the rule allowing execution on motion within five years from entry of judgment, and argued that since the decision approving the compromise was rendered on February 4, 1954, it could no longer be executed by mere motion when the plaintiff moved on September 20, 1960. The respondent Judge answered that entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court only on February 5, 1960, because it was only then that the judgment had become final and executory.

Issues

• Whether or not the judgment of February 4, 1954 could still be executed by mere motion on September 20, 1960, more than five years after its rendition.
• Whether or not the five-year period for execution by motion should be counted from the date the judgment became final, as the petitioner contends, or from the date it became executory in the sense that it could already be enforced.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 39 provides:

A judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

This is the provision invoked by the petitioner, and the Court construes it to determine when the five-year period begins to run.

Article 1193 of the Civil Code provides:

Obligations for whose fulfillment a day certain has been fixed, shall be demandable only when that day comes.

This governs the obligation under the compromise, which was payable only upon the expiration of the six-year term.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the judgment could still be executed by motion. The uncontradicted statement of the respondent Judge that judgment was entered only in 1960 was sufficient to dispose of the petition on the literal terms of the rule. But even irrespective of the date of entry, the decisive issue was not when the judgment became final in the sense that no appeal could be taken, but when it became executory in the sense that it could already be enforced. It would be idle to speak of execution if the judgment was not yet enforceable.

On the second issue, the Court held that the five-year period could not have begun to run from the rendition of the judgment, because the obligation was not yet demandable. The defendant was given six years within which to pay. His obligation was one with a term, and the term was indubitably for his benefit, as shown by the fact that the obligation carried no interest and that in the meantime he continued in possession and enjoyment of the attached properties. Under Article 1193, an obligation with a term is demandable only when the term expires. Had the plaintiff demanded payment before the expiration of the term, the defendant could have refused on the ground that his obligation had not yet become due, and a writ of execution would have been as futile.

Since the writ could only have been effectively issued after the lapse of six years from February 4, 1954, the respondent court committed neither error nor abuse of discretion when it issued the writ upon motion on August 14, 1962. The pendency of the ordinary action could not neutralize the course set by the Rules. The petition was patently frivolous and revealed a groundless effort to cling to technicalities so that a confessed debtor could evade or unduly delay payment. The case of Primo versus Fernandez was not applicable, because there the plaintiff, after the expiration of the period within which the obligation was payable, still had three years to move for execution but failed to do so.

Doctrine

The five-year period for execution by motion under Section 6 of Rule 39 is counted from the date the judgment became executory in the sense that it could already be enforced, not merely from the date it became final in the sense that no appeal could be taken. Where the judgment approves a compromise obliging the debtor to pay within a fixed term, the obligation is demandable only when the term expires under Article 1193 of the Civil Code, and execution by motion may be had within five years from the expiration of that term. A term fixed in favor of the debtor, shown by the absence of interest and his continued enjoyment of the attached properties, cannot be shortened to the prejudice of the creditor's right to execute.

Disposition

The petition was denied, with double costs against the petitioner, and the writ of execution was sustained.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the five-year period for execution by motion runs from the time the judgment became executory, not from the time it became final. Examiners use this case to test whether a student can distinguish finality from executability, and to combine the rules of execution with Article 1193 on obligations with a term.