CAMPUA UY TINA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. DAVID P. AVILA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF COTABATO FIRST BRANCH; TAN CHING JI, AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERI…

In Civil Case No. 536 of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Tan Ching Ji, plaintiff, vs. Campus Uy
Tina, defendant, the parties executed a compromise agreement, which was
submitted to and approved by the Court in its decision dated February 4,
1954.  Under that agreement the defendant
obligated himself to pay the plaintiff the sum of P23,000.00
“without interest, within a period of six (6) years from date
hereof.” It was also stipulated that certain properties which had been
attached as security would not be released until full payment and that the
defendant “during the period of six (6) years, shall hold and fully enjoy
the fruits of said properties.”

On September 20, 1960, after the six-year period had expired,
plaintiff Tan Ching Ji filed a motion for execution. 
The motion was granted and the writ was issued on August 14, 1962.  Defendant Campua Uy Tina moved to reconsider on September 13, 1962,
announcing in his motion that he was going to file an ordinary action to enjoin
the enforcement of the decision.  This he
did on the following September 18 (Civil Case No. 1843).

On October 20, 1962 the court denied the motion for
reconsideration in Civil Case No. 536, and on January 3, 1963 another writ of
execution was issued.  Several other
motions were subsequently filed by the defendant – to quash the writ of
execution or stay its enforcement – but they were all denied by the Court in
its order dated February 11, 1963.

The defendant thereupon filed the instant petition for
certiorari, seeking to have the writ of execution issued on August 14, 1962,
and all subsequent proceedings taken thereunder,
annulled and set aside.

Petitioner, defendant below invokes Rule 39, Section 6, which
provides that a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from
the date of its entry, and that after the lapse of such time and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action.  The contention is that since the
decision approving the compromise agreement was rendered on February 4, 1954, it could no longer
be executed by mere motion when respondent, plaintiff below, moved for that
purpose on September 20, 1960,
more than five years having then elapsed. 
Petitioner would have respondent file an ordinary action in order to
realize the amount to which he is unquestionably entitled.

There is a statement in the answer of respondent Judge that entry
of judgment in Civil Case No. 536 was made by the Clerk of Court only on
February 5, 1960, because it was only then that the judgment had become final
and executory, and consequently the writ of execution
issued on August 14, 1962 was well within the period of five years provided for
in Rule 39, Section 6.  Petitioner, on
the other hand, argues that said period should be counted from the date the
judgment became final, which was immediately upon its rendition be­cause it was
a judgment on compromise.

The uncontradicted statement of
respondent Judge that judgment was entered only in 1960 should be sufficient to
dispose of this petition on the basis of the literal terms of Rule 39, Section
6, as invoked by petitioner.  But even
irrespective of the date of entry of judgment, the decisive issue here is not
when the judgment became final in the sense that no appeal therefrom
could be taken, but when it became executory in the
sense that it could already be enforced. 
For it would be idle to speak of execution or to try to obtain a writ
for that purpose if the judgment was not yet enforceable.  Rule 39, Section 6, in providing that a
judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry, clearly and logically contemplates the usual situation wherein such
judgment is susceptible of execution or enforcement the moment it acquires the
character of finality.

Could defendant, petitioner here, be compelled to comply with his
obligation under the judgment and, upon failure to do so could his properties
be levied upon, at any time within six (6) years from the rendition of the
judgment on February 4, 1954?  The answer
is obvious.  He was given that period
within which to pay.  His obligation was
one with a term and the term was indubitably for his benefit, as show by the
fact that the obligation carried no interest liability and that in the meantime
he continued in possession and enjoyment of the properties which were under
attachment for purposes of security. 
Under Article 1193 of the Civil Code an obligation with a term is demandable
only when the term expires.  Had
respondent demanded payment from petitioner before the expiration of the term
given to him, he could very well have refused to pay on the ground that his
obligation had not yet become due.  A
writ of execution would have been as futile.

Since such writ could only have been effectively issued after the
lapse of six (6) years from February 4, 1954, respondent court committed
neither error nor abuse of discretion when he did issue it upon motion on
August 14, 1962, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 6.  Needless to say, the filing and pendency of Civil Case No. 1843 cannot neutralize the
course set by the Rules for enforcement of the judgment in question.  The petition here is patently frivolous, and
reveals a groundless effort to cling to technicalities in order to enable a
confessed debtor to evade or unduly delay payment of his debt.

The case of Primo vs. Hon. Fidel Fernandez, L-18738, June 29,
1962, cited by petitioner, is not here applicable.  There the plaintiff, after the expiration of
the two-year period within which the defendant’s obligation under the judgment
was payable, had still three years within which to move for execution under
Rule 39, Section 6, but failed to do so. 
In the instant case, under petitioner’s theory, no execution by mere
motion was possible.

The writ prayed for is denied, with double costs against
petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
and Castro, JJ., concur.