🎧 Case Brief Lecture

HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH 2, BATAAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, LUZMINIA T. BAGALAWIS, AMADO SAMSON, JULIETA T. BAGALAWIS, CESAR SICA…

G.R. No. L-46845. April 27, 1990 April 27, 1990

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Santiago versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review brought before the Supreme Court by a trial judge, Judge Pedro T. Santiago, seeking to reinstate his own order, which the Court of Appeals had reversed and set aside. The private respondents, Luzminia T. Bagalawis and her co-owners, had agreed with the Export Processing Zone Authority on the price of their land in an expropriation case, and the judge refused to accept that settlement. The case matters because the Supreme Court never reached the merits of the settlement at all. It decided a threshold question of standing: whether a judge may personally sue to reverse a higher court's adverse ruling on his own order.

Procedural History

The expropriation petition of the Export Processing Zone Authority was raffled to the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch 2, presided over by Judge Santiago. The parties later arrived at an amicable settlement on the compensation and moved to dismiss the case. The judge denied the motion, ordered the deeds of sale submitted to him, and in an order dated October 29, 1975, rejected the settlement as invalid and set the case for further proceedings. The parties moved for reconsideration, which was denied, so they elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals set aside the judge's order and declared the amicable settlement valid. The judge then filed this petition for review before the Supreme Court, evidently moved by a desire to protect the government from what he perceived as a manifestly inequitous and illegal contract.

Facts

The Export Processing Zone Authority filed a petition for expropriation covering two parcels of land, Lot 190 and Lot 293, owned by the private respondents. The authority's power to expropriate was never in issue. The controversy centered on the just compensation it should pay. The judge appointed three commissioners, who submitted their findings. But before judgment could be rendered, the parties agreed on the amount of compensation and on the further sale to the authority of another parcel covered by a separate title. New titles were then issued in the name of the authority.

Because of this development, the parties moved to dismiss the case. The judge denied the motion and ordered the deeds of sale submitted to him. He took the position that having acquired jurisdiction, he retained authority to determine whether the agreement was contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy.

Examining the deeds, the judge found the agreed compensations grossly above both the market value declared by the owners and the value determined by the Provincial Assessor. He concluded they violated Presidential Decree No. 76, which fixes just compensation at the current and fair market value as declared by the owner or the market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. He therefore rejected the settlement, declared it invalid, and set the case for further proceedings.

Issues

  • Whether or not Judge Pedro T. Santiago, who was not a party either in the expropriation proceeding or in the certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals, may file this petition for review.
  • Whether or not the judge abused his discretion in nullifying the deeds of sale and in proceeding with the expropriation.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.

This provision bears on the case because it limits the remedy of appeal by certiorari to a party, and the judge was not one.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition must be denied because the judge lacked legal capacity to sue. Section 1 of Rule 45 allows a party to appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. But the petitioner judge was not a party either in the expropriation proceeding or in the certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals. His being named as respondent in the Court of Appeals was merely to comply with the rule that in original petitions for certiorari, the court or the judge, in his capacity as such, should be named as party respondent, because the question in such a proceeding is the jurisdiction of the court itself. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in Alcasid versus Samson:

In special proceedings, the judge whose order is under attack is merely a nominal party; wherefore, a judge in his official capacity should not be made to appear as a party seeking reversal of a decision that is unfavorable to the action taken by him. A decent regard for the judicial hierarchy bars a judge from suing against the adverse opinion of a higher court.

On the second issue, the Court did not resolve it. It expressly said that the question of abuse of discretion was eclipsed by the threshold concern of whether the judge may file the petition at all. In a concurring opinion, Justice Cruz agreed with the denial but would have admonished the judge for disregarding the doctrine of detachment. He observed that the judge had ceased to be judicial and become adversarial, and reminded that the task of a judge is to decide and not to litigate.

Doctrine

A judge whose order is reversed by a higher court is a mere nominal party in the appellate proceeding and has no legal capacity to file a petition for review seeking reinstatement of that order. The remedy of appeal by certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 45 belongs to a party, and a judge is not a party to the case he decides. A decent regard for the judicial hierarchy bars a judge from suing against the adverse opinion of a higher court. The judge's duty is detachment: he must leave it to the parties to argue their positions and to the appellate court to rule without his participation. The task of a judge is to decide and not to litigate.

Disposition

The petition was denied for lack of legal capacity to sue on the part of the petitioner judge, and the decision of the Court of Appeals stood.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a judge is a mere nominal party and cannot sue to reverse a higher court's ruling against his own order, for the task of a judge is to decide and not to litigate. Examiners use this case in remedial law and legal ethics to test the requisites of a petition for review under Rule 45 and the judge's duty of detachment.