HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH 2, BATAAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, LUZMINIA T. BAGALAWIS, AMADO SAMSON, JULIETA T. BAGALAWIS, CESAR SICA…

This is a petition
for review brought by a trial judge seeking the reinstatement of his order
which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner was the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch 2, where
the petition of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) for expropriation
was raffled.  The subject of the
expropriation was two parcels of
land, Lot Nos. 190 and 293 covered by Tranfer Certificates of Title Nos. 22484
and 22485 respectively, owned by private respondents who were, therefore, named
as defendants in the proceeding.  The
power of EPZA to initiate expropriation proceedings was not an issue.  The controversy was focused on the just
compensation EPZA should pay the private respondents for their land.  For the purpose, three (3) commissioners were
appointed by the petitioner judge who later submitted their findings.  But before a judgment could
be rendered the parties arrived at an agreement as to the amount of
compensation and the further sale to EPZA of another parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 22483.  Consequently, new TCTs
were issued in EPZA’s name.  In view of
this development, the parties moved for the dismissal of the case but was denied by the petitioner who ordered
the submission to him of the deeds of sale.

Petitioner judge is of the opinion that having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, he retains such authority and, considering that the
amicable settlement was reached during the pendency of the proceeding, he has
the power to determine whether the agreement was contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and policy.

Examining the deeds of sale, the petitioner judge found that the
compensations agreed upon by the parties were grossly above both the market
value as declared by the private respondents and as determined by the
Provincial Assessor, and are, therefore, contrary to Presidential Decree No. 76
which provides that just compensation, in cases of expropriation, shall be the
current and fair market value as declared by the owner or the market value as
determined by the assessor whichever is lower.

The first deed of sale concerns Lot No. 190 and the other parcel
of land covered by TCT No. 22483 not subject of the expropriation proceeding
which were both sold for Three Hundred Forty Nine Thousand, Six (P349,006,00)
Pesos.  The declared market value for Lot
190 was Four Hundred Sixty Four Thousand, Seven Hundred (P464,700.00)
Pesos while the assessor determined it to be One Hundred Twenty Three Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty One Pesos
and Ninety Six Centavos
(P123,981,96).  Sold for One Million
Three Hundred Ninety Five Thousand, Nine Hundred Sixty Eight (P1,395,968.00) Pesos was Lot No. 293 as contained in the second deed of sale.  The declared market value for this lot was
Twenty Nine Thousand, Nine Hundred Thirteen Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P29,913.60) while the assessor placed it at Twenty Seven
Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Pesos and Eighty Centavos (P27,420.80).  Accordingly, in an order dated October 29, 1975, petitioner judge
rejected the “amicable settlement,” declared it invalid and set the
case for further proceeding.  The
parties’ motion for reconsideration having been denied, they elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals which, as aforementioned, set aside the order of
petitioner rejecting the amicable settlement and instead declared it
valid.  Petitioner judge, evidently
motivated in protecting the government from what he perceived as a manifestly inequitous and illegal
contract, filed this present petition for review.

While the issue in the Court of Appeals and that raised by
petitioner now is whether the latter abused his discretion in nullifying the deeds of sale and in proceeding with the expropriation proceeding, that
question is eclipsed by the concern of whether Judge Pedro T. Santiago may file
this petition at all.

And the answer must be in the negative, Section 1 of Rule 45 allows a party to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment of the Court of Appeals by filing with this Court a petition for review on certiorari.  But petitioner judge was not a party
either in the expropriation proceeding or in the certiorari proceeding
in the Court of Appeals.  His being named
as respondent in the Court of Appeals was merely to comply with the rule that in
original petitions for certiorari, the court on the judge, in his
capacity as such, should be named as party respondent because the question in such a proceeding in the jurisdiction of the
court itself (See Mayol v. Blanco, 61 Phil. 547 [1935], cited in
Comments on the Rules of Court, Moran, Vol. II, 1979 ed., p. 471).  “In special proceedings, the judge whose order is
under attack is merely a nominal party; wherefore, a judge in his
official capacity should not be made to appear as a party seeking reversal of a
decision that is unfavorable to the action taken by him.  A decent regard for the judicial hierarchy
bars a judge from suing against the adverse opinion of a higher court, x x
x.” (Alcasid v. Samson, 102 Phil. 705, 740 [1957]).

ACCORDINGLY, this petition is DENIED for lack of legal capacity to sue by the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gancayco, and
Griño-Aquino, JJ.,
concur.

Cruz, J., see
concurring opinion.

* Impleaded as
party respondent in the resolution of this Court dated October 28, 1977.

150
Clean
Clean

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