THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FELIPE AMIT, VALENTIN SALA, QUIRIMON PEDRANO & FULDARICO REYES (AT LARGE), DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Felipe Amit, Valentin
Sala, Quirimon Pedrano and Fuldarico Reyes were
charged with rape in the Court of First Instance of Masbate
where, after a trial upon a plea of not guilty (except as to Reyes who had
remained at large up to that time), judgment was rendered as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused Felipe Amit as principal by direct participation in the commission
of the crime of rape against Divina Niez on the night of May 27, 1965, at sitio
Mambog, barrio Buracan,
Municipality of Dimasalang, Province of Masbate, as charged in the information, penalized by
paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 4111 with Reclusion Perpetua; likewise the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused Valentin Sala and Quirimon Pedrano as accomplices
in the commission of the crime of rape necessarily included in the crime as
charged in the information, penalized by Article 52 pursuant to Articles 18 and
71 of the Revised Penal Code, with Reclusion Temporal.  There being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances proven in the commission of the crime, accused Felipe Amit is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and to pay the amount of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos, to the victim
Divina Niez without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and applying the indeterminate
sentence law, accused Valentin Sala
and Quirimon Pedrano are
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
medium of prision mayor to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY medium of reclusion temporal, to pay the victim Divina Niez the amount of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos each, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and accused Felipe Amit, Valentin
Sala and Quirimon Pedrano, to pay three-fourth of the costs.  Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, the bailbond posted by said accused for
their provisional liberty is cancelled and their commitment to jail is hereby
ordered.”

On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the
defense, the trial court found the following facts to have been established:

In the evening of May 27, 1965, Divina Niez, 16 years old, single and a resident of barrio Pagyaman, Uson, Masbate, and her niece Elizalde Bocado were selling soft drinks, beer, bread and cigarettes
in a place in sitio Mambog,
barrio Buracan, Municipality of Dimasalang,
Masbate, where a “fiesta” was being
held.  At about midnight, Divina retired to a uninhabited house, located about twenty meters away from
her stall, belonging to one Filemon Humapao, where she fell asleep on a bench.  Soon thereafter she woke up and found herself
being lifted therefrom by Sala,
Pedrano, Amit and Reyes –
whom she all knew – and was laid on the floor. 
Once she was in that position, Amit tore her
panty and lay on top of her, while Pedrano held her
legs apart, Sala held her shoulders, and Reyes
covered her mouth with a piece of cloth thus preventing her from shouting for
help.  As a result, Amit
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.

At about that time, her niece Elizalde Bocado became sleepy and leaving their wares to Lucina Niez, sister of Divina,
followed the latter to the uninhabited house of Humapao.  On becoming aware of the presence therein of
appellants and Reyes, she shouted: 
“What are you doing here?,” in view
of which they all fled through the window.

Thereafter, Divina and Elizalde returned to their stall and after gathering the
things that they had for sale went home to barrio Pagyaman,
some two kilometers away.  Early that
morning, Divina revealed to her father what had been
done to her, and later that same morning, both reported the matter to Juan Diola, barrio captain of Buracan,
and asked him to bring the case to the attention of the authorities of the Municipality
of Dimasalang.  Father and daughter also complained to Dionisio Mijares, Chief of Police
of Dimasalang, who suggested that Divina
submit herself to a physical examination by Dr. Jose de Vera, municipal health
officer of the town.  This she did, and
the physician found that she had a slight swelling of the labia majora, multiple contusions with abrasions all over the
body and slight cervical laceration (Exh. C).  Thereafter, she was questioned in the office
of the Chief of Police where her written statement was taken, and on June 3,
1965, appellants and Reyes were duly charged with rape in a complaint
subscribed by the offended party.

Appellants now pray for their acquittal, claiming that the trial
court committed the following errors:

“I

THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT
BEING APPEALED, IS NULL AND VOID, THE SAME BEING
CONTRARY TO LAW.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES DIVINA NIEZ AND ELIZALDE BOCADO WHICH ARE FULL OF
INCONSISTENCIES, INHERENT IMPROBABILITIES, INCONSISTENT WITH HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND
EXPERIENCE AND AGAINST THE NATURAL COURSE OF THINGS.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FLIGHT OF ACCUSED
FULDARICO REYES WHICH TEND TO SHOW THAT HE SAID
ACCUSED WAS THE SOLE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME ALLEGED AND IMPUTED UPON THE
APPELLANTS.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION, EXHIBITS
“3” AND “3-A”, THE STATEMENT OF THE OFFENDED PARTY, DIVINA
NIEZ MADE BEFORE THE BARRIO CAPTAIN OF BURACAN, DIMASALANG, MASBATE, STATING
AMONG OTHERS THAT IT WAS FEDERICO REYES WHO ABUSED HER.

V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
FAILED TO PROVE MOTIVE ON THE PART OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO FALSELY TESTIFY
AGAINST THEM.

VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED AGAINST THEM, THEIR GUILT NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”

Appellants’ contention in the first assignment of error is that
the appealed decision is void because, in violation of the provisions of
Article VIII, section 12 of the Constitution of the Philippines and of section
2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, it does not contain “an analysis and/or
make a finding upon all the evidence adduced by both parties” and does not
state (a) the legal qualification of the offense charged, the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attending the alleged commission thereof, and (b) the
participation of each of the appellants in the commission of the crime.

Perusal of the appealed decision readily shows, however, that it
satisfies the above-mentioned legal provisions as it clearly gives the proper
qualification – Rape – for the offense charged; it makes a sufficiently clear
statement of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense and of
the facts which, in the opinion of the trial judge, were established beyond
doubt.

That the appealed decision does not contain a detailed narration
of all the facts testified to by each and everyone of the witnesses for the
defense but instead considered their testimonies as a whole as tending to
establish the defense of alibi – which was, in fact, appellants’ main defense –
does not make said decision fatally defective. 
In fact, we believe that the alleged defect constitutes no irregularity
at all.

The remaining assignments of error raise, in general, the
question of credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the sufficiency of
their testimonies to prove appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In the first place, appellants claim that the testimony of the
complaining witness, Divina Niez,
and of her niece, Elizalde Bocado,
is unreliable because it is full of inconsistencies and of inherent improbabilities.  This we find to be groundless.  Whatever variance or contradictions may be
found in their respective testimony is merely on details that do not affect
their credibility and the substance of their statements in open court.

Next, appellants claim that they could not have committed the
crime charged in a house almost surrounded by improvised stalls and situated
near the place where a dance was going on. 
These particular circumstances do not necessarily support appellants’
view.  Instead it can be claimed that
they render more credible the prosecution evidence regarding the commission of
the crime at the time and place mentioned in the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, because precisely the people attending to the sale of
their wares at their respective stalls, the persons buying from them, as well
as those who were engaged in dancing were too busy to pay attention or notice
what was happening inside the house of Humapao which,
according to the evidence, was located about twenty meters away from the stall
of the complaining witness.

Next claim of appellants is that it was physically impossible for
the complaining witness to recognize them in the dark.  This is untenable, premised as it is on the
unfounded assumption that the crime was committed in a dark place.  On this matter the evidence is to the effect
that the walls of the dilapidated house of Humapao
were studded with holes, and that the place where some people were dancing was
well lighted with a Coleman lamp.

The evidence likewise is clear that appellants were personally
known to their victim; that she knew Amit because she
used to pass by his house in going to school; that before the night in
question, she had seen Pedrano and Sala personally, and that she had also known Reyes when the
latter arrived in barrio Mambog to run a “hantak” game.

The record shows, on the other hand, that Divina
and Elizalde were thoroughly examined and
cross-examined, but that this notwithstanding neither incurred in any
substantial contradiction sufficient to lessen her credibility.  As a matter of fact, the circumstance that
early that same morning when she was victimized Divina
reported her sad experience to her father and both reported the matter to the
barrio captain cannot but bolster her credibility.

Appellants would like us to believe next that, because Fuldarico Reyes absconded, the presumption must be that, if
the rape was committed at all, he was the sole perpetrator thereof.  To bolster this not so definite claim,
appellants presented some evidence to the effect that there were amorous
relations between Reyes and Divina.  Such evidence, however, is far from being
convincing.  In the first place, Maximo Metante, whom appellants
called to the witness stand to corroborate their testimony on this matter
miserably failed to do so.  According to
the testimony of appellants Sala and Pedrano, Reyes and Divina stayed
together conversing in the uninhabited house of Humapao
from 11:00 o’clock up to past twelve midnight, but it may be gleaned from Metante’s testimony that at about midnight he had ordered coffee from Divina,
with instruction to have it served to those who were dancing.  This renders doubtful, if not incredible, Sala and Pedrano’s claim,
although Divina herself denied having sent the coffee
allegedly ordered by Metante, because she had no
coffee for sale that evening.  Furthermore,
as according to Divina she knew Reyes to be a married
man, we cannot easily believe that she had amorous relations with him at her
tender age of sixteen, there being no showing that she was of loose morals.

Appellants’ defense of alibi, on the other hand, cannot overcome
the testimony of the offended party, who knew them personally, identifying them
as the persons who had subjected her to a tragic experience.  To this we may add firstly, that, according
to the trial court, there is absolutely no evidence showing any ill motive on Divina’s part falsely to impute to appellants the
commission of such a serious offense as rape; secondly, as appellants admitted
their presence in Mambog on the night of the
commission of the crime, drinking beer in different stalls, it was not
physically impossible for them to have left those places to go to the house of Humapao and commit the rape they were subsequently charged
with.

Considering all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold
that appellants’ guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.  We, however, disagree with the trial court’s
finding that appellants Valentin Sala
and Quirimon Pedrano are
guilty only as accomplices in the commission of the crime because, upon the
evidence before us, they are guilty of rape as co-principals (Article 17,
paragraph 3, Rev. Penal Code; People vs. Villa et al., 81 Phil. 193; People vs.
Alfaro et al., 91 Phil. 404), and must, therefore, be sentenced accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision, as far as appellant
Felipe Amit is concerned, is affirmed, said appellant
to pay his proportional share of the costs. 
The appealed judgment is, however, modified as far as appellants Valentin Sala and Quirimon Pedrano are concerned by
finding them guilty, as they are hereby found guilty as co-principals in the
commission of the crime charged, penalized by Article 335, paragraph 1, as
amended, of the Revised Penal Code.  As a
consequence, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and to pay, jointly and severally
with the other appellants, the amount of P6,000.00 to
the complaining witness, Divina Niez,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.