SOLEDAD QUIRANTE, MERCEDES YULO, SEVERINO DETOYATO AND LEONOR ORTOÑO, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. THE SPOUSES RAYMUNDO AND PURA VERANO, AND HON. ALEJANDRO DINSAY, MUNICIPAL JUDG…

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental (Bacolod
City) dismissing the petition for certiorari filed therein by
appellants, Civil Case No. 8164, to set aside the actuations of the Bacolod City Court in a case of illegal detainer
brought by the appellees against the appellants,
Civil Case No. 5106.

The facts are stipulated. 
The complaint for illegal detainer was filed
on December 14, 1966.  Summons was served on the defendant on December 19, 1966, requiring them to
answer “in not less than 2 days nor more than 5
days after the service,” and setting the case for trial on January 11, 1967.  No answer was filed within the period
stated.  On the date set for the trial
counsel for the defendants filed a motion for a 15-day extension within which
to answer.  On the same day counsel for
the plaintiffs moved that the defendants be declared in default.  Of this motion the defendants were not
notified.  The City Court, however,
granted their counsel 5 days within which to present a memorandum in support of
his motion for extension.

On January 14, 1967
the defendants filed their answer.  On
January 27 after both parties submitted their respective memoranda, the City
Court issued an order denying the defendants’ motion for extension and at the
same time declaring them in default, and further authorizing the plaintiffs to
present their evidence before the Clerk of Court.

On February 2, 1967
the defendants filed a motion to set aside the order of default.  This was denied in an order dated February
11.  On February 17 the defendants moved
to reconsider the order of February 11, and again the motion was denied in an
order dated March 4.

Pursuant to the order of January 27, the plaintiffs presented
their evidence ex-parte before the Clerk of
Court on March 6, 1967, and
on the same date the Court rendered its decision in their favor.  On March 9 they moved for execution.  On March 13 the defendants opposed and moved
for reconsideration of the decision, which motion was denied on March 15, 1967.  Execution was, however, suspended.  Thereupon the defendants filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of First Instance, assailing the different
orders as well as the decision of the City Court of Bacolod
on the following grounds:  (1) that a
declaration of default is frowned upon judi­cially and each party should be
given his day in court; and (2) that the decision of March 6, 1967 is null and
void because no notice of hearing had been given to the petitioners.

The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition, ruling that
the proper remedy was appeal from the judg­ment by default instead of certiorari;
and that in any event no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the City Court.

The decision appealed from is correct.  The summons served upon the defendants
directed that they should file their answer to the complaint within 5 days
pursuant to section 4 of Rule 5.  And
section 12 of the same Rule provides that “except as provided in section
17 of this Rule (1)^[1],
if the defendant does not file a written answer within the time designated in
the summons, he may be de­clared in default, and the court shall thereupon
proceed to hear the testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses, and shall
render judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the facts alleged and
proved.”

The argument that default orders are judicially frowned upon is
true only in meritorious cases, that is, where the failure to file an answer on
time was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and when the
existence of a good and substantial defense has been shown.  In the present case, the defendants
motion for extension of time within which to answer the complaint was filed
only on January 11, 1967,
the very date set for the trial, which was 23 days after the service of summons
and 18 days after the expiration of the period stated therein.  Obviously it was not only the extension asked
for that should have been justified, but also the fact that the motion itself
was outside the period to be extended.

The following observations of the Court in the decision appealed
from are apropos:

“x x x.  This
apparent lack of diligence therefore of the defendants-petitioners to secure
counsel, and/or to explain this negligence on this score must have provided the
bases for the lower court to deny said motion.

“It is not enough that no order of default has yet been issued
by the court or that there may be valid defenses which a defendant may
interpose in order that the default order may be set aside.  Equally important is a proper showing why a
party may be justifiably excused for disregarding the reglementary period
provided for by the Rules of Court within which such party should submit his
Answer.  Otherwise, these guidelines for
an orderly and expeditious procedure will be rendered meaningless.  In this instance the interval of twenty-six
days is significantly long and there is neither in the Stipulation of Facts nor
in the exhibits or record anything indicating the reason why the petitioners
failed to secure counsel and submit their Answer to the complaint in due time
in the lower court.  In fact when
petitioners thought of securing counsel on January 10, 1967, the period which they should have answered
had long lapsed.”

It should be observed likewise in this connection that none of
the different motions of the defendants to set aside the order of default and
the judgment by de­fault was verified, or accompanied by an affidavit of
merits.  Reference was made to the answer
which was tardily filed, but not only was it not verified, but the allegations
therein do not constitute good and sub­stantial defenses in the suit for
illegal detainer.

The appellants contend that they were not given notice of the
presentation of the plaintiffs’ evidence before the Clerk of Court on March 6, 1967, to which notice they
say they were entitled since they had filed a motion to set aside the order of
default.  Section 9 of Rule 13 is cited,
to the effect that if a party in default has filed a motion to set aside the
order of default he shall be entitled to notice of all future proceedings
regardless of whether the order of default is set aside or not.  But as pointed out by the lower court, while
the motion to set aside was filed on February 2, 1967, the presentation of
evidence on March 6 was not by virtue of any order issued after February 2 but
pursuant to a prior order – that of January 27 – of which the defendants had
been duly notified.

In any event, if there was error in this regard, it was not one
that infringed the requirement of due process, since after all the defendants
could not have been heard in their own defense, their motion to set aside the
order of default having been denied.

In view of the foregoing, without ruling on the question of
whether or not the remedy of appeal instead of certiorari should have
been pursued, we hold that the challenged actuations of the Bacolod
City Court constitute neither excess of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discre­tion.  What we do find is that on the face of the
record, especially considering the absence of good and substantial defenses to
the complaint for illegal detainer, the petition for certiorari
before the Court of First Instance and the instant appeal to this Court have
needlessly taken up their time which could have been devoted to more meritorious
cases.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
treble costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Villamor,
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., concurs, reserving, however, his opinion as to whether or not under
the Revised Rules, a defendant in default in an inferior court has the right to
appeal.

^[1]
Summary procedure for money claims not exceeding P200.00.