PEDRO S. RAVELO AND CARMEN TAN RAVELO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND RURAL BANK OF SALINAS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

The Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc. on February 17, 1969 filed an action to foreclose a mortgage
on two lots with an area of 1,923 square meters located at San
Fernando, Pampanga which the
spouses Pedro S. Ravelo and Carmen Tan executed on February 9, 1967 as security for a
loan of P16,000 maturing after 270 days.

The Ravelo spouses pleaded that the
suit was premature because they had made representations to the bank that they
be allowed to sell the lots in order to pay the mortgage debt.

The Ravelos and their counsel did not
appear at the “initial hearing” scheduled on September 19, 1969. Instead, they caused to be
filed on that date a motion for postponement on the ground of illness which the
lower court denied (p. 43, Record on Appeal). A copy of the denial order was
allegedly received by Ravelo on October 27, 1969. The bank presented its
evidence ex parte. In its decision
dated October 24, 1969 the lower court ordered the Ravelo
spouses to pay the bank within ninety days from the finality of the decision
P16,000 with 12% interest per annum from
December 12, 1967, plus P500 as attorney’s fees, and, if no payment was made,
then the mortgaged lots should be sold to pay the amount of the debt. A copy of
the decision was received on November
4, 1969 by the Ravelos‘ lawyer.

The lower court in its order of January 19, 1970 denied the Ravelos‘
motion to set aside the judgment “by default” and granted the bank’s
motion for reconsideration by increasing the attorney’s fees to P1,600 in accordance with the stipulation in the mortgage
contract. The judgment became final and executory.

The sheriff sold the mortgaged properties on August 21, 1970 to the bank for P6,000. (The bank in its appellee’s
brief offered to allow the Ravelos to redeem the
mortgaged lots by paying P16,000 plus interest and
bank charges within sixty days from the receipt of the brief.)

The bank filed a motion for confirmation of the sheriff’s sale.
It was opposed by the mortgagors. It was confirmed in the lower court’s order
of March 22, 1971. The Ravelos appealed that order to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the lower court’s order on De­cember
16, 1974. The Ravelos appealed to this
Court.

Their three assignments of error have no relevance to the said
confirmation order. They assail the pro­ceedings leading to the rendition of
the judgment from which they did not appeal. They contend that the trial court
erred in omitting the mandatory pre-trial and that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that the Rave­los had waived it by not
raising that omission in the trial court.

The fact is that the bank filed a motion to set the case for
pre-trial, a pleading act included in the Ravelos‘
record on appeal. Acting on that motion, the trial court set the case for
“initial hearing on September 19,
1969” (p. 14, Record on Appeal; pp. 9-10, Bank’s Brief).

As correctly contended by the bank that “initial
hearing” was intended as a pre-trial but the Ravelos
moved for postponement and did not appear at that initial hearing. It has been
held that the omission of the court to specify in a notice of hearing that it
was a notice of pre-trial is not an irregularity (Trocio
vs. Labayo, L-35701, September 19, 1973, 53 SCRA 97).

If the defendant does not appear at the pre-trial, the plaintiff
may be allowed to present his evidence (Province
of Pangasinan
and Soriano vs. Palisoc, 116
Phil. 609).

Since the Ravelos did not appeal from
the judgment, they cannot now complain that the trial court erred in allowing
the bank to present its evidence ex parte.
The lower court acted properly in denying the Ravelos‘
motion for postponement. They had no valid defense to the action. The
instant appeal is manifestly frivolous and dilatory.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed with costs against the Ravelos.

SO ORDRED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, and Escolin,
JJ., concur.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.