PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, RAMON O. NOLASCO AND ARSENIO SOLIDUM, AS ASSO­CIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (4TH SPE…

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the
then Court of Appeals which dismissed the action petitioner had filed with said
court for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction, seeking to
set aside, pending appeal, the order of execution issued by the lower court in
Civil Cases Nos. 11548, 11658 and 11672.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are the following:

“On October 19, 1967,
Civil Case No. Q-11548 was filed by the United Narvacan
Planters Association, Inc. and forty (40) other corporations domiciled within
the Provinces of La Union, Ilocos Sur,
Ilocos Norte and Abra,
against the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration and the Central
Cooperative Exchange, Inc. for alleged unpaid tobacco shipments amounting to
P266,274.32 (see amended complaint, rec. 21-24,
63-70). In its Answer to the complaint in Q-11548, defendant Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Adminis­tration (PVTA) alleges that the tobacco shipments
referred to therein were not actually delivered by the plaintiffs, nor received
and accepted by said defendant PVTA or its agent, co­-defendant Central
Cooperative Exchange, Inc. (CCE for short, see rec. 36). It further alleges
that co-defendant CCE has acted beyond the scope of, and contrary to, its
authority as agent of defendant PVTA and should be held solely liable for the
payment of the tobacco shipments of the plaintiffs in Civil Case Q-11548 (rec.
36). The co-defendant CCE likewise denies the plaintiffs’ claims (rec. 171).

“On November 24,
1967, plaintiffs Mellow Leaf TPA, Inc. and twenty-three (23) other corporations, filed Civil Case No. Q-11658
against the PVTA and the CCE (see 1st amended complaint and 2nd amended
complaint, rec. 42-45; 71-77). The same defenses were inter­posed by the
said defendants to this 2nd case (rec. 46-50).

“On December 16,
1967, Narvacan Union TPC and seventeen (17) other corporations filed Civil Case No.
Q-11672 against the PVTA and the CCE (see complaint, rec. 51-54; amended
complaint, rec. 80-84). Both defendants adopted the same Answers filed in the
first 2 cases (rec. 172). The above three (3) cases were jointly tried by
respondent Judge (rec.173-A).

“At several stages of these  3
cases, partial judgment (sic) were rendered therein in favor of some plaintiffs
and the awards thereunder, according to defendant
PVTA, had already been satisfied through writs of garnishments and actual
releases of the sums of money specified (rec. 172-173). As to the remaining
controversial matters, the respondent Judge rendered partial judgments therein
on October 30, 1969
and these partial judgments gave rise to the present petition for certiorari
with Preliminary Injunction (rec. 173).

“On October 31, 1969, the day following the partial judgments
in question, winning plaintiffs in the aforesaid 3 cases filed an urgent motion
for execution pending appeal on the following propositions: (1) ‘said partial
judgments rest on incontrovertible facts and upon laws as applied and
abundantly illustrated by court precedents, such that any appeal therefrom would be palpably to delay’ (rec. 126-127); (2)
‘plain­tiffs’ claims have a first priority in the order of payment of
outstanding PVTA obligations under RA 4155′ (rec. 127); (3) ‘the termination of
the tobacco subsidy law would permanently remove from plaintiffs any chance of
recouping their losses thereby causing their injury irre­parable’ (rec. 127);
(4) ‘other similar cases or claims previously upheld by this Honorable Court
(CFI) had been paid by execution pending appeal’ (rec. 128) and (5) ‘the
defendants, particularly defendant PVTA, had subscribed to the urgency of
settling plaintiffs’ claims expeditiously under the joint manifestation of both
parties of September 25, 1969 and in defendant PVTA’s
formal offer of evidence of October 11, 1969, said defendant PVTA manifested
that it is submitting the case with respect to plaintiffs’ claims against PVTA
but reserving its right to pursue independently its crossclaims
against its co-defendant CCE, thus making it evident that said defendant PVTA
had in the course of the trial been sufficiently impressed by plaintiffs’
evidence’ (rec. 128). This motion for execution pending appeal dated October 31, 1969 was set for hearing
on November 3, 1969 (rec.
129). Written opposition dated October 31, 1969 was filed by defendant PVTA
stating the following: (1) the appeal is meritorious without explaining the why
and the wherefore (rec. 131); (2) the plaintiffs have already enjoyed that
preference ‘considering that in the said gapes the plaintiffs have already
secured no less than 5 partial judgments in their favor, all of which had been
executed despite appeal interposed by defendant PVTA; the amount involved in
the instant partial judgment is much less than the amounts previously received
by the plaintiffs as a result of the executions issued respecting previous five
(5) partial judgments’ (rec. 132); (3) the termination of the tobacco subsidy
law is speculative (rec. 132); (4) ‘the fact that the previous partial judgments
rendered on the subject cases have been executed despite the appeals interposed
by defendant PVTA does not automatically entitle the plaintiffs to an order of
execution respecting the present par­tial judgment’ (rec. 132); and (5) the
allegation of urgency is a mere conclusion (rec. 132), ‘the fact that
plaintiffs have already collected the greater bulk of their claims as a result
of the execution earlier issued in the cases, already negates the urgency for
immediate execution respecting the present partial judgment’ (rec. 133-134).
Resolving this incident, the respondent Judge issued an order dated November 5, 1969 granting
execution pending appeal, which reads as follows:

“CONSIDERING plaintiffs’ ‘Urgent Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal’ dated October 31, 1969, and defendant PVTA’s
opposition thereto, the Court finds the following reasons for execution of its
Partial Judgment of October 30, 1969, as sufficient and compelling, to wit:

‘(1) That the facts
on which these cases were decided fully substantiated that no significant
evidence was adduced against these claims and that plaintiffs’ legal right to
payment upon these facts is sustained by laws, which as applied by the Supreme
Court, confirm plaintiffs’ cause, such that any appeal from the Court’s partial
judgment of October 30, 1969, would be merely dilatory;

‘(2) That
plaintiffs, being clearly entitled to the payment of their claims, are likewise
entitled to law to priority in the liquidation of outstanding PVTA obligations
to wit, Section 5 of Republic Act 4155, approved on June 20, 1964, which
specifically provide as follows:

‘SEC. 5. Financing. – The support given by the Central Bank as
provided for by Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred ninety-four, as amended,
is hereby discontinued and in lieu thereof, a special fund is hereby
established to be known as the Tobacco Fund, which shall be constituted by and
collected from the proceeds of fifty per centum of the tariff or taxes of
imported leaf as herein above provided and also fifty per centum of the
specific taxes or locally manufactured Virginia type cigarettes. This fund
shall be expended for the support or payment of:

‘1. Indebtedness of the
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration and the former Agricultural Credit
and Cooperative Financing Administra­tion to FACOMAS and farmers and planters
regarding Virginia tobacco transac­tions in previous years.’

‘(3) That plaintiffs
face a real danger of having an empty judg­ment in their favor since, as this
Court takes notice of the fact, subsidy has not been intended as a permanent
solution to the problems of the Virginia tobacco industry;

‘(4) That in all
previous partial judgments in these cases and in other similar cases already
decided, this Court had, taking cognizance of the urgent and compelling reasons
given for immediate execution, granted the same, and there is no reason why it
should now reverse itself.

‘In the opposition
filed by the defendant PVTA to the ‘urgent motion for execution pending appeal
of the plaintiffs in the instant cases, the Court noted that they admitted that
payments of the obligations under litigation enjoys a priority and that, as in
previous cases decided involving the same nature and relative to these cases,
the defendant PVTA raised only the question as to the payment of interest
counting from 48 hours from the date of delivery and the high percentage of
attorney’s fees. As to the pay­ment of the cost of tobacco delivered, the PVTA
practically admitted same and have been partially paid by virtue of the
previous orders of this Court. Such being the case, the ends of justice may be
better served considering that actually the farmers who have not received
payments of their tobacco will be the ones prejudiced if pay­ments will further
be delayed, the Court deems it wise to grant the instant motion after the
plaintiffs shall have filed a bond equal to the total amount to be executed to
answer for the same should plaintiffs be finally adjudged to be not entitled to
the payments thereof.

‘WHEREFORE, the ‘urgent motion for execution pending appeal’ is
hereby granted, provided that a bond be filed by the
plaintiffs in favor of the defendant PVTA. Upon the filing of such bond, the
Clerk of Court is directed to issue the corresponding writ of execution.

‘SO ORDERED.’

“And, on November
14, 1969, in pursuance of the above-quoted order,
respondent Judge issued a writ of execution in favor of 18 plaintiffs whose
names are listed therein (see writ of execution, rec. 138-140). On November
14, 1969, also, respondent Judge issued on the aforesaid 3 cases a Notice
of Garnishment to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation, Makati, Rizal,
for P647,572.93 (see Notice of Garnishment, rec. 141). On November 17, 1969,
acting upon plaintiffs’ urgent motion, respondent Judge directed the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation to immediately release
and deliver to the Special Sheriff, Mr. Roberto B. Garcia, the garnished amount
of P647,572.93 and ordered the said Sheriff, upon
receipt of the amount, to deliver the same to plaintiffs counsel Atty. Buenaventura
Salvador, upon proper receipt (see order, rec. 142). The order of November 5,
1969 granting execution pending appeal (rec. 135-137) and the order of November
17, 1969, directing the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation to release the sum of P647,572.93 are the object of the present
petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction on the
ground that the special reasons stated on the order of November 5, 1969 are not
sufficient to warrant the issuance of a special order of execution’ (rec.
10)” (pp. 2-7, Petitioner’s brief)

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in granting execution
pending appeal.

We find the petition to be without merit. For certiorari to
lie, “there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with
centuries of both civil law and common law traditions (Panaligan
vs. Adolfo, 67 SCRA 176, 180).” The “abuse of discretion must be
grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised
arbitrarily or despotically (Palma
and Ignacio vs. Q. & S., Inc., et al., 17 SCRA 97, 100).”

The petition in the case at bar does not show any misuse of power
properly vested in courts. On the contrary, the court a quo, in
granting the motion of herein private respondents for execution pending appeal,
required of them to file a bond equal to the amount sought to be executed, as
in fact they have posted three (3) bonds in the total amount of P647,500.00, the same to last until the cases are terminated and
released by the court. And, said bonds bear for the express approval of the
corporate counsel.

Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows execution pending
appeal. Said rule provides:

“SEC. 2. Execution pending appeal.- On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even
before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in
a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion and the
special order shall be included therein.”

Thus, the court may, in its discretion, order an execution even
before the expiration of the time within which to appeal provided there are
good reasons for execution which must be stated in the special order. An
example of good reason is when the successful or prevailing party files a bond.
In Hacienda Navarra, Inc. vs. Hon. Alejo Labrador, 65 Phil. 536, the Court held that “the
filing of the bond required by the respondent judge in the order sought to be
annulled constitutes a special ground authorizing the court to issue a writ of
execution pending appeal.” However, the order of execution pending appeal
may be stayed, “upon approval by the court of a sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the appellant, conditioned upon
the per­formance of the judgment or order appealed from in case it be affirmed wholly or in part.” (Section 3, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court). The supersedeas bond guarantees
satisfaction of the judgment in case of affirmance on
appeal, not things like damage to the property pending the appeal (De Leon vs. Santos,
78 Phil. 461).”

Further, it is well established that “certiorari,
being an extraordinary remedy, cannot be resorted to whenever another adequate
remedy is available. x x x
[T]he petitioner, as would be appellant, could have stayed execution by
tendering supersedeas bond, as provided by
section 3 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, that would have enabled the
trial court to stay execution, without prejudice to attacking the issuance of
the execution in his brief on appeal. 
Having failed to avail himself of that remedy, the petitioner is not
entitled to certiorari (Javellana vs. Querubin, et al., 17 SCRA 873, 875).”

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ of certiorari
prayed for is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Teehankee, (Chairman), in the result.