DOMINGO B.  TEOXON PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

The pivotal question raised by petitioner, a veteran who suffered
from permanent physical disability, in this appeal from a lower court decision
dismissing his suit for mandamus, is its failure to accord primacy to statutory
provisions fixing the amount of pension to which he was entitled.^[1]
Instead, it sustained the plea of respondent officials, members of the Board of
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration, relying on the
administrative rules issued by them presumably in pursuance of their duty to
enforce the Veterans’ Bill of Rights.  We
have to resolve, then, whether or not there has been a failure to apply the
doctrine to which this Court has been committed that if it can be shown that there is repugnancy between the statute
and the rules issued in pursuance thereof, former prevails.  Unfortunately, as will be hereafter shown,
the lower court did not see it that way. 
It found nothing objectionable in respondents following a contrary norm
and thus disregarding petitioner’s legal right for which mandamus is the proper
remedy.  We, cannot lend our approval then to such a conclusion especially so in the light of our
decision barely two months ago, Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Administration^[2]
where we categorically held that a veteran suffering from permanent disability
is not to be denied what has been granted him specifically by legislative
enactment, which certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans
Administration, presumably in the implemen­tation thereof.  We reverse.

Petitioner, on April 23,
1965, filed his suit for mandamus before the Court of First Instance of Manila alleging that he filed his claim
for disability pension under the Veterans’ Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65,
for having been permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first
awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month contrary to
the terms of the basic law as thereafter amended.^[3] His claim, therefore, was for a pension
effective May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21,
1957 and at the rate
of P100. 00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his unmarried minor
children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference
of P50.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried
minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963.  He
would likewise seek for the payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees.^[4] The answer for respondents filed on May 25, 1965, while admitting, with qualification
the facts as alleged in the petition, would rely primarily in its
special and affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having exhausted its
administrative remedies and his suit being in effect one against the government,
which cannot prosper without its consent.^[5]
In the stipulation of facts dated Oct.
13, 1965, it was expressly agreed: 
“That the petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former member of a recognized
guerilla organization which participated actively in the
resistance movement against the enemy,
and as a result of which
petitioner suffered a permanent physical disability.”^[6] Mention was likewise made in the aforesaid stipulation of facts that while petitioner would rely on
what it set forth in the Veterans’ Bill of Rights, as
amended, respondents in turn would limit the amount of pension received by him in accordance
with the rules and regulations promulgated by them.

In the decision now
on appeal, promulgated on Dec. 4, 1965, the lower court, in dismissing the
petition, expressed its conformity with
the contention of respondents.  Thus:
“Upon examination of the issues involved
in this case, the Court believes that a
case for mandamus will not lie. 
The respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to process applications for pension, using as guide
the rules and regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions,
unless shown clearly to be in error or against the law or against the general
policy of the Board, should be maintained.”^[7]
The lower court went even further in its recognition
of the binding force to be given the administrative rules and regulations promulgated by
respondents.  Thus:  “As
mentioned above, under the
provisions of the Veterans Law as
subsequently amended, the Board is authorized to promulgate regulations
to carry into effect the provisions of the law.  In accordance with said law, the Board has promulgated rules and regulations which
are considered in the approval of the claims for pension.  The court sees no reason why the case of petitioner should be considered
as an exception.  There is no question that his disability is not complete, and, therefore, he
cannot be entitled to complete disability allowance.  That the decision of the Board is based on
its regulations is also, according to the Court, justified because that is how
the Board functions.”^[8]

Hence, this appeal,
which, as noted at the outset, calls for an affirmative response.  Petitioner’s contention that his right as conferred by law takes precedence to
what the adminis­trative rules and
regulations of respondents provide is indisputable.  So our decisions have indicated
with unfailing uniformity.

1.  The recognition of the
power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of
the statute, necessarily limited
to what is provided for in the
legislative enactment, may be found in the early case of United States
v. Barrias^[9] decided in 1908.  Then came, in a 1914 decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina,^[10] a delineation of the scope of such competence.  Thus: “Of course, the regulations
adopted under legislative authority
by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general
provisions.  By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended.  So long, however, as the regulations relate
solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they
are valid.” In 1936, in People v. Santos,^[11]
this Court expressed its disapproval of
an administrative order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power
vested in an administrative
official.  We reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative
order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy
to the provisions of the Act, “the mandate of the Act must prevail and
must be followed.”^[12]
Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission,^[13]
citing Parker^[14]
as well as Davis^[15]
did tersely sum up the matter
thus:  “A rule is binding on the
courts so long as the procedure fixed
for its promulgation is followed
and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature,
even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom * *
*.  On the other hand, administrative
interpretation of the law is at
best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what
the law means.”

 It cannot be otherwise as
the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive
power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.^[16]
No lesser administrative
executive office
or agency then can, contrary to
the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive
prerogative.  Necessarily, it is bound to
observe the constitutional mandate. 
There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment.  Its terms must be followed.  The statute requires adherence to, not
departure from, its provisions.  No
deviation is
allowable.  In the terse language
of the present Chief Justice, an
administrative agency “cannot amend an act of Congress.”^[17] Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only
if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in
accordance with what the Veterans’ Bill of Rights provides.

We
examine, then, the original act
approved in 1946^[18] and its later amendments.  The Veterans’
Bill of Rights, as it read when enacted in 1946, insofar as pertinent,
provides: “The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are
permanently incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries
sustained in line of duty, shall
be given a life pension of fifty pesos a month unless
they are actually receiving a similar
pension from other Government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the
necessary hospitalization and medical care.”  The act took effect upon its approval, on
Oct. 18 of that year.  Then, in 1955,
came the first amendment in these words: 
“[Sec.] 9.  The
persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently
incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of
fifty pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of
his un­married minor children below eighteen years of age, unless they are
actually receiving a similar pension from other government funds, and shall
receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care.”^[19] The present Section 9, as again amended in
1957, reads as follows:  “The
persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently
incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty,
shall be given a life pension of one hundred pesos a month, and ten pesos a
month for each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age,
unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds, and
shall receive in addition, the necessary
hospitalization and medical care.”^[20]

To the extent, therefore, that petitioner would base
his suit on the legal rights thus conferred
on him by the above statutory
provisions, he is entitled to a favorable judgment.  That is what was decided in Begosa v.
Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, referred to by us earlier in the opinion Ate decisive of a controversy of this nature.  We
do so again.  Hence,
reversal of the appealed decision is indicated.

2.  The affirmative defenses
as to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as a proceeding of this character being a suit against the
State were considered and rejected in the aforesaid Begosa
decision.

WHEREFORE, the decision of December 4, 1965 of the lower court is reversed, and
another one entered granting this petition for mandamus.  Respondents are ordered to pay petitioner a
pension effective as of May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June
21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of
his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the
difference of P50.00 a month, plus P10.00
a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age
from July 1, 1963, until the statutory rate has been satisfied.  Thereafter petitioner is entitled to the
amount of P100.00 a month plus P10.00 a
month for each of his four unmarried minor children below
eighteen years of age, in accordance with Iaw.  Without pronouncement as to
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., no part.

^[1]
Petitioner would avail himself of the rights granted him by Republic Acts Nos. 65,
Veterans’ Bill of Rights (1946) as amended by Republic Acts Nov. 1362 (1955)
and 1920 (1957).

^[2]
L-25916, April 30, 1970

^[3]
Republic Acts Nos. 1362 (1955) and 1920 (1957).

^[4]
Petition, Record on Appeal, pp. 2-7.

^[5]
Answer, ibid, pp., 7-12.

^[6]
Stipulations of
Facts, ibid, p. 13.

^[7]
Decision, ibid, p.49.

^[8]
Ibid.

^[9]
11 Phil. 327.

^[10]
29 Phil. 119.

^[11]
63 Phil. 300.

^[12]
Chinese Flour Importers Association v.
Price Stabilization Board, 89
Phil. 439.

^[13]
L-16704, March 17, 1962, 4 SCRA 627.

^[14]
Parker on Administrative Law, p. 197 (1952).

^[15]
Davis on Administrative Law, pp. 194-197 (1957).

^[16]
Art. 7, sec. 10, par. 1, Constitution.

^[17]
Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 (1960).

^[18]
Republic Act No. 65.

^[19]
Republic Act No. 1362, approved June 18, 1955.

^[20]
Republic Act No. 1920, approved June 22, 1957.