G.R. No. L-24771. June 30, 1970
ALFONSO ACEDO, AND ESMEÑA AMBROS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, TERESA SORIANO, UBALDO DUMLAO, ALBERTO CRISOSTOMO, ROSITA ROLLUDA, FERMIN MARCOS, MARCELO MARCOS, AND VA…
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari
from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28006-R entitled
Teresa Soriano et al., plaintiffs-appellees, versus Alfonso Acedo,
et al., defendants-appellants, and Fermin Marcos, et
al., intervenors, affirming with modifications the
decision the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Vizcaya in its Civil
Case No. 722 in favor of plaintiffs and intervenors,
herein private respondents, declaring them owners of the lands in question as against the defendants, herein
petitioners.
As found by the Court of
Appeals, the background facts are:
“On July 26, 1916,
upon a homestead patent, Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 was issued in
the name of Carolina Aggasid covering a parcel of
land in Barrio Cuccub, Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya.
“On April 29, 1925,
Carolina Aggasid sold one-half pro–indiviso portion of the land
to Tomas Marcos. That sale was recorded
at the back of Carolina Aggasid’s O.C.T. No. R-827.
“In the cadastral proceedings, that land was broken into two:
Lot No. 984 and Lot No. 985.
“Carolina Aggasid claimed Lot
984. The court, on April 15, 1932, ordered the registration of said lot
in the name of Carolina Aggasid and the cancellation
of Original Certificate of Title No. R-827.
“On May 23, 1952,
Victoria Paculla, sole heir of Carolina Aggasid, in an ‘Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement’,
adjudicated unto herself the “entire one-half (1/2) unsold portion’ of Carolina’s
land as covered by Original Certificate of Title No. R-827. That affidavit, too, was annotated at the
back of Original Certificate of Title No. R-827.
“On May 30, 1952,
Victoria Paculla sold to her son Alberto Crisostomo (Married to Rosita Rolluda)
the said portion she adjudicated to herself.
Similarly, this
was entered at the back of
Title No. R-827.
“On June 2, 1952,
the spouses Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda sold the same portion of land to Teresa Soriano, married to Ubaldo Dumlao.
“Lot 985 was listed in a cadastral case
different from that which covered Lot 984. No claim thereto was filed. Hence, it was declared public land.
“One Trinidad Agsunod obtained a
homestead patent thereto – Lot 985 – and was issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 420 on January 26, 1932.
“On April 12, 1937,
Trinidad Agsunod sold the lot to the spouses Alfonso
Ace-do and Esmeña Ambros. The deed of sale was first annotated on
Trinidad Agsunod’s Title No. 420. Later, on September 19, 1940, Title No. 420 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3788 was issued to the vendees Acedo and Ambros.
“Then came the suit filed by Teresa Soriano
and others against the spouses Alfonso Acedo and Esmeña Ambros for the recovery of
ownership and possession of Lot 985 and damages. Tomas Marcos’ heirs intervened and joined
hands with plaintiffs.
“The judgment below reads:
‘IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, decision is hereby rendered, declaring
the plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao
and Teresa Soriano, owners with right to possess, the
one-half western portion of LOT No. 984 of the Bayombong
Cadastre, and the intervenors Fermin
Marcos, Marcelo Marcos and Valentin Marquez, the
latter in his own behalf and in representation of his children, Ciriaco, Victoria, Restituta,
Nestor, Agripino and Felicidad,
all surnamed Marquez, owners with right to possess the other one?half
(1/2) eastern portion of said Lot No. 984; declaring the plaintiffs Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda
owners with right to possess the western one-half(1/2) portion of Lot No. 985
of the Bayombong Cadastre, and the intervenors Fermin Marcos,
Marcelo Marcos and Valentin Marquez, the latter in
his own behalf and in representation of his children, Ciriaco,
Victoria, Restituta, Nestor, Agripino
and Felicidad, all surnamed Marquez, owners with
right to possess the other eastern one-half (1/2) portion of said Lot No. 985;
and further ordering the defendants Alfonso Acedo and
Esmeña Ambros to surrender
to the plaintiffs Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda and the intervenors, Fermin Marcos, Marcelo Marcos and Valentin
Marquez, the latter in his own behalf and in representation of his children, Ciriaco, Victoria, Restituta,
Nestor, Agripino and Felicidad,
all surnamed Marquez, the possession of Lot No. 985 of the Bayombong
Cadastre, in the proportion already stated; and ordering, lastly, the
cancellation of the owner’s duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 420
in the name of Trinidad Agsunod (Exhs.
10 and 3-Intervenors), and the owner’s duplicate of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3788 in the name of the herein defendants, spouses Alfonso Acedo and Esmeña Ambros (Exhs. 13 and 2-Intervenors),
together with their corresponding originals existing in the office of the Register
of Deeds for Nueva Vizcaya,
upon payment of the legal fees. And
without special pronouncement as to costs.
‘SO ORDERED.’
“Defendants appealed.”
On the basis of these
facts, the Court of Appeals rendered the following judgment:
“Lot No. 985 was part of a homestead previously placed under
the operation of the Torrens system. Therefore, the subsequent adjudication of
said lot in the cadastral proceedings is null and void. Title No. 420 and Title No. 3788 issued in lieu thereof,
accordingly, must be cancelled; defendants acquired nothing thereby.
“Normally, an appellate court does not give relief to appellees. Of
course, this is understood as against the appellants. Reason therefor is
that a party who does not appeal must be deemed, for legal purposes, to have
remained satisfied with the decision below.
“But the situation here involved stands upon a different
plane. Appellees
themselves have asked this Court in their brief that, for purposes of
rectifying an obvious error in the decision, the 1/2 share of Lot 985 be
adjudicated – not to the spouses Alberto Crisostomo
and Rosita Rolluda, as was done below – but to the
other plaintiffs Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo Dumlao, the real owners
entitled to the possession thereof.
Peace of mind amongst them must have compelled appellees
to do so.
“Not that appellees are without
reason. The recorded evidence, the deed
of sale, Exhibit C, as to which appellees are agreed,
establishes the fact that the other half _ i.e., the western half _
of Lot 985 (after deducting the half sold to Marcos) had already been sold by
plaintiffs spouses Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda to their co-plaintiffs Teresa Soriano
and Ubaldo Dumlao.
“Accordingly, the dispositive part
of the decision is hereby amended by (1) declaring that plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano are the owners with right to possess the one-half
(1/2) portion of Lot No. 985 of the Bayombong
Cadastre aforesaid, and (2) ordering defendants Alfonso Acedo
and Esmeña Ambros to
surrender to said plaintiff and the intervenors the
possession of the entire Lot No. 985.
“Modified as just indicated, the judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed. Costs against
appellants.”
A motion for reconsideration of this decision was filed on the
following grounds:
“1. That the decision is not
only not supported by the facts and evidence of record, but also that it is
contrary to such facts and evidence; and
“2. That the decision is not
only not in consonance with, but also contrary to, law and jurisprudence on
the matter, particularly, the protection of the rights of an innocent purchaser
for value, which is the case of the defendants-appellants.”
but
said motion was denied, hence this appeal.
Petitioners claim that:
“I. The Court of Appeals
erred in not finding that notwithstanding her free patent certificate of title,
Exhibit A, Carolina Aggasid could not be deemed as to
have been the owner of that portion embraced in said free patent certificate of
title, which, during the cadastral survey, was designated as Lot No. 985,
because she has never claimed, nor possessed, nor occupied, the same, either
by herself or through her predecessors in interest, since July 4, 1907, or
prior thereto, or even at anytime thereafter;
“II. The Court of Appeals
erred in not finding that Carolina Aggasid, by her
inaction and neglect for a period of 23 years, was guilty of laches; and
“III. The Court of Appeals
erred in not finding that the petitioners herein, Alfonso Acedo
and Esmeña Ambros, are
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, and their rights as such
should be protected.”
None of these assigned errors can be sustained.
This is a clear case of a second Torrens
title having been issued covering a land already previously registered, being
part of a duly registered bigger land. It is undisputed that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3788 in the name of herein petitioners was derived
from Original Certificate of Title No. 420 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest
Trinidad Agsunod who, in turn, acquired her title by
virtue of a homestead patent obtained by her on January 28, 1932, and it is
admitted that at that time, the land covered by said patent had already been
registered, as part of a bigger registered parcel, as early as July 26, 1916 in
the name of Carolina Aggasid from whom private
respondents herein have either successively or separately secured their
respective interests. The fact that
Trinidad Agsunod was able to obtain her homestead
patent in 1932 because the land in question was declared public in a cadastral
proceeding in which the holder of the first title did not file any opposition
does not improve in any manner the position of petitioners. With or without such opposition, the
cadastral court had absolutely no jurisdiction to declare as public Aggasid’s land which had been previously registered already
under the Torrens System. This is not
only a definitely settled question in this Court,[1]
it is indeed good law; it is a
direct consequence of the indefeasibility of a torrens
title.
Petitioners contend that the earlier title of Carolina Aggasid was void inasmuch as she had no right to any homestead patent, it having been
proven at the trial, and the trial
court so held, that neither Aggasid nor anyone on her behalf has possessed the
land in dispute since earlier than 1907.
To begin with, the decision of the Court of Appeals now before Us
contains no such finding and We are without authority to base Our decision hereof directly on findings of fact of the trial court
this case having been appealed on issues of fact and law to the said appellate
court. Even assuming, however, that what
petitioners claim is true, that is, that neither Aggasid
nor any of her successors-in-interest had ever possessed the land here in
dispute, the very case cited by them that of Zarate
v. Director of Lands, 34 Phil. 418, is clear authority for Us to overrule their
contention. As quoted in their brief, We held
therein that “if, within the (that) period of one year from that date, the
adverse claimant does not seek to contest on the ground of fraud the right of
the patentee, he is forever barred from questioning the rights of the patentee,
as the title issued by virtue of the patent duly registered shall then have
acquired all the characteristics that determine the finality and
indefeasibility of a Torrens title”. Incidentally, this doctrine cannot
apply to private respondents in so far as the homestead patent of Agsunod is concerned for the simple reason that said patent is null and
void, the land covered by it having been previously registered already as
private land in the name of Aggasid.
Neither is petitioners’ pose that they are purchasers in good
faith tenable. It is true they bought
the land in reliance of Original Certificate of Title No. 420 of Trinidad Agsunod. It may also
be true they parted with valuable consideration. The sad fact, however, is that the said
Torrens title of Agsunod is null and void and such
nullity, it is settled, affects even bona fide purchasers for
value. In Legarda
v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, this Court held:
“We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title
are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the
earlier in date must prevail as between original parties and in case of
successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the
land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against the person who rely on the second certificate. The purchaser from the owner of the latter
certificate and his successors, should resort to his vendor for redress,
rather than molest the holder of the first certificate and his successors, who
should be permitted to rest secure in their title.”
This doctrine has been followed in
subsequent cases[2]
and We see no reason at all for Us to change it now.
As they did in their answer in the trial court, as well as in
their brief in the Court of Appeals, petitioners are raising here again the
issue of laches.
We note, however, that inspite of the fact
that the Court of Appeals did not pass on the said issue, in their motion for
reconsideration in that court, petitioners seemingly abandoned the same, since
no mention of it was made therein. As
already stated earlier, the only points pressed upon in said motion were: (1)
that the earlier title and even the homestead patent of Aggasid
were void for lack of the requisite actual possession of the land in question;
and (2) that petitioners are bona fide purchasers for value. Accordingly, We do not feel We can rule on the
said issue in this appeal.
In any event, We do not believe that the precedent in the cited
case of Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277, nor the
later case of Miguel v. Catalino, 26 SCRA 234,
wherein Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes reiterated and further elucidated on the
doctrine in Gamponia, may be applied to private
respondents in the present case. There is one vital point of difference between
the situation of the private respondents here, on the one hand, and the defendants
in the two mentioned cases, on the other.
In those cases, the defendants, either by themselves or their
predecessors-in-interest, had acquired the lands therein disputed from the
original title holders, and although such acquisitions were found to be defective
and legally unenforceable, the said title holders allowed the said defendants
to take possession of and continue possessing the said lands and otherwise
perform other acts of dominion in regard thereto, without questioning their
right to do so for unusually extended periods of time. Thus, in the Catalino
case, Bacaquio, the original owner of the land in
controversy sold the same to Catalino Agyapao, father and successional
predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs, but said sale which took place in 1928
was technically invalid for lack of approval by the Governor-General which
under the law then in force was indispensable for such transactions of non-christians. Inspite of said
invalidity, however, the vendee was allowed by the vendor to take possession
of and enjoy the property from 1928 to 1943 and even the heirs of Bacaquio, the plaintiffs, did not disturb the buyer nor his
successors-in-interest, the defendants, nor was the ownership of said
defendants or their predecessor-in?interest
ever questioned before 1962, or for a period of practically thirty-five
years. Under these facts, this Court
held:
“Since the 1928 sale is technically invalid, Bacaquio remained, in law, the owner of the land until his
death in 1943, when his title passed on, by the law on succession, to his
heirs, the plaintiffs-appellants.
“Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed
decision, we are of the opinion that the judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino must be sustained.
For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino
Agyapao, father of defendant-appellee,
the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter,
possess and enjoy the land in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when
the seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding the deceased,
also remained inactive, without taking any step to vindicate
the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit was commenced in
court. Even granting appellants’ proposition
that no prescription lies against their father’s recorded title, their
passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the
equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of
plaintiffs-appellants must be considered barred and the court below correctly so held.
Courts can not look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay
and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in
cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long
years only to spring, from ambush and claim title when the possessor’s efforts
and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his
expense. x x x“
Similarly, in the case of Gamponia, the
original landowner Domingo Mejia, shortly after the issuance of the Free Patent
No. 3699 to his land on March 13, 1916,
sold the same to one Zacarias Ciscar
– in violation of Section 35 of the Public Land Act – on March 24, 1916.
Inspite of the sale, the corresponding
certificate of title was issued in tae name of Domingo Mejia when the patent
referred to was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1916. Notwithstanding the
invalidity of the sale, how-ever, Domingo Mejia allowed Ciscar
to take immediate possession and enjoyment of the property. Pedro Mejia, the brother of Domingo Mejia,
who after the latter’s death, succeeded him, also did nothing to recover the land during all the time that
it was possessed and enjoyed by the original purchaser Ciscar,
as well as said vendee’s successors-in-interest, Roque
Sanchez and later Andres Gamponia. It was only after the above named possessors
of the property had continuously and successively enjoyed it for a period of
more than 37 years teat Pedro Mejia’s daughter Concordia Mejia de Lucas tried
to recover possession and ownership of the land sold by Domingo Mejia relying
on the strength of the certificate of title
still in the name of Domingo Mejia.
In these circumstances, this Court ruled:
“Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances,
we are constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to the action
lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the defendant and that is, the
equitable defense of laches. We hold that the defense of prescription or
adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo
Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of laches.
Otherwise stated, we hold that while defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors’ long continued
possession for 37 years, the original owner’s right to recover back the possession
of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the long
period of 37 years and by patentee’s
inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.”
On the other hand, in the case at bar, it does not appear that either Aggasid,
the original owner of the disputed
land or any of her successors-in-interest has ever conveyed to or otherwise disposed
of in favor of Agsunod or her successors-in-interest,
the herein petitioners, any part of the land herein involved. In the record of this case, the only transfer of said land that appears is that of Aggasid to Tomas Marcos, the predecessor-in-interest of intervenors-respondents, involving one-half thereof pro-indiviso. Clearly,
therefore, the theory of laches being urged by
petitioners is not based on any positive act of the respondents or their predecessors which could have induced
the former to believe that they would no longer claim ownership of the land in
issue as against petitioners. The mere
failure of private respondents to file oppositions in the cadastral proceedings
is not inconsistent with their indefeasible rights under their registered
title. In other words, in the cases of Catalino and Gamponia wherein
this Court sanctioned the defense of laches even as
against the holder of a Torrens title, present always was one element, not
found in the case at bar, namely, that of “conduct on the part of
defendant or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy.”
This conduct consisted not only of inactivity or silence, which are negative
in character, in the face of adverse possession and other assertions of
ownership by the other party but of the positive act of transferring title to
said other party, albeit in an illegal manner, and then doing nothing for more
than thirty years to disengage themselves from such illegal transfer, thereby
making the transferees believe
that such illegality was being impliedly, if not actually, waived. Even if such waiver may be, in law,
ineffective by itself alone, to create any right in favor of the vendee, if the
failure of the title holder to act contrarywise for
such a long time is added to it, a situation is created which in equity renders
any further attempt of the holder of the title to vindicate his rights under it
too stale to be judicially cognizable.
Indeed, it may be said that in order to defeat a Torrens
title, the laches must be such as to be somehow in
the nature of estoppel in pais.
All the foregoing notwithstanding, We do not consider it in order to
just affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as is, without any
explanation. We note that in its dispositive
portion, said court not only declared the respondents Ubaldo
Dumlao and Teresa Soriano
owners of one-half portion of Lot No.
985 of the Bayombong Cadastre but also ordered petitioners to
surrender to said respondents and the intervenors-respondents, presumably the
successors-in-interests of Tomas Marcos, the possession of the entire Lot No.
985. These dispositions seem to be
inconsistent with said court’s own findings which in effect mean that what
remained as her one-half share of the land originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. R-827, after she sold the other half, pro-indiviso, to Tomas Marcos in 1925, was Lot No. 984 which
she precisely claimed in the cadastral proceedings and of which she was again
declared owner by the cadastral court.
Consequently, what would appear to have been sold to Tomas Marcos was
Lot 985 and, therefore, the intervenors-respondents
would also appear to be entitled to the whole of Lot 985, thus leaving to
plaintiffs-respondents Dumlao and Soriano
the whole of Lot 984 instead of one-half of each of the said two lots going to
the plaintiffs-respondents and the other one-half of each of them to the intervenors-respondents, as decided, in effect, by the
Court of Appeals.
To straighten out this apparent confusion, We have found it
necessary to go beyond the decision, to the record on appeal and the briefs of
the parties filed with the appellate court.
In the decision of the trial court, an indication of the cause of the
confusion appears in the following discussion:
“The plaintiffs claim as stated above that the parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exh.
A) is equivalent to Lots Nos. 984 and 985 of the Cadastral Survey of Bayombong (certificate issued by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office, dated November
20, 1952, Exhs. D and 4-Intervenor).
However, the plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao
and Teresa Soriano are only in possession of
one-half (1/2, of Lot No. 984 (western side), and the intervenors,
Fermin Marcos, Marcelo Marcos and Valentin
Marquez, in his own behalf and in representation of his children, Ciriaco, Victoria, Restituta,
Nestor, Agripino and Felicidad,
all surnamed Marquez are in possession of the other half of said Lot No. 984
(eastern side), as owners, it being a portion of what their predecessor in interest, the late Tomas
Marcos had purchased from the original registered owner Carolina Aggasid, whose title was annotated at the back of Original
Certificate of Title No. R-827 Exh. A, as per entry
No. 274 (Exh. I-Intervenor). (See
Exh. 5-Intervenor and par. 3 of the second
amended complaint.)
“Plaintiffs-spouses Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano are
claiming one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 985 (western side) while the intervenors Fermin Marcos-et al.,
are claiming the other one-half (1/2) portion (eastern side) of said Lot No.
985.
“The defendants Alfonso Acedo and Esmeña Ambros on their part aver
that they are in the actual possession of Lot No. 985 ever since they
purchased it from Trinidad Agsunod on April 12, 1937 in a deed of absolute
sale (Exh. 12), which was duly inscribed in the
office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya, causing thereby the issuance in their favor of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3788 (Exhs. 13 and
2-Intervenor) on September 19, 1940; that before the sale in favor of the
spouses Alfonso Acedo and Esmeña
Ambros of Lot No. 985, the vendor Trinidad Agsunod had been in possession as owner, as shown by
homestead patent No. 17935, issued on January 9, 1932 and transcribed as
Original Certificate of Title No. 420 (Exhs. 10 and
3-Intervenor) in the office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Vizcaya on January 28, 1932; and that said defendants
Alfonso Acedo and Esmena Ambros as well as the vendor Trinidad Agsunod
had declared Lot No. 985 for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from
1930 up to the present (Exhs. 14, 14-a to 14-c; 15,
15-a to 15-f; 17 and 17-a to 17-e).
“It has been agreed by
the parties that the plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano
never possessed Lot No. 985 since their acquisition of the land from Alberto Crisostomo
in Exhibit C. It has been
admitted by plaintiff Ubaldo Dumlao
that when he attempted to possess the land which he and his wife Teresa Soriano
bought from Alberto Crisostomo on June 2, 1952, he learned that
defendant Alfonso Acedo was in possession of Lot No.
985. It has been likewise agreed by the
parties that defendant Alfonso Acedo has been farming
Lot No. 985; that he has been in possession thereof and has harvested all the
crops raised thereon for his own benefit.
It is shown by the evidence that
neither the plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano nor
their predecessors in interest Alberto Crisostomo
and Rosita Rolluda, nor Victoria Pacula
and Carolina Aggasid had ever possessed Lot No. 985
and that said Lot No. 985 has always
been in the possession of Trinidad Agsunod and later
on of the defendants Alfonso Acedo and Esmeña Ambros up to the present.
“The plaintiffs and the intervenors
contend that Original Certificate of Title No. 420, in the name Trinidad Agsunod (Exhs. 10 and
3-Intervenor), issued on January 28, 1932, as well as the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 3788, in the name of the spouses Alfonso Acedo
and Esmeña Ambros (Exhs. 13 and
2-Intervenor), which cover Lot No. 985, are null and void, on the
ground that said Lot No. 985 is embraced in a bigger parcel of land covered by a previous
title, which is Original Certificate of Title No. R-827
(Exh. A), in the name of Carolina Aggasid,
issued on July 26, 1916.
“The Court has as already stated arrived at the conclusion
that what was sold by plaintiffs Alberto Crisostomo
and Rosita Rolluda to their co-plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano, was Lot No. 984.
Considering that Victoria Paculla, the
registered owner of the remaining one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel of land
described in Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exh.
A) as per Entry No. 15848 (Exh. A-2) at the back
thereof, had sold the said remaining undisposed
one-half (1/2) portion to Alberto Crisostomo on May 30,
1952, in a
deed of absolute sale (Exhs. B and 5), the latter is
entitled to claim one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 985, which is embraced in the
parcel of land described in Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exh. A). Likewise, the intervenors
Fermin Marcos, Marcelo Marcos and Valentin
Marquez, the latter in his own behalf and in representation of his children, Ciriaco, Victoria, Restituta,
Nestor, Agripino and Felicidad,
all surnamed Marquez, are also entitled to claim the other half of Lot No. 985, which formed part of the
undivided one-half portion which their predecessor in interest Tomas Marcos,
had purchased from the original registered owner Carolina Aggasid,
as per Entry No. 274 (Exh. I-Intervenor)
at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exh.
A).”
On the other hand, in petitioners’ brief as appellants in the
Court of Appeals, the first and second assignments of error and their
corresponding discussion read thus:
“FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
“THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN ‘DECLARING THE PLAINTIFFS
ALBERTO CRISOSTOMO AND ROSITA ROLLUDA OWNERS WITH RIGHT TO POSSESS THE WESTERN
ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF LOT NO. 985 OF THE BAYOMBONG CADASTRE, AND THE INTERVENORS FERMIN
MARCOS, MARCELO MARCOS AND VALENTIN MARQUEZ, THE LATTER IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND
IN REPRESENTATION OF HIS CHILDREN, CIRIACO, VICTORIA, RESTITUTA, NESTOR, AGRIPINO AND FELICIDAD, ALL SURNAMED MARQUEZ OWNERS WITH RIGHT TO POSSESS THE OTHER EASTERN ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF SAID LOT
NO. 985″.
“SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
“THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN ‘ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS ALFONSO ACEDO AND ESMEÑA AMBROS TO
SURRENDER TO THE PLAINTIFFS ALBERTO CRISOSTOMO AND ROSITA ROLLUDA AND THE
INTERVENORS, FERMIN MARCOS, MARCELO MARCOS AND VALENTIN MARQUEZ, THE LATTER
IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION
OF HIS CHILDREN, CIRIACO, VICTORIA, RESTITUTA, NESTOR, AGRIPINO AND
FELICIDAD, ALL SURNAMED MARQUEZ, THE POSSESSION OF LOT NO. 985 OF THE BAYOMBONG CADASTRE IN THE PROPORTION ALREADY
STATED:’
“Being closely related
with one another – the
second being the necessary effect of the first – we beg leave of this Honorable Court of Appeals to discuss these
two assignments of error together in order to avoid repetition and for the
sake of brevity.
“The plaintiffs Alberto Crisostomo
and Rosita Rolluda based their present action upon
their deed of sale (Exhibit B which is also marked as Exhibit 5). The intervenors also based their
inter- vention upon the recorded lien or gravamen
in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Tomas Marcos (Exhibit 1-Intervenors),
which is also embodied in the decision of the Cadastral Court dated April 15,
1932 (Exhibit 1 which is also marked as Exhibit 6-Intervenors).
“While the deed of
sale (Exhs. B and/or 5) in favor of Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda
does not specifically state the land sold thereby any clearer or more
specific than stating ‘the remaining undisposed
half-portion’ of the parcel of land described in the deed of sale, yet, in the
affidavit (Exhibit 2) of Alberto Crisostomo himself,
particularly paragraph 3 thereof, he stated ‘that in truth and in fact,
Cadastral Lot No. 984 x x x which was claimed by my father, Domingo Crisostomo,
is the same land as that unsold portion of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No, R-827 (Free Patent No. 3983) in the name of Carolina Aggasid,
which was extrajudicially adjudicated in favor of Victoria
Pacula as the nearest forced heir, and which
the latter conveyed, to me for valuable consideration as evidenced by deed of conveyance
duly registered and annotated on the memorandum page of Original Certificate of Title
No. R-827 of the Land Records of
Nueva Vizcaya aforesaid‘
(Exhibit 2-a). Likewise, Victoria Pacula, the vendor
of Alberto Crisostomo, in her affidavit (Exhibit 4)
particularly in paragraph 3 thereof, she stated ‘that in truth and in fact, Cadastral Lot
No. 984 x x x which was continuously cultivated by, my said late
husband (Domingo Crisostomo) is the same as that unsold portion of the land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Free Patent No. 3983 in the
name Carolina Aggasid aforesaid‘ (Exhibit 4-a). What, therefore, was a vague description or
identity of the land sold as ‘the remaining undisposed
half-portion‘ in the deed of sale (Exhibit B and/or 5) was made clear, specific and definite by the affidavits of
the vendor (Exhs. 4 and 4-a) and of the vendee (Exhs. 2 and 2-a) to be no other than Cadastral Lot No. 984.
“The deed of sale
(Exhibits B and/or 5) was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for
Nueva Vizcaya, and annotated on the memorandum page of
Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exhibit A) as Entry No. 15911 (Exhibit
A-1). Later on, the plaintiffs-appellees, Alberto Crisostomo
and Rosita Rolluda sold the parcel of land which they
bought from Victoria Pacula by their deed of sale
(Exhibits B and/or 5) which was registered and annotated on the back of
Original of Title No. R-827 (Exhibit A) under Entry No. 15911 (Exhibit A-1) to their co-plaintiffs, Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo Dumlao. In the deed
of sale (Exh. 6 which is also marked as Exh. C) which the
plaintiffs-appellees, Alberto Crisostomo
and Rosita Rolluda executed in favor of their
co-plaintiffs Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo
Dumlao there is no mistake as to the identity of the
land sold to be Lot No. 984 because it
is so stated in the said deed of sale in the following tenor: ‘(This is the same land referred to as Lot No. 984 x x x formerly claimed, for and in behalf of the true
owner, Carolina Aggasid, by Domingo Crisostomo, deceased. x x x.)’ (See
portion of Exhibits and/or C, underlined with red pencil). From these series of transactions it is very
clear that whatever land the plaintiffs-appellees
Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda
bought from Victoria Pacula by means of Exhs. B and/or 5, they have sold the same to their
co-plaintiffs Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo
Dumlao by means of Exhibits 6 and/or C.
“There is no evidence of record of any claim of ownership,
either by purchase or otherwise, of the plaintiffs-appellees,
Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda
for and over Lot No. 985 or any portion thereof. It could not be said that the said
plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo
and Rosita Rolluda are the owners of the western one-half
portion of Lot No. 985, as the
trial court erroneously declared, by virtue of their deed of sale (Exhibits B
and/or 5) because their deed of sale, as we have shown above, specifically
refers to Lot 984. Moreover, they have
already sold to their co-plaintiffs Teresa Soriano
and Ubaldo Dumlao all what
they have bought from Victoria Pacula. Consequently, said plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo and
Rosita Rolluda could no longer have any interest,
ownership or otherwise, to and over any portion of the land embraced in
Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exhibit A), much less, to and over Lot
985 or any portion thereof.
“In the case of the intervenors-appellees, we have already stated at the beginning
of this argument that they based their intervention upon the recorded lien or gravamen in favor of Tomas Marcos, their
predecessor-in-interest (Exhibit 1-Intervenors) which lien or gravamen is also
embodied in the decision of the Cadastral Court dated April 15, 1932 (Exhibits
1 and/or 6-Intervenors). While as
recorded or annotated on the back of Original Certificate of Title No. R-827
(Exhibit A) as Entry No. 274 (Exhibit 1-Intervenors), the lien or gravamen in favor of Tomas Marcos, the predecessor-in-interest
of the herein intervenors-appellees, does not relate
to any specific or particular portion of the land embraced in Original
Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exhibit A), yet, when the Cadastral Court
passed judgment over Lot No. 984 which it found was embraced by Original Certificate
of Title No. R-827, it also had the occasion to pass judgment over the recorded
or annotated lien or gravamen in favor
of Tomas Marcos, so that in the decision (Exhibit 1 and/or 6-Intervenors)
which the Cadastral Court rendered over Lot No. 984, it is therein stated:
‘EN SU VIRTUD, se ordena la cancelacion del Certificado de Titulo No. R-827, Patent No. 3983, y, en su lugar, expidase
el titulo del catrastro a nombre de la referida Carolina Aggasid, sujeto desde luego al gravamen a favor de Tomas Marcos tal
Como aparece al respaldo de
dicho titulo debidamente inscrito en el Registro de la Propiedad de esta Provincia.’ (Dispositive portion of the Decision, Exhibit 1 and/or 6 Intervenors)
So what has been a vague identity of the
land subjected to the lien or gravamen in
favor of Tomas Marcos as recorded, has been made clear, specific, and definite
in the decision of the Cadastral Court (Exhibit 1 and/or 6-Intervenors) as to
be Lot No. 984 and no other else.
“As in the case of the plaintiffs-appellees
Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda,
there is no evidence of record of any claim of ownership or otherwise, either
by purchase or by any other means, of the intervenors-appellees
for and over Lot No. 985 or particularly the western portion thereof. It could not be said that the intervenors-appellees are the owners of the eastern
one-half portion of Lot No. 985, as the trial court erroneously declared, by
virtue of the recorded lien or gravamen in favor of Tomas Marcos (Exh. 1-Intervenors) who is their predecessor-in-interest
because such recorded lien or gravamen refers
to Lot No. 984 as found and declared by the Cadastral Court (Exhibit 1 and/or
6-Intervenors). Consequently, the herein intervenors-appellees
do not have any interest, ownership or otherwise, to and over the eastern
one-half portion of Lot No. 985.
“As has been correctly found by the trial court, ‘neither the
plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao
and Teresa Soriano, nor their predecessors-in-interest
Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda,
nor Victoria Pacula and Carolina Aggasid
had ever possessed Lot No. 985, and that said Lot No. 985 had always been in
the possession of Trinidad Agsunod and later on of
the defendants Alfonso Acedo and Esmeña
Ambros up to the present’ (Decision, Records, p. 29;
38-39). On the other hand, the evidence
of records shows that Carolina Aggasid, and later on,
her daughter Victoria Pacula, then later on the
vendees, the plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda,
and then lastly, the plaintiffs Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo Dumlao, have been in
possession successively of the western one-half portion of Lot No. 984; and
that similarly, Tomas Marcos, and later on his successors-in-interest the
herein intervenors-appellees have been in possession
successively of the eastern one-half portion of Lot No. 984 only. If the overt act of possession is a positive
way of asserting or exercising the right of ownership, then, we respectfully
submit, that Carolina Aggasid, and later on, Victoria
Pacula, and still later on, the plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo and
Rosita Rolluda asserted and/or exercised their right
of ownership over the western one-half portion of Lot No. 984 only; and Tomas
Marcos, then later, the intervenors-appellees
asserted and/or exercised their right of ownership of the eastern one-half
portion of Lot No. 984 only.
“As we have shown above that the plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo and
Rosita Rolluda, and the intervenors-appellees,
have no interest, ownership or otherwise, to and over Lot No. 985, the trial
court, therefore, has flagrantly committed the second error assigned.”
The net result is that
whereas, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the latter impliedly,
both found that what was actually sold by Aggasid to
Tomas Marcos was one-half of Lot 984 and one-half of Lot 985, what was claimed
by Aggasid in the cadastral proceedings and actually
adjudicated to her by the cadastral court was Lot 984, said adjudication being made subject, as stated in the above
quotation from petitioners’ brief ‘desde luego al gravamen a favor de
Tomas Marcos, tal como aparece al respaldo de dicho titulo debidamente
inscrito en el Registro de
la Propiedad de esta Provincia” and Lot No. 985 was declared by the same
cadastral court to be land of the public domain. In other words, the cadastral court found
that what Aggasid sold to Tomas Marcos was only a
portion, if one-half, of Lot No. 984.
Indeed, the findings of the trial court as to the parts of the lands
here in question actually possessed respectively by the petitioners and
respondents, would seem to support such conclusion.
All these are, however, out of the question here. We have no
authority to modify the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals; much less may
we refer for any holding on any argument or statement of fact of petitioners
in their brief filed with said court. We
have brought out these matters only to explain and clarify the apparent
confusion arising from what appear to be inconsistent portions of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Besides, in
their brief, filed with this Court, petitioners expressly admit that in the
cadastral survey, the land covered by the free patent certificate of title No. R-827 “was broken … into
two lots, namely Lot 984 and Lot 985”.
With this admission, it is of
no consequence to petitioners how the lands herein involved are divided between
respondents-plaintiffs and respondents-intervenors,
there being no controversy as between them.
As far as
petitioners are concerned, since We are holding that the original patent
title of Aggasid must prevail over the later patent
and title issued in favor of Agsunod, they have no
interest nor right of any kind on said lands; they must surrender possession,
the possession of Lot 985, as directed by the Court of Appeals, the one-half
western portion thereof to plaintiffs-respondents and the other eastern half to
the intervenors-respondents. How these respondents
will subsequently adjust the partition of the whole land previously covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 to reconcile with Aggasid’s
claim over Lot 984 in the
cadastral court, thus implying that the portion she had sold to Tomas Marcos
was Lot 985, is a problem
exclusively for respondents to settle
among themselves. As the record
before Us stands, We cannot make any specific pronouncements on the matter.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We have no alternative but
to affirm, as We do affirm, the
decision of the Court of Appeals as is,
with costs against petitioners.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Villamor, J., on leave.
[1] Ramoso v. Obligado, et
al., 70 Phil. 86; See also Pamintuan v. San
Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga,
60 Phil. 17; Republic v. Carle, et al., G. R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959; Samonte
et al. v. Descallar, et al., G. R. No.
L-12964, Feb. 29, 1960;
Duran v. Olivia, L-16589, Sept.
29, 1961.
[2]
De Villa v. Trinidad, G. R. No. L-24918, March 20, 1968; Gatioan
v. Gaffud, et al., G. R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969.