NATY BALIAZAR, ET AL., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEES, VS. SILVINA CARIDAD, ET AL., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANTS.

Appeal against an
order, issued by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Horte, in its
Cadastral Case No. 54, GLRO Cad. Case No. 1222, compelling respondents
Silvina Caridad and Eduarda Caridad to remove their respective houses
built on the southern portion of Lot No. 8864 within thirty days from
receipt of said order, Respondents originally interposed the present
appeal to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as its CA-G. R.
No. 31289-R. The appellate court, however, certified the appeal to this
Court for raising only questions of law.

The facts are not in dispute, and are as follows:

In
the cadastral proceeding above stated, the trial court rendered
decision, dated January 23, 1941, awarding said Lot No. 8864 of the
Laoag (Ilocos Norte) cadastre to the spouses Julio Baltazar and
Constancia Valencia as their conjugal partnership property. Said
decision having become final, the corresponding decree was issued on
July 12, 1941, and pursuant thereto, said lot was registered in the
names of applicant spouses under Original Certificate of Title No.
O-1445, which was later transcribed, on November 5, 1959, in the office
of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte.

In the meanwhile,
Julio Baltazar, the registered owner of said Lot No. 8864, died. On
December 6, 1961, his surviving wife and children, as petitioners,
filed a motion, in the cadastral case, praying for writ of possession
against respondents Silvina Caridad and her daughter, Eduarda Carldad,
who had been in possession of the southern portion of said Lot No. 8864
since 1939, while the cadastral case involving said lot was pending
before the trial court, and before the decision was rendered and the
corresponding decree issued in 1941.

No writ having
theretofore been issued in petitioners’ favor, the trial court issued
an order, on December 11, 1961, granting petitioners’ motion, and
overruled respondents’ opposition but directed the shariff not to
remove or destroy the permanent improvements on the lot without an
express command. On January 2, 1962, the order having become final, the
sheriff enforced the writ and placed petitioners in possession of the
southern portion of the lot.

On January 23, 1962, petitioners
presented a motion to compel respondents Eduarda Caridad and her
mother, Silvina Caridad, to remove their respective houses which they
built in 1958 and 1959, respectively, In the southern portion of the
disputed lot, and, in the event of their failure to do so, to order the
sheriff to demolish the same. Respondents again opposed said motion.

On
March 20, 1962, the trial court, after due hearing, granted
petitioners’ motion, ordering respondents to remove their respective
houses from the southern portion of said lot No. 8864 within thirty
days from receipt of said order. Not satisfied, respondents appealed.

Respondents-appellants
question the power or jurisdiction of the trial court, sitting as a
cadastral court, to order the removal of their respective houses which
were built in the disputed lot long after the Issuance of the final
decree of registration. They insist that they are builders in good
faith of the houses in question, and, as such, they are accorded rights
under Article 448 of the new Civil Code, which rights cause a conflict
to arise between petitioners, as registered owners, on the one hand,
and respondents, as builders In good faith, on the other; that this
conflict Is a new matter which the cadastral court could not have
possibly passed upon in 1941 when it rendered its decision awarding the
disputed lot to Julio Baltazar, the predecessor-in-interest of
petitioners. Respondents also insist that the determination or
settlement of this controversy is cognizable only by a court exercising
general jurisdiction, and that the only remedy available to petitioners
is to file an ordinary action for ejectment or recovery of possession
against them. Respondents further urged that this remedy is rendered
unnecessary in view of the pendency of an action for reconveyance over
the disputed portion of said Lot No. 8864, which respondents filed
against petitioners in the same court and docketed (but after the writ
of possession had been asked) as its Civil Case No. 3451, and wherein
the respective rights, interests and title of the parties will
ultimately be ventilated.

The above contentions of
respondents are without merit. It is to be noted that respondents do
not dispute that during the pendency of the cadastral proceeding,
rendition of the judgment awarding said Lot No. 8864, and consequent
issuance of the final decree of registration of the same in favor of
Julio Baltazar, the late Andres CarIdad, his surviving spouse,
respondent Silvina Caridad, and their children, one of whom is
respondent Eduarda Caridad, were in possession of the southern portion
of the disputed lot; and that respondent Eduarda Caridad claims right
and title thereto as a mere heir and successor-in-interest of said
Andres Caridad. Neither do respondents dispute the propriety and
validity of the order of the cadastral court, granting the writ of
possession in favor of petitioners as well as its enforcement. Under
these circumstances, we hold that the order, dated March 20, 1962, of
the cadastral court, granting petitioners’ motion to compel respondents
to remove their respective houses from the disputed lot, is valid and
enforceable against respondents. In the case of Marcelo vs.
Mencias, etc., et al., L-15609, April 29, 1960, 58 0ff. Gaz. 3349, this
Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or authority of the court of
first instance, sitting as a land registration court, to order, as a
consequence of the writ of possession issued by it, the demolition of
improvements introduced by the successor-in-interest of a defeated
oppositor in the land registration case. Thus, in the foregoing cited
case, Mr, Justice Jesus G. Barrera, speaking for the Court, opined:

“It
is contended that respondent Judge erred in denying the petition for
demolition. To this we agree. Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, provides:

‘SEC. 13. How execution for the delivery or restitution of property enforced.—
The officer must enforce an execution for the delivery or restitution
of property by placing the plaintiff in possession of such property,
and by levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the property of
the judgment debtor as will satisfy the amount of costs, damages,
rents, and profits included in the execution. However, the officer
shall not destroy, demolish or remove the improvements made by the
defendant or his agent on the property, except by special order of the
court, which order may only issue upon petition of the plaintiff after
due hearing and upon the defendant’s failure to remove the improvements
within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court.’

“Respondent Judge is of the view that the above quoted provision of
the Rules of Court applies only to ordinary actions involving the
delivery or restitution of property, and not to proceedings under the
land registration law which, according to him, is silent on the point.
The view is not correct, for the reason that the provisions of the
Rules of Court are applicable to land registration cases in a
suppletory character (Rule 132). Put differently, if the writ of
possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the
delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein
(Demorar vs. Iba&ez, 51 0ff. Gaz. 2872, Fasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil. 391; Manlapas vs.
Llorente, 48 Phil. 298), a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue,
especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the
former which without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective.

“Apparently, respondent Judge, in refusing to issue the writ of
demolition to petitioner, was of the belief that the latter has another
remedy, namely, by resorting to ordinary civil actions in the regular
courts, such as that of forcible entry and detainer, or the recovery of
possession, in which instances, said courts would then be competent to
issue said writ. Such a situation, in our opinion, could not have been
intended by the law. To require a successful litigant in a land
registration case to institute another action for the purpose of
obtaining possession of the land adjudged to him,would be a cumbersome
process. It would foster unnecessary and expensive litigations and
result in multiplicity of suits, which our judicial system abhors. In
this connection, this Court on one occasion, said:

‘But this construction of the law entirely defeats its
purpose. It would compel a successful litigant in the Court of Land
Registration to commence other actions in other courts for the purpose
of securing fruits of his victory. The evident purpose of the law was
to prevent that very thing; ***” (Pasay Estates Co. vs. Del Rosario, et al., supra)

“Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 124, of the Rules of Court states that –

‘When by law jurisdiction Is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
most conformable to the spirit of said rules.’

“As already stated, provisions of the Rules of Court are applicable
to land registration cases in a suppletory character. Pursuant to the
provision just quoted, respondent Judge has the power to issue all
auxiliary writs, including the writ of demolition sought by petitioner,
processes and other means necessary to carry into effect the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law in land registration cases to
issue a writ of possession to the successful litigant, the petitioner
herein.

“Lastly, in the case of Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333, we
pointed out that ‘Independent of any statutory provision,*** every
court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.’ In
line with this doctrine, it may be stated that respondent Judge, in the
instant case, has the inherent power to issue the writ of demolition
demanded by petitioner. Needless to say, its issuance is reasonably
necessary to do justice to petitioner who is being deprived of the
possession of the lots in question, by reason of the continued refusal
of respondent Clemente Fagsisihan to remove his house thereon and
restore possession of the premises to petitioner.”

We
believe the above-quoted ruling aptly answers the arguments of
respondents-appellants, the same having practically identical sets of
facts obtaining in the case at bar.

Appellants can not be regarded as builders in good faith
because they are bound by the 1941 decree of registration that
obligated their parents and predecessors-in-interest. Good faith must
rest on a colorable right in the builder, beyond a mere stubbornn
belief in one’s title despite judicial adjudication. The fact that in
1959 appellants demolished and replaced their old house with new and
bigger ones can not enervate the rights of the registered owners.
Otherwise, the rights of the latter to enjoy full possession of their
registered property could be indefinitely defeated by an unsuccessful
opponent through the simple subterfuge of replacing his old house with
a new one from time to time.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order should be, as it is hereby, affirmed. With costs against respondents-appellants.

Concepcion, C. J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.