G. R. No. L-23445. June 23, 1966
REMEDIOS NUGUID, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT VS. FELIX NUGUID AND PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.
SANCHEZ, J.:
30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga
Nuguid, and 6 brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico,
Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed
by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her
demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and
that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the
legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered
their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia,
is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal
heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs of the
deceased in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and
that in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29,
1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and
objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner
registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss. The court’s order
of November 8, 1963, held that “the will in question is a complete
nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid” and dismissed the petition without costs. A
motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to
this Court on appeal.
- Right
at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case
is for the probate of a will. The court’s area of inquiry is limited –
to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity
of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary
capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law
prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted
upon, by the court. Said court – at this stage of the proceedings – is
not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.[1]
A
peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside
the question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For
them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will.
Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated.[2]
But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal,
travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a
nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for
probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this
litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on
the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are
the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might
as well meet head-on the issue of the nullity of the provisions of the
will in question.[3] After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
- Petitioner’s
sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion
below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study
of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
“Nov. 17, 1951
I,
ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and
bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved
sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In
witness .whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November,
nineteen hundred and fifty-one.(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUOUID”
The statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
“Art.
854. The preteritlon or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious, ***”
Except for inconsequential
variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of
the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus
–
“Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the
forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at tbe time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments[4] shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious, ***”
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
“La
pretericion consists en omitir al heredero- en el testamento. 0 no se
le nombra siquiera, o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le
instituye heradero ni se le deshereda expresamente, ni se le asigna
parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un raodo tacito de su
derecho a legitima.Para que exista pretericitfn, con
arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el tastador a
uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponds la
herencia forssosa. Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un
heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero
forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.”[5]
It may now appear trite but nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear
perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut
definition of the word annul:
“To ‘annul’ means to abrogate, to make vouid; In re Morrow’s Estate, 54 A. 342, 204 Pa. 484.”[6]
“The
word ‘annul’ as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony
provisions of divorce decree upon wife’s remarriage means to reduce to
nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 – 38 (now
N.J.S.2A:34-25). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A.2d 611, 614, 136.N.J. Eq. 132.”[7]“ANNUL.
To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to aboli3h; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123
W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.”[8]
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid
left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced
heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, now oppositors Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of
them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were
deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited.
This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of
Manresa “anulara siempre la institucioin de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamlento”, referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.[9]
The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal
heir – nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein
provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is
complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
“En cuanto a la institucitin de heredero, se anula.
Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se anade
limitacion alguna, como en el artfculo 851, en el que se expresa que se
anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto perjudique a la legitlma
del desheredado. Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacio’n es completa o
total, y que este artlculo como especial en el caso que le motiva. rige
con preferencia al 817.” [10]
The same view is expressed by Sanchoz Roman:-
“La
eonsecuencfa de la anulacifn 6 nulidad de- la institucidn de heredero
por pretericlin de uno, varios 6 todos los forzosos en linea recta, es
la apertura de la sucesidn intestada, total 6 parcial. SerA
total, cuando el testador que comets la pretericiin, hubiere dispuesto
de todos los bienes por tltulo universal de herencia en favor de los
herederos institucion, cuya instituclon se anula, porque asi lo exige
la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determiner, como
efecto de la preterici6n, el de que ¦anularA la institucion de
heredero’.***”[11]
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is
no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner
to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will.
Because, the nul- lification of such institution of universal heir –
without any other testamentary disposition in the will – amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in
clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the
roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, S&nchez RomSn cites
the “Memoria annual del Tribunal Supremo, correspondiente a 1908”,
which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
“***
El art. 814, que preceptiia en tales casos de preterici6n la nulidad de
la institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna
favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto, aun
cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas 6 menos equitativa,
porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el
hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo, por lo tanto, procederse
sobre tal base 6 supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde
falte la institucion, es obllgado llamar a los herederos forzosos en
todo caso, como habrfa que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el
testador no hubiese distribufdo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo
tanto mas obllgada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de
testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia. con
repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si
esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha
exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituirfa una
interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como
legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de
que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando
asi fuese, sera esto razdn para modificar la ley, pero que no autoriza
a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que
informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en
el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay raz6n para convertir este
juicio en regla de interpretaci6n, desvirtuando y anulando por este
procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer.”[12]
- We
should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that,
annulment notwithstanding, “the devisees and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious”. Legacies and devises merit
consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will.
Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a
universal heir in a will – void because of preterition – would give the
heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is
inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and
separate from the nullified institution of heir, Sanchez Roman,
speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states
that preterition annuls the institution of the heir “totalmente por la
pretericion”; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests), “pero
subsistiendo, x x x todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se
refieren a la institucidn de heredero ***”.[13]
As Manreea puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the
entire inheritance including “la porcion libre (que) no hubiese
dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacidn.”[14]
As
aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the
institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by
itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues,
- Petitioner’s mainstay is that the present is “a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition”.[15]
From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 “does not
apply to the case at bar”. This argument fails to appreciate the
distinction between preterition and disinheritance.
Preterltlon
“consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited.” [16] Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.”[17]
In Manresa’s own words: “La privaciin expresa de la legitima constituye
la desheredacio’n. La privacio’n tacita de la misma se denomina
pretericion.’[18] Sanchez
Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance “es
siempre Yoluntarla”: preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to
be “involuntaria”.[19] Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself.[20]
The
will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s parents, the
forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather
than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the
said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this
is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally
different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854
of the Civil Code, we repeat, “shall annul the institution of heir”.
This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies.
In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also “annul the institution of heirs,” but only
“insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited”, which last
phrase was omitted in the ease of preterition.[21] Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited
to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been
illegally deprived. Manresa’s expressive language, in commenting on the
rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one
hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: “Preteridos, adquieren el derecho a todo; deshereda dos, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos teroios,[22] segun el caso.”[23]
- Petitioner
insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are
entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir
“is not invalidated,” although the inheritance of the heir so
instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.[24]
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Koran in the Nerl case heretofore cited, viz:
“But
the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in
favor of the children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora
and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced.
This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of
articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of
heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments
reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of articles 814
and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would be
absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And
the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the
reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage
because they would be absorbed by article 817. Thus, instead of
construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil
Code.The destructive effect of the theory thus
advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs
from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision.
With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to
the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution
of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from
legacies or betterment. And they are separate and distinct not only
because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but
because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a
bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. legacy
refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special
title. *** But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a
legacy,”[25]
The
disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question “a complete
nullity”. Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies “the
institution of heir.” Considering, however, that the will before us
solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir,
and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
[1] Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428; Pimentel vs. Palanca, etc., et al., 5 Phil. 436, 440-441; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil. 393, 394-395; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679; Riera vs. Palmaroli, et al., 40 Phil. 105, 116; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 174; Palacios vs. Palacios, 58 0ff. Gaz., No. 2, 220, 221; Teotico vs. del Val, etc., 1-18753, March 26, 1965.
[2] Section 13, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
[3] Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al., vs Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522.
[4] Betterments are eliminated in the present Civil Code. II Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, p. 1077.
[5] VI Manresa, Comentarios al Co’digo Civil Espafiol, 7th Edition, (1951) p. 424.
[6] Words & Phrases, Vol. 3A, Permanent Ed., p. 3.
[7] Id., p. 4.
[8] Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 117.
[9] Manresa, id., p. 426.
[10] Manresa, id., pp. 43
[11] VI Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil, 2nd Edition, Volume 2, p. 1140.
[12]
VI Sanchez Roman, id., p. 1138. This is also cited in the Neri case,
74″ Phil. pp. 192-193. Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Judge R.C. Puno, in
their work entitled “An Outline of Philippine Civil Law”, 1956 ed.,
Vol. III, p. 8, citing Herreros vs.
Gil, L-3362, March 1, 1951, likewise opined that “the right to make a
will is statutory, not a natural right, and must be subordinate to law
and public policy.”
[13] Sanchez Roman, id., p, 1141.
[14] Manresa, id., p. 434,
[15] Petitioner’s brief, p. 15.
[16] Neri, et al., vs. Akutin, et al., supra. 72 Phil., at p. 325.
[17] Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Judge R.C. Puno, id., p. 106.
[18] Kanresa, id., p. 424. Justice Reyes and Judge Puno, ibid.,
107, speaking of the requisites of a valid disinheritance, confirm: the
theory that disinheritance “must be express (not implied) (Art. 918);
otherwise there is preterition”.
[19] Sanchez Roman, id., p. 1131.
[20] Arts. 915, 916,”Civil Code; II Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, pp. 750-752.
[21] III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172.
[22] Now, one-half, Articles 888 and 889, Civil Code.
[23] Manresa, id., p. 430.
[24] Petitioners brief, p. 13.
[25] Neri, et al., vs.
Akutin, et al., 74 Phil. pp. 191-192. Articles. 817 and 851, Civil Code
of Spain of 1889, referred to in the opinion above, are now arts. 907
and 918 of the present Civil Code.