G.R. No. L-22621. September 29, 1967
JOSE MARIA RAMIIREZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, RITA D. RAMIREZ, BELEN T. RAMIREZ, DAVID MARGOLIES, MANUEL UY & SONS, INC., BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, …
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by the defendants from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
Plaintiff, Jose Maria Ramirez, brought this action[1]
against defendants Jose Eugenio Ramirez, Rita D.
Ramirez, Belen T. Ramirez, David Margolies, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., the Estate of the late Jose Vivencio Ramirez, represented by its judicial administrator,
the Bank of the Philippine Islands, and Angela M. Butte – hereinafter referred
to collectively as defendants – for the partition of a parcel of land situated
at the Northwestern corner of Escolta street and
Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila – otherwise known as Lot 1 of Block 2120 of the
Cadastral Survey of Manila and more particularly described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 53946 of the Register of Deeds for said City – and
belonging pro indiviso to both parties,
one sixth (1/6) to the plaintiff and five-sixths (5/6) to the defendants.
Manuel Uy & Sons expressed its
conformity to the partition, “if the same can be done without great
prejudice to the interests of the parties.” Defendant Butte
agreed to the partition prayed for. The
other defendants objected to the physical partition of the property in
question, upon the theory that said partition is “materially and
legally” impossible and “would work great harm and prejudice to the
co-owners.” By agreement of the parties the lower Court referred the matter
to Commission completed of:
(1) Dellin Gawaran,
Deputy Clerk of said court, as Chairman,
(2) Artemio U. Valencia,
President of the Manila Board of Realtors as commissioner for plaintiff, and
(3) Ramon F. Cuervo, President of the Perpetual Investment Corporation,
Inc., as commissioner for defendants,
to determine
whether the property is susceptible of partition, and submit a plan therefor, if feasible, as well as to report thereon. Subsequently, the commissioners submitted
their individual reports with their respective plans for the segregation of
plaintiff’s share.
After due hearing, the Court rendered a decision declaring that
plaintiff is entitled to the segregation of his share, and directing that the
property be partitioned in accordance with the plan submitted by commissioner
Valencia, and that the expenses incident thereto be paid by both parties proportionately. Hence, this appeal by the
defendants, except Mrs. Butte.
Appellants maintain that the lower court has erred: 1) in holding that
said property is legally susceptible of physical division; 2) in accepting the
recommendation of commissioner Valencia, instead of that of commissioner Cuervo, or a proposal made by the very plaintiff; and 3) in
not ordering that the incidental expenses be borne exclusively by him.
We find no merit in the appeal.
With respect to the first alleged error, it is urged that a
physical division of the property will cause “inestimable damage” to
the interest of the co-owners. No
evidence, however, has been introduced, or sought to be introduced, in support
of this allegation. Moreover, the same
is predicated upon the assumption that a real estate suitable for commercial
purposes – such as the one herein sought to be partitioned – is likely to
suffer a proportionately great diminution in value when its area becomes too
small. But, then, if plaintiff’s share
of 260.26 square meters were segregated from the property in question, there
would still remain a lot of 1,301.34 square meters for appellants herein and Mrs.
Butte. A real estate of this size, in
the very heart of Manila, is not,
however inconsequential, in comparison to that of the present property of the
community. In other words, we do not
believe that its value would be impaired, on account of the segregation of
plaintiff’s share, to such an extent as to warrant the conclusion that the
property is indivisible.
Appellants argue that, instead of making the aforementioned
segregation, plaintiff’s share should be sold to them. In support of this pretense, they cite the
provision of Article 495 of our Civil Code, to the effect that:
“x x x
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot
demand a physical division of the thing owned in common, when to do so would
render it unserviceable for the use for
which it is intended. But the
co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with article 498.”
They apparently assume, once again, that the alleged
“inestimable damage” to be suffered by the property, if plaintiff’s
share were segregated, is equivalent to rendering it “unserviceable for
the use for which it is intended.” independently of the fact that the
minor premise of this syllogism – the alleged “inestimable damage” –
has not been established, the conclusion drawn by appellants does not follow
necessarily. Indeed, the record shows
that there are two (2) buildings on land in question, namely: 1) a two-storey
commercial building – known as “Sta. Cruz Building” – abutting, on
the one (1) side,2 on the Escolta,
and, on the other,3 on Plaza Santa Cruz; and 2) a
small two-storey residential building, on the Northwestern end of the lot, and
behind the first building, adjoining the Estero de la
Reina, which constitutes the Southwestern boundary
of the property. There is nothing to shown that, after segregating plaintiff’s share, the
buildings left on the remaining 1,301.34 square meters, representing defendants’ share, would be unserviceable,
either for commercial or for residential purposes. On the contrary, it seems obvious that plaintiff
would not insist upon the partition prayed for, if his share4 where
unserviceable for either – particularly the commercial – purpose. In fact, every one of the
aforementioned commissioners, including the one representing defendants
herein, recommended the segregation of plaintiff’s share. The commissioners merely failed to agree on
the precise configuration thereof.
This brings us to the second issue raised by appellants: whether
the lower court should have adopted the plan submitted by their own
commissioner, or “in not taking into consideration,” at least, a
proposal made by plaintiff herein. In
this connection, it appears that
said commissioner5 recommended that plaintiff’s share be given a frontage
of 6.14 lineal meters at Plaza Sta. Cruz, whereas the commissioner for the
Court,6 favored a frontage of 12.66 square meters at said
Plaza; that defendants’ main objection to the plan recommended by commissioner
Valencia7 and adopted by the lower court, is that it left, behind
the portion awarded to plaintiff, a lot of 169 square meters, which would have
to be divided among the defendants, should they later wish to have their
individual shares segregated; and that, in order to offset this objection,
plaintiff had expressed – in one of the pre-trials held in the lower court and
in order to “facilitate early termination” of the case – the
willingness “to buy from the other co-owner
the remaining portion of the land behind his lot at P1,000 per square meters.”
The record does not show that this offer of the plaintiff had not
been “taken into consideration” by the lower court. Moreover, defendants had not accepted
it. And neither do they accept it
now, for they would want the plaintiff to pay a price higher than that offered
by him. Upon the other hand, the
disadvantage resulting to the defendants from the existence of said lot of 169
square meters, behind that awarded to the plaintiff, is offset by the fact
that the remaining portion of the land in question – representing defendants’
collective shares – has, in addition to a frontage of around 40 meters
on Plaza Santa Cruz, a frontage of 24.13 meters on Escolta
Street, which apart from being, admittedly, the most valuable one,
is totally denied to the plaintiff, Then, again the Cuervo
plan giving plaintiff a 6.14 meters frontage at Plaza Sta. Cruz, goes all the
way down to the Western of the property, the Estero
de la Reina, and would require a partition of the
residential building, on that part of the property in question, which the very
plaintiff says is indivisible, because it would render said building
“unserviceable for the purpose for which it is intended.”8
As regards the last alleged error, it is obvious that the
segregation of plaintiff’s share inures to the benefit, not only of the plaintiff,
but, also, of the defendants, and that both should, consequently, defray the
incidental expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against herein defendants-appellants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., on leave.
[1]
Belen T. Ramirez was originally one of the plaintiffs, but she later withdrew as such.
2
The South.
3
The East.
4
Of 260.26 square meters.
5
Mr. Cuervo, representing
defendants.
6
Deputy Clerk of Court of Gawaran.
7
Representing the plaintiff.
8
Deputy Clerk Gawaran’s plan is more objectionable to
the defendants, not only because it gives plaintiff a bigger frontage of 12.66
meters at Plaza Santa Cruz, but, also, because it leaves a bigger backyard
lot, of 225 square meters, on the side adjoining the Estero
de la Reina, without access to any street.