G.R. No. L-22096. September 29, 1967
TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND ILDEFONSO ALVAREZ, RESPONDENTS.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari by the Talisay-Silay
Milling Co., Inc. from the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
rendered on August 16, 1963 in case R07-46801[1]
and affirmed by the Commission en banc on October 8, 1963,
ordering the company
“1. To pay the
claimant, through this Office, in lump sum the amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED NINETY FIVE AND 69/100 (P1,395.69) as compensation;
“2. To pay the claimant the amount of SIX HUNDRED
TWENTY-ONE and 85/100 (P621.85) as reimbursement of medical expenses; and
“3. To
pay to the Workmen’s Compensation Fund the amount of FOURTEEN PESOS (P14.00) as
fees, pursuant to Section 55 of the Act.
On November
23, 1953 the claimant Ildefonso
Alvarez, paymaster of the petitioner, after he had paid the wages of
some of the laborers of the petitioner, was ordered by the latter to cease work
and go home because of an approaching typhoon.
A passenger bus brought him to Bacolod City, where he boarded a pick-up truck of the petitioner
which proceeded to Bago, Negros
Occidental, his hometown. At Kilometer
17 in barrio Calumangan, the vehicle met with an
accident, resulting in death to three of its passengers and physical injuries
to four others, among them the respondent.
The latter was confined at the Negros Occidental Provincial Hospital for twenty-one days. After his discharge from them hospital, his
injuries took three more months to heal.
He was thereafter never re-employed.
The issues tendered for resolution are (1) whether the WCC erred
in holding that the respondent’s injuries arose “out of and in the course of employment[2] within the meaning and intendment of
section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, and (2) whether the
petitioner failed to controvert the claim for compensation.
It is undisputed that the
petitioner furnished its employees free transportation from its central
to Bacolod City
and from Bacolod
City to the central, and that the
pick-up truck that figured in the accident was assigned for such purpose.
The petitioner contends, however, that the injuries sustained by the
respondent are not compensable as they did not arise out of and in the course
of employment, because the trip to Bago was made
without the “knowledge and consent”
of its resident manager, Mariano Castañeda, or
his duly authorized representative, Roque Torres, chief of security guards and
superintendent of transportation; and that, therefore, the respondent took the
ride at his own risk, and, like a “hitch-hiker”, should suffer the
consequences of the travel.
This contention is
untenable. Castañeda’s
testimony that the respondent did not ask him permission to use the vehicle for
the trip to Bago does not belie the respondent’s
claim that he “asked permission
from Mr. Torres * * * for the use of the pick-up truck from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., to the municipality of Bago,
Negros Occidental, which request
was granted him by Mr. Torres“.[3] True it is that Torres declared that “there was no pass”
or written permission given for that trip, but this witness never
denied categorically that the respondent orally asked his permission for the
use of the vehicle for the trip, or that he orally ‘”granted” the
request. Absent such categorical denial,
the reasonable inference can be made that such request was indeed made and that
he, as superintendent of the petitioner’s transportation department, granted it
orally.
This Court has in the
past refused to reverse or modify the findings of fact of the WCC on the
ground, here relied upon, that there was testimonial evidence on record
contrary to the findings of the WCC.[4] And there is at all no showing that the findings of the
WCC, more particularly the finding that the trip was with the petitioner’s
“knowledge and consent”, find “absolutely no support in the
evidence op record”, or are “unsupported by substantial evidence.”[5] Upon the contrary, findings of the
WCC are based not merely upon the respondent’s oral testimony, but also upon
“factors and circumstances brought out during the hearing of the
case”. Thus, the WCC correctly
observed that
“Aside from the claimant who lived in Bago, three other passengers of said truck, who were also
employees of respondent company, resided in said municipality. From this and from the fact that the
respondent declared an emergency because of the coming storm and had to send
its employees home, the most logical conclusion that can be drawn is that said
trip to Bago was with the knowledge and consent of
the respondent [petitioner
herein], as had been previously done during an emergency or when employees
rendered overtime work.”
It is of no moment that the trip to Bago, Negros Occidental, was
beyond the customary perimeter of travel,
for the extended trip was made with the acquiescence of no less than the petitioner’s superintendent of
transportation. Injuries sustained by a workmen when he is
provided with transportation while going to or coming from his work have been considered as arising out of
and in the course of his employment,
“when such transportation is
the result of an ‘express agreement’ between the employer and his workman, or
when it has ripened into a ‘custom’ to the extent and it is ‘incidental to,’
and ‘part of’, the ‘contract of employment,’ or when it is with the
‘knowledge and acquiescence of the
employer,’ or when it is the result
of a ‘continued practice’ in the ‘course of the employer’s business’ and which
practice ‘beneficial to both employer and employee.'”[6]
The petitioner further
contends that the WCC erred holding that it failed to make a timely controversion of the respondent’s claim for
compensation. The petitioner admittedly
failed to file on time its Controverting Claim for
Compensation (Form No. 6, exh. 1) and its Employer’s Supplementary Report
of Accident or Sickness (Form No. 5,
exh. 2). It nonetheless argues that the time requirement of the law regarding the
filing of the controversion is not “strictly
mandatory”, considering that the rules of the WCC should be
“liberally construed in order to promote and attain their objection assist
the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their case”[7] that the fact that the hearing officer allowed the petitioner to adduce
evidence resisting the
respondent’s claim shows that
such claim was “never treated as an uncontroverted
or uncontested case”; and that the respondent’s failure to have the
petitioner declared in default and to object to the presentation of its
evidence “had the legal consequence
of reinstating to the petitioner
its right to controvert”.
This
contention is without merit. Having
failed to file its controversion on time, the
petitioner thereby waived or renounced “by operation of law” its
right to question the validity
or reasonableness of the respondent’s claim for compensation. [8]
And this “statutory renunciation” was not voided by the fact that the hearing officer never treated the case as uncontroverted or uncontested. Nowhere case ipso facto reinstated because of the respondent’s failure to have the petitioner declared in default or to object to the
presentation of its evidence. For to effect a reinstatement of its right to
controvert, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to submit reasonable grounds on the basis of which his right to controvert might be reinstated. The petitioner’s
honest assumption that controversion was
superfluous and unnecessary as “the respondent’s claim for compensation was filed out of time”, is not one of
the “reasonable grounds,” contemplated
by the applicable provision of law.
We have repeatedly held that the requirement prescribed
in section 24 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended may
be dispensed with, where, as in
this case the record indubitably shows that the petitioner had knowledge of the accident that resulted in physical injuries to the respondent
and that no prejudice was caused to the employer by the delay in the filing of the claim for compensation.[9]
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed in toto, at petitioner’s cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, and Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles and Fernando JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., no part.
[1]
“ILDEFONS0 ALVAREZ, Claimant, versus TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., Respondent”.
[2]
The words ‘arising out of’ refer to the
origin or cause of the accident
and are descriptive of its character,
while the words ‘in the course
of’ refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes
place.” (Amado vs. Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc., 95 Phil. 33, 36.)
[3]
P. 36, Record.
[4]
Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Consulto,
G.R. No. L-12726, May 20,1960
Davao Gulf Lumber Corp. vs..Del
Rosario, G.R. No. L-15978, Dec. 29,
1960.
[5]
Rio y Compania vs. WCC, et al, G.R. No. L-21647, Aug. 30 1967 and the cases cited therein.
[6]
Micieli vs. Erie R. Co. (New Jersey) (1943), 33 A.2d 586, 589, cited in In Re Jensen (1947), 178 P.2d 897, 902-903. (emphasis supplied)
[7]
Sec. 2, Rule 1, Rules of the WCC.
[8]
See Note 5; Tan Lim Te vs. WCC, et al., G.R. No. L-12324,
Aug. 30, 1958; Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs.
WCC, et al., G.R. No. L-10553, May 13, 1957.
[9]
Rio y Compania vs. WCC, et al, supra,
and case therein cited.